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Understanding the Turkish foreign policy has become even more important in 
recent years given the developments surrounding the country.  Furthermore, the last 
decade witnessed a radical change in the Turkish foreign policy making under the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP). 
This dissertation aims to explain the nature of this change based on the 
application of the Policy Paradigms Theory, comparing the components of the AKP 
foreign policy understanding with those of the Kemalist, the status que paradigm that 
defined the foreign policy making in Turkey well into the early 21st century. The 
application of the theory provides evidence, based on the changes in ideological, 
institutional and practical settings, that a paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy did 
indeed take place, but not in the manner of leaving the west in favor of the east but the 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Objectives and Significance of the Study 
The advent of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power by forming a 
super majority government in the Turkish Parliament in 2002 heralded far reaching 
implications not only for Turkey’s social, economic and cultural makeup but also in the 
country’s foreign policy. The foreign policy practices under the AKP coupled with the 
background and the pro-Islamic identity of the party brought about the oft asked 
question; “Is Turkey leaving its traditional westward foreign policy direction in favor of 
the East, creating a paradigm shift?” For example, the direction of Turkey’s foreign 
policy orientation became a source of contention when Turkey set out to improve its 
relations with the Bashir Regime in Sudan, openly siding with the Hamas Government in 
Gaza severing the relations with Israel, and fostering more resilient ties with Russia and 
China. Therefore, in this context, the question of a paradigm shift was merely posed 
based upon the foreign policy snapshots of the time, omitting the bigger picture. What is 
missing with this approach is that it fails to properly establish the concept of “paradigm” 
in policy making and what constitutes “shift”. 
By applying the policy paradigms theory with the focus of Peter Hall’s “Policy 
Paradigms, this research seeks to establish whether there is an actual paradigm shift in  




Turkey is leaving the West focusing on the East. Although predominantly applied to 
Economic policies, the major theoretical and methodological contribution of the 
dissertation is to set the groundwork for the application of the “Paradigm Shift” concept 
as applied to foreign policy. As part of comparative case study, process tracing and 
pattern matching techniques are employed. According to this, “process tracing focuses on 
the unfolding of events or situations over time…To characterize process, key steps in the 
process must be properly characterized.” 1 
In order to accomplish this objective, this dissertation compares the instrument 
settings, overall goals, instruments of policy and the ruling elite of the main paradigm, 
Kemalism, with those of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Furthermore, the 
periods of the former prime minister and the president of Turkey, Turgut Ozal (1983-
1993) and the former Prime Minister Necmeddin Erbakan (1996-1997) were also 
included in the comparative study as, like AKP, they too display signs of deviation from 
the Kemalist paradigm. Additionally, these two prominent figures, their ideology and 
their implemented policies culminated into the creation of those of the AKP.  
This dissertation also aims to contribute to the literature on the impact of domestic 
politics on foreign policy. A substantial part of this dissertation is devoted to evaluating 
Turkey’s social, economic and cultural evolution since its inception in 1923 and how the 
identity has had an impact on decision makers’ thinking, determining the priorities and 
the means of the Turkish foreign policy.   
                                                 




The main idea of this dissertation, such that it corresponds to Hall’s definition of a 
paradigm shift, is to examine if the AKP government has changed and reoriented the 
instrument settings, overall goals, and instruments of policy in Turkey turning it towards 
the East away from the West. The study has found that there is a paradigm shift. 
However, the findings disproved the supposition that Turkey is leaving the West and 
turning to the East as Turkey’s economic and political interaction with the West has 
increased under the AKP administration. Turkey’s increasing interaction with non-
Western actors does not in fact constitute a complete detaching from the West but is 
attributed to the nature of the emerging post-Cold War international environment. 
Turkey’s aspirations to be a regional power, as well as an important international actor is 
opting for more dynamic foreign relations, not leaving the West. It is just diversifying its 
foreign policy options to include the East. 
Finally, the research carries policy relevance. Due to its history, geography and culture, 
Turkey’s relations with state and non-state actors in a vast geography from Eurasia and 
Africa to North America, have important political, economic and cultural implications. 
Especially, in light of the current tumultuous situation in the Middle East, the Turkish-
American relations in this context, political and economic changes in the European Union 
and the recent resurgence of Russia in the Black Sea rim have made it more important to 
understand the dynamics and practices of the Turkish foreign policy as well as the 
thinking of the policy makers in Turkey. Therefore, this dissertation hopes to be a broad 
source of information for those scholars and individuals who are interested in Turkish 
foreign policy. Furthermore, considering that the internal socio/political evolution of and 




attention, this dissertation also endeavors to contribute to the literature providing relevant 
research information to understand the changes in Turkish domestic policy that brought 
about changes in Turkish Foreign policy development. 
1.2 The Outline of the Dissertation 
Chapter two establishes the theoretical framework on which this dissertation rests. 
Drawing from literature, it defines the concept of a policy paradigm, scrutinizing the 
conditions which bring about change in those paradigms as well as the nature of 
paradigmatic changes.  
Chapter three conceptualizes the Kemalist paradigm in Turkey. It starts with a 
comprehensive analysis of the events that took place in the late stages of the Ottoman 
Empire that culminated into the creation of the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal 
and the establishment of a new paradigm. The second part of the chapter comprises an in-
depth analysis of the ideological make-up of Kemalism, which has important implication 
for the domestic and foreign politics. The last part of the chapter explores the impact of 
the Kemalist ideology on the making of the Turkish foreign policy of the time referring to 
the cases that were reflective of the Kemalist worldview.  
Chapter four provides a comprehensive analysis of how the Kemalist paradigm 
created and consolidated its ruling elite through institutional means, especially the 
military and the civilian bureaucracy. This chapter includes the exploration of the 
transition to democracy in the late 1940s and 1950s. The results of the first democratic 
elections of 1950 has had profound impact on the relations between the existing Kemalist 
ruling elite and the new rising, more conservative elite, whose five decade long of 




to power. One of the most important parts of the chapter is the detailed examination of 
the praetorian Turkish Military, who has been considered to be the defender of the 
Kemalist values and the foundation of the republic. In this context, the means through 
which the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) established and maintained its privileged and 
sovereign status within the state bureaucracy as well as the methods it employed to 
control the civilian administrations based on Kemalist principles and the creation of a 
securitization culture by TAF are examined. I found that with the failure of the Kemalist 
civilian state machinery in 1950 to prevent the opposing entities from rising, the Kemalist 
elite began to rely heavily on the Turkish Military, part of the Kemalist elite itself, in the 
hopes of keeping such future challenges under control. Therefore, after the 1960 military 
coup, the Turkish military became the single most important Kemalist entity to navigate 
the civilian governments. Furthermore, this chapter provides an overarching inquiry of 
the military-civilian relations in Turkey and aims to contribute to the related literature. 
Chapters five and six are an in-depth exploration of the political movements that 
display features that fall outside of the Kemalist realm in Turkey. Also, these movements 
represent the rise of an alternative elite to that of Kemalism and they preceded the Justice 
and Development Party, ideologically, especially in foreign policy, inspiring it. In 
Chapter five, I scrutinized the Turgut Ozal Era (1983-1993). His period is relevant for 
this dissertation in that Ozal challenged the status-quo oriented, stagnant, isolationist, 
reactive orthodox Kemalist foreign policy tradition that persisted for decades in favor of a 
more pro-active as well as culture based foreign policy, which then was coined as “neo-
Ottomanism” since it aspired for Turkey to become a more dominant entity in the 




once was a dominant power. Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of the AKP foreign policy 
stated that Ozal inspired him greatly in his foreign policy making. Ozal overtly criticized 
the Kemalist bureaucracy and ideology for its insufficiency to meet Turkey’s growing 
demands in the post-Cold War era as well as the Kemalist demonization of the Ottoman 
past. He clearly shows his intention to revive Ottoman multi-culturalism, and the 
“glorious” days of that time.  
I heavily resorted to qualitative document analysis by examining Ozal’s speeches, 
related newspapers, parliamentary archives and documents. This chapter begins with 
examination of the social, political and economic conditions that brought Ozal to power.  
It scrutinizes his distinct personality and ideology that separated him from the 
mainstream Kemalist paradigm. The next part of the chapter examines the Ozalist foreign 
policy in action delving into the implications of the fall of the Soviet Union and how he 
perceived it as an opportunity to fulfill his foreign policy aspirations as well as promote 
his staunch pro-American stance during the Gulf War of 1991, which created friction 
with the Kemalist military and bureaucracy. In the end, I find that while Ozal’s ten year 
tenure, which ended abruptly upon his premature passing, display thoughts and practices 
that run counter to traditional Kemalist approach, it cannot be said that he ushered in a 
paradigm shift in Turkey for the very reason that the institutional, bureaucratic and 
ideological fabric of the Kemalist paradigm remained intact despite Ozal’s efforts to 
challenge them.  
The sixth chapter dwells on Erbakan and his “Just Order Movement”. The 
Erbakan movement represents the fruition of political Islam, the major blatant challenge 




dissertation. Furthermore, the rise of political Islam epitomizes the demographic shift in 
the form of a more Islamized population as well as the intensification of the identity 
politics, which also has important implications for foreign policy. Finally, understanding 
the movement is significant since the founders of the AKP are the former members of the 
Erbakanist movement, who broke apart from it after the 1997 military ousting of 
Erbakan, establishing the reform movement in Turkish political Islam.  
The beginning of the sixth chapter offers a comprehensive explanation of the 
nature and the rise of political Islam in Turkey. This is followed by the analysis of the 
application of the Erbakanist ideology in Turkish foreign policy. While the Erbakan Era 
Turkish foreign policy displayed activism as well as neo-Ottomanist elements, its heavy 
reliance on pan-Islamic principles, limited the foreign policy priorities of the Erbakan 
government to the Islamic world.  The forcible overthrow of the Erbakan government by 
the all-powerful Kemalist Turkish military demonstrated that the short lived Erbakan 
government failed to create a paradigm shift. 
The final and the seventh chapter is the overarching examination of the AKP 
government. The first part of the chapter is divided into three parts; the examination of 
the process that led to the inception of the AKP, as well as an in-depth analysis of the 
ideological composition of the party  and the subsequent successful ascent to power by 
forming single party government in the parliament; the power struggle with the Kemalist 
establishment, especially with the military and finally the consolidation of power, in 
which the AKP government managed to subdue the military and took over the Kemalist 
bureaucracy. The second part of the chapter seven is devoted to theoretical and operative 




of case analyses. Additionally, export and import figures between 1994 and 2013, are 
charted in order to determine whether there is a change of direction in Turkey’s economic 
policy vis-à-vis its immediate neighborhood. The final section of Chapter seven contains 
the comparative analysis of the institutional makeup of the foreign ministry under the   
AKP government with that of the pre-AKP era.  
The eighth chapter concludes the dissertation by providing a comprehensive 





CHAPTER 2. PARADIGM SHIFT CONCEPT IN THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
 The importance of using the policy paradigm concept has been proven significant 
in evaluating and understanding the interplay between the ideas, organizations and related 
actors who are involved in political and organizational process. According to Marcus 
Carson et al. the policy paradigm concept can be used to explain the key ingredients of 
paradigms, how they form, develop, institutionalize and de-institutionalize as well as how 
paradigm shifts occur.2 
Louis Moreno argues that overall, paradigms offer a novice means to gather 
scientific data, new problem solving techniques, and even enable us to find new solutions 
that existing paradigms fail to expound. Thanks to paradigms we are able to understand 
how important political and social actors behave when they attempt to solve important 
problems. He says, “Paradigms, value systems and réferentiels provide normative and 
cognitive elements, which shape principles and actions adopted by actors within the same 
frame.”3 
Policy paradigm, which Marcus Carson calls ‘a powerful, cognitive-normative 
concept’, allows us to theorize such aspects of policymaking as interests, goals and 
solutions. A policy paradigm is defined as a “generally coherent complex of assumptions 
                                                 
2 Marcus Carson, Tom R. Burns, Dolores Calvo eds. (2009) Paradigms in Public Policy: Theory and 
Practice of Paradigm Shifts in the EU. Peter Lang GmbH. 1st edition. pp.  11-12. 
3 Luis Moreno, “Europeanization, Decentralization and Welfare Reform” Paper presented at the 
International Conference: “Territorial Governance for the 21st Century”, Royal Flemish Academy of 




and principles, simplifying metaphors, and interpretive and explanatory discourses”. It 
represents a shared conceptual framework through which adherents envision "how things 
should be" and "how the world works", and with which they define the kinds of issues 
that should be considered social problems. This conceptual frame-work helps impose 
order on a chaotic environment in which actors engaged in making or influencing public 
policy are frequently required to make decisions with limited expertise, inadequate or 
contradictory information, and often on a comparatively short time frame.4 
One of the most widely recognized conceptualization of policy paradigm is that of 
Peter A. Hall. Hall derives this conceptualization from Charles Anderson's "the Logic of 
Public Problems: Evaluation in Comparative Policy Research" in which Anderson states 
"the deliberation of public policy takes place within a realm of discourse...policies are 
made within some system of ideas and standards which is comprehensible and plausible 
to the actors involved.”5 In other words, Hall is convinced that policymakers routinely 
work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of 
policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them but also the very nature 
of the problems they are meant to be addressing.6 It is this point that Hall utilizes Thomas 
Kuhn’s notion of scientific paradigms to better explain Anderson's "system of ideas and 
standards".7 According to Hall, policy paradigms can be seen as one feature of the overall 
terms of political discourse. They suggest that the policymaking process can be structured 
                                                 
4 Carson et.al, p. 17 
5  Peter A. Hall. (1993) "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic 
Policymaking in Britain", Comparative Politics 25 (3), p. 279. Quoted from:  Charles Anderson, "The 
Logic of Public Problems: Evaluation in Comparative Policy Research," in Douglas Ashford, ed., 
Comparing Public Policies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978), p. 23 
6 Hall, p. 279. 





by a particular set of ideas, just as it can be structured by a set of institutions. He further 
argues that the two often reinforce each other since the routines of policymaking are 
usually designed to reflect a particular set of ideas about what can and should be done in 
a sphere of policy.8  
Hall's main concern is to explain factors that bring about the stability as well as 
the precipitating factors that create paradigmatic change. Hall's dependent variable is 
policy change and he is more interested in explaining not a single change but the nature 
of change in general. Some of the questions of interest are "Is it typically incremental, is 
it immune from radical change?” or, is it perhaps prone to the characteristics of 
punctuated equilibrium?" This would indicated that policy change is minimal most of the 
time but liable, on rare occasion, to be quite dramatic. One of the most important 
explanatory variables is the ideas due to the fact that policy change is typically highly 
constrained because the ideas that support the status quo remain extremely powerful. 
However, in the presence of paradigmatic shifts the policies themselves can be 
transformed, creating a new equilibrium and a severe break from the past. 9  
In discussing paradigm shift, Hall identifies three orders of change in a policy 
environment or domain. The first-order is the “process whereby the [policy] instrument 
settings are changed in the light of experience and new knowledge, while the overall 
goals and instruments of policy remain the same…” The process of first order change is 
likely to display the features of incrementalism, satisficing, and routinized decision-
                                                 
8 Hall. p. 290 
9 Frank R. Baumgartner. (2012) "Ideas and Policy Change", Governance: An International Journal of 




making that we normally associate with the policy process.10 First order change is likely 
to be ongoing, incremental and often routine - "normal" policymaking.11  
With second-order change, the hierarchy of goals remains largely the same; 
however, the basic methods used to achieve these goals are altered due to dissatisfaction 
with the prevailing policy. Hall notes that such changes can lead to a situation where “the 
instruments of policy as well as their settings are altered in response to past experience 
even though the overall goals of policy remain the same”12 Second order change 
represents increasingly "strategic action" in developing policy, but does not directly 
challenge the fundamental goals of policy, and is therefore less likely to be conflict 
ridden. 13 
Hall refers to the third-order change as policy making marked by radical changes 
in the overarching terms of policy discourse creating a policy paradigm shift. Third-order 
change entails simultaneous changes in instrument settings, instruments themselves, and 
the rearrangement of policy goals. He argues that the third-order change occurs when an 
emerging policy failure leads to the discrediting of an old paradigm, which subsequently 
leads to “a wide-ranging search for alternatives and to a process of experimentation with 
modifications to policy.”14 The movement from one paradigm to another that 
characterizes third order change is likely to involve the accumulation of anomalies, 
experimentation with new forms of policy, and policy failures that precipitate a shift in 
the locus of authority over policy and initiate a wider contest between competing 
                                                 
10 Hall, p. 280 
11 Carson et al. p. 403 
12 Hall, p. 280. 
13 Carson et al. p. 403 




paradigms. 15  This contest may well spill beyond the boundaries of the state itself into 
the broader political arena. It will end only when the supporters of a new paradigm secure 
positions of authority over policymaking and are able to rearrange the organization and 
standard operating procedures of the policy process so as to institutionalize the new 
paradigm.16 
First and second order change can be seen as cases of "normal policymaking," 
namely of a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given 
policy paradigm, much like "normal science." Third order change, by contrast, is likely to 
reflect a very different process, marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of 
policy discourse associated with a "paradigm shift." If first and second order changes 
preserve the broad continuities usually found in patterns of policy, third order change is 
often a more disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy.17  
Hall goes on giving examples to these three orders of changes. For the first order 
change Hall gives the example that the levels (or settings) of the basic instruments of 
British policy, such as the minimum lending rate or the fiscal stance, were altered at 
frequent intervals during the 1970-89 period, even when the overall goals and 
instruments of policy remained the same. Most of the adjustments made in the annual 
budget took this form: the settings of the government's policy instruments were modified 
in the light of past experience and projections for the future performance of the economy. 
We can call the process whereby instrument settings are changed in the light of 
                                                 
15 Hall, p. 279 
16 Hall pp.  280-281 




experience and new knowledge, while the overall goals and instruments of policy remain 
the same, a process of first order change in policy.18 
Second, there were several instances in the 1970-89 period when the hierarchy of 
goals behind British macroeconomic policy remained largely the same but the basic 
techniques used to attain them were altered, as a result of dissatisfaction with past 
experience. These episodes included the introduction of a new system of monetary 
control in 1971, the development of a new system of "cash limits" for public spending 
control in 1976, and the movement away from strict targets for monetary growth in 1981-
83. Changes of this sort, when the instruments of policy, as well as their settings, are 
altered in response to past experience even though the overall goals of policy remain the 
same, might be said to reflect a process of second order change.19  
Finally, when monetarism replaced Keynesianism as the template guiding policy, 
there was a radical shift in the hierarchy of goals guiding policy; the instruments relied on 
to affect policy, and the settings of those instruments. Moreover, these changes were 
accompanied by substantial changes in the discourse employed by policymakers and in 
the analysis of the economy on which policy was based. In short, the third order change 
in British policymaking that occurred during this period was accompanied by a wholesale 
shift in policy paradigms.20  
One aspect of the third order change that Hall emphasizes is the simultaneous 
shift in authority. He says the center of authority over macroeconomic issues began to 
shift. Although the movement began around 1976, the most intense break in policy came 
                                                 
18 Hall, p. 278 
19 Hall, pp. 278-279 




after a Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher was elected in 1979. Not only 
were the settings of policy changed but hierarchy of goals and set of instruments 
employed to guide policy shifted radically as well. Inflation replaced unemployment as 
the preeminent concern of policymakers. Macroeconomic efforts to reduce 
unemployment were rejected in favor of balanced budgets and direct tax reductions. 
Monetary policy replaced fiscal policy as the principal macroeconomic instrument, and it 
was reoriented toward fixed targets for the rate of monetary growth. Many regulatory 
instruments associated with state intervention, such as incomes policies, exchange 
controls, and quantitative limits on bank lending, were eliminated. To Hall, this was a 
clear case of third order change in policy.21 
Frank Baumgartner asserts that Hall's “third-order” change, in order to happen, 
may require a serious degree of discredit to the status quo policy and to its protectors. 
Things that could produce such change include obvious policy failures or crises that 
occur “on the watch” of a set of incumbent policymakers. When the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 occurred, it was clear that major elements of U.S. intelligence had 
failed and that airport security procedures were insufficient. No one stepped forward to 
defend these policies, especially the private security firms that hired poorly paid and 
relatively ill-trained personnel to screen passengers in airports. The creation of the 
Transportation Security Administration was not particularly controversial in spite of the 
fact that it was a Republican administration creating a vast new public bureaucracy. So, it 
is clear that obvious policy failures can discredit the status quo, sometimes even to the 
                                                 




level that the incumbents who benefit from or who implement the existing policy do not 
even mobilize to protect it, knowing that this is a hopeless cause.22 
Lawrence C. Reardon states that paradigm shifts can be either comprehensive or 
sectoral. The former takes place when revolutionary elites undergo complex learning 
initiated by the absolute rejection of the polity adaptations adopted by the country's ruling 
elites. Such was the case in 1917 and 1949 when the Soviet and the Chinese communist 
revolutionaries became the new ruling elites; they fundamentally transformed the state's 
political, economic and social structures. Sectoral paradigm shift occurs when policy 
elites learn that adaptations of policy strategies have failed over time. According to 
Lawrence, this type of paradigm shift includes many of the anti-authoritarian "color" 
revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia since 2000, which he classifies as 
political; China's transition from a revolutionary to techno-economic paradigm as 
economic; and the United States’ adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as social.23 
Marcus Carson, Tom R. Burns, and Dolores Carvo state that paradigm shifts 
entail fundamental, conceptual and organizational changes, which guide policy in a 
markedly different direction than previous paradigms. Such shifts are the result of the 
creation of a new-problem solving model within a particular policy sector. These shifts 
manifest themselves in the reconfiguration of the core principles used in defining the 
nature of policy problems and in guiding political problem solving activities.24  
The term paradigm shift is best used to characterize what amounts to conceptual 
and organizational tipping points in an ongoing, often incremental process of adjustment 
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that began long before the actual "shift" is said to occur and is likely to continue for some 
time afterwards. That is to say, Carson et al. define the concept of paradigm shift as the 
articulation of a new model and the initial concrete steps taken to realize that model in 
practice. Given the nature of the process, they continue to argue, it is likely that the 
actions constituting paradigm shift cannot be pinned down to a single moment in time 
and that should be considered as a phrase in a broader process of change. Therefore, the 
institutionalization of paradigm shift is best understood as a process rather than a point of 
time and constitutes changes in the institutional arrangement, a rule regime that gives 
effect to reordering of guiding principles and redefinition of policy problems through 
changes in regulatory, organizational, and relational structures. 25  
Another important point that Carson et al. make regarding the policy paradigm 
shift is that due to its lengthy duration of institutionalization, and such institutionalization 
must frequently take place within a variety of existing, organizational/ institutional 
cultures, policies adopted after the paradigm change may not be greatly consistent with 
the new paradigm. An operative policy paradigm may not be necessarily 
contemporaneous with the conceptual framework that has guided it.26  
Paradigms are complexes ideas of how to conceptualize, analyze and deal with 
public issues. In that vein, one of the important features of policy paradigms is that 
paradigm transformation entails a fundamental restructuring of elements of such 
problem-solving and organizational complexes and the relations between them. This 
reconfiguration may or may not entail the introduction of new principles or goals. Carson 
et al. found in their case studies that new principles are introduced and adopted 
                                                 





incrementally as considerations that temper the application of existing institutionalized 
paradigm. The paradigm shift can be identified in some form of the re-ordering of core 
principles. When competing goals came into conflict with one another, the new paradigm 
is distinguishable in terms of a different priority ordering of principles, and thus different 
kinds of problem definitions, preferred remedies, authorities and experts, and ultimately 
different outcomes.27 
The paradigm shift can be identified in some form of re-ordering of core 
principles whereas changes in the periphery do not constitute a paradigm shift. When 
competing goals come into conflict with one another, the new paradigm is distinguishable 
in terms of different priority ordering of principles and therefore different kinds of 
problem definitions, preferred remedies, authorities, experts and eventually different 
outcomes.28  
In general, the analytical strategy is to trace the process of fundamental policy 
change as it evolves from ideas and through action to become institutionalized. The basic 
elements of this change process include: a) the emergence of new phenomena that are 
defined as problems or the redefinition of existing phenomena as pressing problems, then 
impelled by new claims and demands for structural change made by organized interests 
and policy entrepreneurs, b) the replacement of an established complex of policy ideas 
with a new one that is not comparable in the same terms, and c) the institutionalization of 
the new set of ideas in the form of new norms, policy competencies, revised or new 
                                                 





organizational structures and goals, and new types or groups of actors defined as having a 
legitimate role to play.29 
Replacing an earlier elite to institutionalize the new paradigm may occur relying 
on force, as in coup d'état or violent revolution or through democratic process, such as 
elections or nominations, societal negotiation, or generational cohort shift. A new group 
or coalition with a new paradigm or model of institutional arrangements appears on the 
scene and assumes a position of power, enabling it to bring about a substantial shift in the 
institutional paradigm and arrangements. This may be, but is not necessarily, proceeded 
by a breakdown in consensus among established power elites about the appropriate 
paradigm or about reform of the existing paradigm. However, a breakdown in consensus 
facilitates a coalition between parts of the elites and the contender groups, which refuse 
to defer to the established authority or to adhere to the established, rule regime and its 
organizing principles and norms. Such new, emerging coalitions were apparent in the 
case of "peaceful" revolutions in, for example, Poland or Hungary, in 1989, which 
involved negotiated settlements and elections. In Poland the negotiated elections brought 
unexpected victory to groups advancing liberal market and political paradigms.30 
Carson et al. summarize the conditions of paradigm shifts as follows: 
(1) Policy failures, anomalies. A "paradigm crisis" arises when policy failings 
occur and accumulate, or cognitive and control problems emerge (policies and programs 
lead to unacceptable or negative unintended consequences), and the status and authority 
of the original policy paradigm is undermined. The negative judgments may be those of 
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key authorities or experts associated with the established paradigm- or, more often, 
challengers to the authority and expertise of the established groups. 
(2) Emergence of new ideological ideas, a change in the normative context. 
Initiatives to change paradigm, in such a way, that a restructured paradigm is perceived or 
judged to fit better or to be more compatible with global values and norms. Those 
responsible and/or experts are driven to adopt these ideas and values or are pressured by 
their constituencies or the general public. These generalized norms may concern gender 
equality, security, health, etc. 
(3) Power gain. Power agents propose (or adopt) a new paradigm as a way of 
enhancing their power and/or undermining the power of those associated with the 
established paradigm. There may be no anomalies or performance failings of the 
established paradigm. 
(4) Competition. Political or group competition may pressure a group to 
differentiate themselves from others. Interest in differentiating "them" from "us" results 
from agential processes in a group configuration or network. 
(5) Breaking of Solidarity. A key shift in a paradigm, such as a transformation of 
dominant values (e.g. increased value placed on the environment or social welfare (or on 
the market) in conjunction with an economic crisis (and relative decrease in government 
revenues, or increases in the cost of fuel) may contribute to conflicts and the breakdown 
of an existing coalition, e.g. in an oligarchy or a majority within a polyarchy. For 
instance, this has happened in the case of social welfare coalitions; or, environmental 




(6) Problematic change in practice. Paradigm shifts result more from changes in 
institutional practices. The Marxian conception of the "contradiction" between 
institutional arrangements/cognitive-normative components ("the relations of 
production"), on the one hand, and new knowledge, new technologies, new practices 
("the forces of production") sets the stage for "revolution" (of course, there are other 
possibilities, such as suppression of "forces of production"). 
(7) Failure of Change Efforts. The failure of mass mobilization to bring about a 
paradigm shift when structural conditions (problem situation or crisis) seem otherwise 
ripe may be accounted for by the absence of a resonant paradigm and/or insufficient 
power to overcome a dominant regime.31 
While changes may involve one or more of these dimensions, changes in radical 
nature would include significant changes in multiple dimensions. Even if only a few 
dimensions are changed initially, some changes have much greater secondary 
consequences than others. Examples of such changes are: 
• Shift from public agency responsibility to private (the laws, incentive 
structures etc. differ substantially), 
• Shifts from covering one population (the middle class) to another (lower 
classes or marginal groups), or both, 
• Shifts from narrow scope of policy to comprehensive scope, which will 
affect many more us and involve a much greater array of methods, types of 
knowledge and expertise.32 
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Michael J. Oliver and Hugh Pemberton refer to Hall's propositions as deliberate 
evocation of Thomas Kuhn’s argument that scientific paradigms “gain their status 
because they are more successful than their competitors in solving [the] problems that the 
group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute”33 In Hall’s schema, Oliver and 
Pemberton argue, first and second order change are essentially the same as Kuhn’s 
“normal science” but third order change amounts to a revolution in ideas and practice in 
policy and the replacement of one policy “paradigm” by another.34  
While ideas as policy solutions may exist, their proponents must wait for the right 
opportunity to present them and have them adopted. This shifts the focus from an ‘idea 
whose time has come’, suggesting inevitability to the need for a range of conditions to be 
satisfied before a policy will change, suggesting uncertainty and that the receptivity to, 
and acceptance of, the idea is more important than the idea itself.35  
Robert C. Lieberman suggests, an idea’s time arrives not simply because the idea 
is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political circumstances favor it. At 
those moments when a political idea finds persuasive expression among actors whose 
institutional position gives them both the motive and the opportunity to translate it into 
policy-then, and only then, can we say that an idea has found a time.36 
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Table 2.1 Order of Changes 




-The [policy] instrument settings are changed in the light of 
experience and new knowledge, while the overall goals and 
instruments of policy remain the same. 
-It is likely to be ongoing, incremental and often routine - "normal" 
policymaking. 
-It can be considered "normal policymaking," namely of a process 





-The instruments of policy as well as their settings are altered in 
response to past experience even though the overall goals of policy 
remain the same. 
-It does not directly challenge the fundamental goals of policy, and 
is therefore less likely to be conflict ridden. 
-It can be considered "normal policymaking," namely of a process 











-A policy making marked by radical changes in the overarching 
terms of policy discourse creating a new paradigm. 
-Major departure from the way that policymaker think and act. 
-Simultaneous changes in instrument settings, instruments 
themselves, and the rearrangement of policy goals. 
-A serious degree of discredit to the status quo policy and to its 
protectors.  
-The accumulation of anomalies, experimentation with new forms 
of policy, and policy failures that precipitate a shift in the locus of 
authority over policy and initiate a wider contest between 
competing paradigms. 
-The new paradigm is institutionalized when the supporters of the 




CHAPTER 3. THE KEMALIST PARADIGM 
3.1 Introduction  
It is crucial to recognize that the fundamentals of Turkish policy were conceived 
and implemented by the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk between 1923 
and 1938. These standards and code of conducts that he created became so embedded in 
the Turkish politics that literally every government and policymaker who came after him 
strove not to veer off from them and those few who did or believed to have done so were 
labeled as the traitor to his legacy and to the republic. Therefore, it would not be wrong to 
call these principles “indisputable dogmas” to denote that they are religiously perceived 
unquestionably and implemented unconditionally.37  
This chapter is an in-depth exploration of many aspects of the Kemalist paradigm 
in Turkey. The chapter starts with an analysis of the conditions of the very late stages of 
the Ottoman Empire, out of which the Kemalist ideology was born. A good grasp of the 
historical background of Kemalism is important as it will be a useful tool to compare 
between the Kemalist paradigm, which is seen as the anti-thesis of the Ottmanism, and 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) policy making, which is considered to have 
undertaken the task of reviving the principles of the Ottomanist policy making. The 
second part of the chapter will analyze the birth and the institutionalization of the 
Kemalist ideology in the newly created Turkish Republic. The final part will study how 
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the Kemalist ideology and the conditions of the time laid the foundations of new 
republic’s foreign policy as well as its evolution after the death of Mustafa Kemal.  
3.2 In Search of a Paradigm 
Mustafa Kemal was a soldier in the last decades of the crumbling Ottoman 
Empire. Therefore, his experiences during his time in the Ottoman army greatly shaped 
his worldview, thus it shaped the paradigm he would create for Turkey. The late 19th 
century was extremely gloomy for the Empire. Among the territories that had already 
been lost was Greece (1832), Egypt (1882) Bosnia and Herzegovina (1878). To make 
matters worse, Trablusgarb (today’s Libya) was occupied by the Italian forces only to be 
lost in 1912. The sultans and the bureaucrats endeavored to implement a series of reforms 
to amend the military and daily life but they were proven ineffective. The most 
detrimental development for the empire turned out to be the impending upsurge of 
nationalism and ensuing involvement of European powers in the Ottoman domestic 
politics. Because of “the capitulations”, the Ottoman Empire continued to lose power 
against Russia, Great Britain and France, as these powers intensified their patronage over 
such Christian subjects as the Greeks and the Armenians.   
It is important to point out that the Ottoman Empire did not constitute a nation 
state nor were its subjects recognized based on their nationality. The Millet System38 that
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the Ottoman Empire implemented for centuries to govern its vast territories stipulated 
that the subjects be divided into Muslims and non-Muslims, rather than their ethnic 
background. Therefore, such concepts as Arab, Greek, Armenian and Turk were foreign 
to the Ottoman ruling elite. This aspect of the Ottoman governance would later play a 
great role in the creation of ideologies that were aimed to save the Ottoman Empire from 
collapsing.39 This is an important point because it will play a great role in shaping 
Ataturk's policy making before and after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and 
has serious implications in the debate whether the AKP government, which adopted a 
more pro-Ottoman approach in both domestic and foreign policy, is shifting its foreign 
policy making paradigm away from the established Kemalism. 
Bernard Lewis concedes that it was the religion of Islam not the ethnic 
background of Muslims that kept them loyal to the Ottoman sultan, who was at the same 
time the Caliph. He was considered to be the ultimate epitome of Islam for the Ottoman 
society while at the same time acted as the commander in chief. His religious role 
overshadowed all his other roles, including the military one. Because of this reason, the 
Sultan was a Muslim before anything else. Hence, it would not be wrong to assume that 
the concept of Turkishness as we see in the Kemalist Turkey was not applicable to the 
Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the ruling elite and the Sultan did not really resort to the 
concept of Turk or Turkishness to define themselves or the empire, although they were 
cognizant of their ancestral background. This began to change through the mid-19th, the 
Tanzimat (Reorganization) Era, when it became evident to the ruling elite and the sultan 
that serious measures had to be taken to halt or even reverse the fast implosion of the 
empire. While the need for a drastic change was acknowledged, what was not agreed 
                                                 




upon was the method by which it was to be implemented. Because of this divergence, 
several movements were put forward. Most important of these were Ottomanism, pan-
Islamism and Westernism/Turkism. 40  
In the following section, I will explain these streams of ideologies that impacted 
the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.  
3.2.1. Ottomanism 
One of the ideological movements was the Ottomanism. According to this the 
empire could be saved if the non-Muslim entities were to be declared equal with the 
Muslims in order to construct, what Yelda Demirag of the Baskent University coins, a 
"we-feeling of being Ottoman" and an incorporating "Ottoman nation".41 
The roots of this movement go back to the Greek independence. The secession of 
the Greeks prompted the need for a new constitution by the sultan, named the Tanzimat 
Fermani (Imperial Edict of Reorganization), which was declared in Istanbul in 1839. This 
ensured the legal equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects. Although the ruling 
elite of the Empire hoped that this new constitution would quell the resentments of non-
Muslims, fortifying their loyalty to the sultan and thus the empire, the European powers 
deemed it an exceptional tool to meddle with domestic politics of the Ottomans. The new 
reforms only deteriorated the situation in the Balkan territories of Ottoman, where the 
majority of its non-Muslim subject lived, only aggravating the nationalistic feelings.42 
Through the end of the 19th century it was evident that Ottomanism was due to fail.  
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The signs of failure began to emerge when the Muslim subjects expressed 
displeasure that they were rendered equal with non-Muslims. The Ottoman-Russian War 
of 1877-78 was the real blow to the Ottomanist idea as the Ottoman Empire lost its 
Balkan territories (Romania, Serbia and Montenegro), where most of the non-Muslims 
Ottomans lived. The Muslim influx from these territories into the Ottoman heartland, 
Anatolia, and the only remaining territories outside Anatolia, albeit under the British and 
French threat, were those of the Middle East and North Africa. The influx of Muslims 
into Anatolia brought the idea of pan-Islamism.43  
3.2.2 Pan-Islamism 
The dismal defeat against the Russians prompted the rescinding of the 
constitution by Sultan Abdulhamid II (1842-1918). Having realized that the European 
style governance did not work, he resorted to the idea of Muslim unification in order to 
save the empire. The fact that now the Muslims in the empire made up of the majority of 
population reinforced his hopes. His title “Caliph”, the ruler of all Muslims, would be 
functional not only to coalesce the Muslims at home but also those who were in India and 
South East Asia. The emphasis in the splendor of bygone Arab-Islam past which 
appealed to Muslims, especially those in the Middle East only resulted in the Arabs’ 
gaining their national consciousness. This even resulted in the emergence of such ideas 
among Arabs such as Arabic is the language of the Qur’an, hence Arabs were the chosen 
people of Allah. All this was in conjunction with the rising British and French influence 
on Arabs. In the early 20th century, with the dismantling of the Ottoman Middle East, it 
was proven that pan-Islamism too was in vain.44 Eventually, it became evident that 
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Islamism turned out to be a futile effort to save the empire as the Arabs, one of the most 
important Muslim nations in the empire, put their ethnicity in front of the religion. 
Despite Abdulhamid's efforts to use Islamism, the empire was losing territories in the 
Middle East and North Africa. 
3.2.3 Pan-Turkism/ Westernism 
When Abdulhamid’s pan-Islamist movement failed to address the problem of 
dissolution, secular ideas gained prominence. In this regard, the Ottoman Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) was established by the Young Turk movement in 1889 in 
defiance of the Sultan. The Young Turks were heavily influenced by such European 
streams of thought as scientific materialism and Social Darwinism. Pan-Turkism was also 
part of their worldview.45 Also, pan-Turkist ideology was a principal one in the CUP. 
Among the prominent members of CUP and pan-Turkist, Yusuf Akcura, who at 
the same time was a close friend of Mustafa Kemal, urged the Ottoman rulers to embrace 
pan-Turkism, which aimed at resuscitating the Turkish nationalism and uniting not only 
the Ottoman Turks but also the Turks in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This idea of 
uniting the Turks across the Eurasia was a new concept in history.46 To him, this 
endeavor was a new one and not even Genghis Khan, let alone the Ottoman Empire, 
whose founders were of Turkic origin, had ever pursued such an ideology.47  
The prominent Turkologue Jacob M. Landau argues that the secular nature of 
pan-Turkism in the second part of 19th century is worth noting because it meant that the 
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pan-Turkists had been convinced that Islam was not strong enough an identity to retard 
the dissolution of the empire.48 
One of the most remarkable developments in the late history of the Ottoman 
Empire took place in 1906 when the anti-Abdulhamid opposition of bureaucrats, military 
officers and members of the CUP united under the Ottoman Freedom Society, in the then 
Ottoman city Salonika (in today's Greece). Now, with the military on their side, there was 
virtually nothing blocking the path of the CUP to keep them from openly confronting the 
sultan. In July 1908, the CUP staged a coup against Abdulhamid, which culminated into a 
revolution, whose motto was “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Justice". According to 
Sukru Hanilioglu, this revolution is different from other European revolutions such as the 
French and Russian in that the purpose was not to replace the absolutist monarch but to 
reinstate the constitutional governance as well as the parliamentary rule, which had been 
dissolved in 1878. Hanilioglu notes that the CUP members did not want to eradicate the 
monarchy because they wanted to "pull the levers of imperial power”. From its 
ascendance to power in 1908 to the end of World War I, the CUP was the sole ruler of the 
Ottoman Empire rendering the monarch powerless but left as a figure-head.49  
In conjunction with their ideology, the CUP began to carry out reforms to 
secularize many aspects of the Ottoman life, from education, such as mandatory foreign 
language, to judiciary, by which they sought to diminish the authority of religious clergy 
over the Sultan. As part of their attempt to westernize the Ottoman society, the CUP 
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abolished polygamy, introduced women’s rights, and supplanted the fez in favor of 
European type head gear.50  
Most members of the Young Turk movement were staunch advocates of 19th 
century German materialistic idea of “Vulgärmaterialismus”, which combines the 
principles of materialism, Darwinism and scientism, thereby they aimed to maintain such 
scientific understanding in the society. The roots of the official state ideology that we 
have in modern Turkey has its roots in the Young Turks period.51 The official state 
ideology of modern Turkey was shaped during the period of the early Young Turks and 
to this day has continued to influence Turkey's intellectual and political life.52 It would 
not be erroneous to assume that being a member of the Young Turks movement, the 
founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, was heavily influenced by the policies that 
were conceived and implemented by the CUP.53  
It is at this point that it is important to examine how the Young Turks influenced 
Ataturk and in turn how his policies created and shaped the future of the newly 
established Republic of Turkey. 
3.3 The Birth of the Kemalist Paradigm in Turkey 
The end of World War I sealed the fate of the 600-year-old empire. Having been 
an experienced and successful commander in the Ottoman ranks, Mustafa Kemal 
capitalized on the power vacuum created by the implosion of the empire. Having won the 
Turkish independence war against the British, French, Italians, Greeks and Armenians, 
the Kemalist clique deposed the Sultan and established the new Turkish republic in 1923. 
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The Kemalist triumph of Westernism marked the end of a power struggle among the 
ideologies that competed to save the empire. Given his experiences in the battlefronts and 
the CUP ranks, M. Kemal was convinced that it was impossible to continue with the 
legacy of the Ottoman Empire hence the need for a clean slate. That is to say, to Ataturk, 
this newly emerging nation-state, of which he was the architect, ought to be completely 
detached from its past. Therefore, first and foremost, the Kemalists launched a 
comprehensive de-Ottomanisation campaign to eradicate the Islamic/Ottoman state 
institutions. The complete overhaul of state alone would not have been meaningful if the 
society remained Ottoman. Thus, the extensive restructuring of the society was set to be 
one of the major endeavors of the Kemalists. M. Kemal was adamant about creating a 
society and a state identity based on western values. To him, the two had to go in hand in 
hand because the divergence between state and social identity would create a legitimacy 
problem.54 
Above all, the catastrophic experiences of the past century that lead to the 
impending collapse of the empire prompted the Kemalist elite55 of the newly established 
republic to concede that in order to be able to hold onto the hard earned territory, a 
strongly centralized state and ethnically homogenized nation was paramount. Therefore, 
the Turkification efforts in the new republic went as far as changing the Kurdish or 
                                                 
54 Yücel Bozdaglioglu (2003) Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach, 
New York: Routledge p. 45, http://www.questia.com/read/106192540. 
55 According to Bozdaglioglu, the Western oriented Kemalist reforms contributed greatly to the creation of 
the Kemalist elite. He further states that the Kemalist elite in Turkey vowed to protect unconditionally the 
Kemalist doctrine, which basically chaped the domestic and foreign policy of the republic’s entirety. 
The emergence of the Kemalist elite in modern Turkey is the result of the transformation of the state from a 
theocratic empire into a modern, secular nation-state through Kemalist reforms. The Kemalist elite was 
responsible for preventing any deviations from the Kemalist principles, carried important implications for 
both Turkey's foreign and domestic politics, which will be evaluated in the later chapters of this work. 
Yücel Bozdaglioglu (2003) Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach (New 




Armenian names of settlements in the text books. By law, every citizen of the republic 
was considered to be “Turkish”. 
Another prerequisite for consolidation of power was the establishment of elitism. 
The justification for elitism arises out of the conviction that the majority of citizens of the 
new republic were “ignorant and illiterate”, which at the same time was the elitist view 
of anything Ottoman. This contemptuous view from the elite, not to mention the survival 
instinct, called for a stringent implementation of the reforms, which naturally were top to 
bottom.56 The disparity between the ruling elite (the core), who predominantly lived in 
urban areas and the ruled, who resided in rural Anatolia (the periphery), began to 
constitute a contentious matter with the latter’s gradual movement into the former’s 
habitat in early 1970s.57 The gradual rise of the periphery eventually would result in the 
advent of the AKP government. This situation will be extensively discussed, in the 
following chapter. 
 The effective permeation of reforms into society as well as the eradication of the 
entrenched Ottoman beliefs and state system depended greatly on the degree of their 
radical character. Therefore, M. Kemal believed that the envisaged cultural, social and 
economic reforms had to be radical in character. 58  
Finally, Michael A. Raynolds depicts the essence of Kemalism. He says; "[t]he 
conceptual matrix that provided the ideational basis of the Turkish Republic is known as 
Kemalism, after Mustafa Kemal, the general who led the military campaign that 
culminated in the creation of the republic and then ruled it until his death in 1938. 
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Kemalism functioned as a comprehensive worldview that supplied both a historical 
diagnosis of the challenges facing Turkish society as well as a vision of how to overcome 
those challenges." 59 
3.4 Pillars of the Kemalist Ideology 
Ataturk’s view of Islam, his absolute belief in western/European ideas and the 
overall state of domestic and foreign politics of the early 1920s shaped the Kemalist 
ideology, which is also called “the Six Arrows”. These principles were officially adopted 
in 1931 and put in the constitution in 1937. The fact that these principles were accepted 
as the symbol of M. Kemal’s party, the People’s Republican Party (PRP) is a testament to 
their significance. Out of these six principles, (Nationalism, Secularism, Republicanism, 
Populism, Etatism, and Revolutionism)60 I will dwell on Republicanism, Nationalism and 
Secularism due to the fact that they bear the most important implications for foreign 
policy.  
Republicanism stipulates that, as opposed to the Ottoman period where the 
legitimate ruler was the sultan, in the newly established Turkish republic the Turkish 
people own the sovereignty and have the legitimacy to rule. The purpose of Atataurk’s 
adoption of this principle was to leave no room for the resurrection of revisionist, 
imperialistic monarchy or totalitarian regimes in Turkey.  This partially aims to rule out 
any possibility of the Caliphate regime, which he abolished in 1924. Opposing any 
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expansionist objectives, M. Kemal conceded that preserving the existing international 
status quo was important.61  
Nationalism is one of the pillars that has been subject to heated debates. The 
origins of the controversy go back to the establishment of the republic and the way it was 
initially interpreted and implemented. The type of nationalism that M. Kemal envisioned 
was built upon common citizenship rather than of ethnocentric. It was argued that given 
the circumstances of the early stages of nation building in Turkey, such an understanding 
of nationalism was a prerequisite. According to this “individuals from many different 
ethnic backgrounds but, according to the Turkish Constitution, all citizens of Turkey are 
Turks”.62 Leonard A. Stone states that the Kemalist understanding of nationalism is, 
unlike that of Germany, not of ethnic or racial. 63  
Yet, divergent opinions about the Kemalist understanding of nationalism are 
plenty. According to Aydinli, while M. Kemal strived to form an identical Turkish nation 
via constitutionalism with the broad support of Turkish people, he ended up 
disenfranchising non-Turkish aspects of society, particularly the Kurds.64  
To Philip Robins, M. Kemal’s was inspired by the European understanding of 
nationalism, which is ethno-centric. What the Kemalist nationalism doctrine envisioned 
was that those non-Turkish entities of the new republic could not retain their identities, 
they must be united under the banner of ‘Turkishness’. In this regards, attempts to deny, 
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eradicate and change non-Turkish components of society were made as the Kurdish 
language was strictly restricted and village names were ‘Turkified’.65  
Aydin points out that this repression of the Kurds would eventually result in the 
emergence of Kurdish consciousness in 1970s, which was followed by the Kurdish armed 
struggle against the Turkish state in early 1980s.66 This is important to note because the 
Kemalist elite’s perception of nationalism culminated in one of the thorniest issues of the 
Republic of Turkey, “the Kurdish question”, which has had considerable implications for 
both domestic and foreign politics of Turkey. 
At this point, we must also note that although Ataturk’s ideas were partially 
shaped during his time in the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which also 
pursued revisionist, expansionist pan-Turkism67 he chose not carry it over to the new 
republic. M. Kemal was well aware that considering the fragile state of newly established 
republic, it would have been unwise to pursue unobtainable, utopian pan-Turkism. 
Instead, he restricted his understanding of Turkism within the borders of the republic, for 
which he had already been trying to secure after the War of Independence. Mustafa 
Aydin comments that any adventurist endeavor would greatly harm the gains that had 
been made with great difficulty. Therefore, M. Kemal rejected such utopian ideas such as 
pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. Consequently, his rejection of the utopian ideas of pan-
Islamism and pan-Turkism,68 had its implications, in later decades, in the Turkish foreign 
policy.  
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The Kemalist ideology also called for strict employment of secularism. It was 
important for M. Kemal predominantly because it was one of the strong elements of his 
efforts to eradicate the remnants of the Ottoman past. To this end, he set about to 
implement the daunting task of expunging the entrenched influence of Islam in the 
society and state. One of the reasons for his obstinacy in this matter was his strong 
conviction that it was Islam that impeded the progress in the late stages of the Ottoman 
era, which rendered it lagging behind the prosperous, civilized Europe. More importantly, 
the perpetuation of Islam and its sway over the masses would have spelled a predicament 
for the Kemalist elite in their infliction of top-to-bottom reforms, most of which were of 
Western/secular nature.69 The Caliphate represented one of the most powerful elements 
of Islam in the state and over the people, thus it was abolished in 1924, along with the 
religious courts.   
The dress code of the public that was of Islamic was not spared from strict 
enforcement campaign of reforms. Western style hats became the symbol of the 
Kemalist/Western reforms and replaced the turban and fez with strict enforcement. One 
radical reform was the replacement of the language of the Qur’an, Arabic, as well as the 
Farsi alphabet with Latin.70 One reason for the eradication of Islam, according to 
Raynolds, was that it ran counter to M. Kemal’s attempt to make the ‘Turkish’ nation 
superior over other nations. The Islamic creed instructs that it is not the nationality that 
determines one’s preeminence but his/her level of devotion to Allah. Due to the influence 
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of Islam during the reign of the Ottomans, the Kemalists argued, the Turks had lost 
conception of their ancestral roots.71  
Nilufer Gole argues that M. Kemal’s reforms are the continuation of the positivist 
and secularist Turkish modernity that commenced in the early 19th century and reached 
its climax during the Ataturk era. She posits that positivism was utilized by the new 
Turkish elite as a tool to justify the reforms of modernity. August Comte’s positivist 
ideology served as guidance to the liberal elite from the Young Turks to the Kemalists. 
Furthermore, ‘social engineering’, which is conceived as a natural result of positivist 
approach, became an instrument for the elite to enlighten and remodel the Turkish 
society. To those reformers, the positivist axiom “progress and order” and ‘national 
order’ were intimately intertwined because their existence secured the consolidation of 
secularism in a Muslim country.72 
Scholars establish correlation between the Turkish and French secularization 
attempts in that the main purpose of both was to establish the dominion of the secular 
elite over the royalist and totalitarian ‘religious establishment.73  
Since 1950, by which time the multi-party system had been introduced in Turkey, 
secularism had been aggressively enforced by the Turkish military and it did not shy 
away from staging military coups against governments or politicians that were perceived 
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to be a threat to the secular foundations of the republic. Therefore, Turkish secularists 
refused to accept other ideas contrary to Kemalism.74  
Binnaz Toprak argues that in Turkey, the source of law and education under the 
Kemalist paradigm has been rationalism.75 The Article 24 of the constitution stipulates 
that individuals are not only entitled to freedom of religion but they also have protection 
from religion.76 
According to the European Court of Human Rights (EHRC), in their verdict for the 
case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, the secular principles were added to the constitution due to 
legacy of the past and the idiosyncrasies of Islam. Secularism was considered to be an 
integral part of democracy and ensured freedom of religion. Moreover, secularism curbs 
the state from displaying any sort of favoritism towards a particular faith, preventing any 
involvement of dogmatic decrees in the process of making legislature. The court further 
stated:  
“Secularism is the civil organizer of political, social and cultural life, based on 
national sovereignty, democracy, freedom and science. Secularism is the principle 
which offers the individual the possibility to affirm his or her own personality 
through freedom of thought and which, by the distinction it makes between politics 
and religious beliefs, renders freedom of conscience and religion effective. In 
societies based on religion, which function with religious thought and religious rules, 
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political organization is religious in character. In a secular regime, religion is 
shielded from a political role. It is not a tool of the authorities and remains in its 
respectable place, to be determined by the conscience of each and every one...”77 
Comparing the secular properties of the United States, France and Turkey, Ahmet 
Kuru finds that Turkey’s secularism is of an “assertive” nature. This means that the state 
enforces secular principles such that the public sphere is rendered free from any religious 
footprint.78 Gole draws attention to a discrepancy between Turkish and French 
secularism. Whereas in the latter the establishment was bottom up, but in the former it 
was a forceful imposition of the idea that was top down by the secular elite to the bottom, 
which resulted in the estrangement of the masses. Gole concludes that secularization 
turned out to be a byproduct of social engineering rather than a consequence of the work 
of a public collective.79  
It must be noted here that while the Kemalist understanding of secularism 
presupposed the strict separation of Islam and the state, it did not opt to totally eradicate 
religion and espouse an “atheistic” type of application. Rather, the stringent oversight of 
state in the way Islam is practiced was found to be the solution. In this regard, the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs was founded in 1926 with the special duty “to execute 
the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about 
their religion, and administer the sacred worshipping places".80 Today, the government 
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is responsible for financially supporting the directorate and its staff, including the mosque 
imams.  
There are certain political implications of the Kemalist ideology in Turkey.  One 
is “a secularized and westernized homogenous nation-state”, which is the result of the 
fact that due to its preset rules, Kemalism does not really leave room for a popular debate 
to establish a social contract. The second is that the dogmatic nature of Kemalism results 
in its innate repugnance for alternative ideologies and way of lives for they may pose 
detriment to the idyllic world that it envisages for Turkey. The third is for Kemalism, 
“politics” is only a tool to establish its own dogmas. Lastly, the exclusionist nature of 
Kemalism, which those who wholeheartedly adopt and promote the Kemalist principles 
are entitled to political participation and promotions whereas those who resist are 
excluded from public space and labeled as reactionist, old fashioned and backward. The 
Turkish military was ‘appointed’ to safeguard the Kemalist principles of the republic and 
is authorized to punish or ‘correct’ those who have deviated from Kemalism. This 
entitlement coupled with the military might resulted in, after 1961, the creation of the 
National Security Council (NSC), which serves as an advisory board to the government 
in domestic and foreign policies (and before the AKP administration), Turkish Armed 
Forces dominated the civilian members of it. This rendered the NSC the ultimate 
authoritative body in domestic and foreign affairs. This situation virtually reduced the 
civilian Parliament to an institution whose duty is to pass laws that are aimed at 
protecting and perpetuating the Kemalist hegemony over the state and society. It is 




did not hesitate to step in and interfere should there be a perception that the foundations 
of Kemalism, national security and/or territorial integrity of the republic was at 
jeopardy.81  
Table 3.1 Pillars of Kemalist Ideology 
Pillars of the Kemalist Ideology  
 
Republicanism 
• Sovereignty belongs to the Turkish nation 
• A barrier against the monarchic and totalitarian of  
government. 
• The state pursues the welfare and the happiness of  




• All citizens of Turkey are Turks 
• Homogenous Turkish nation state 
• Ethno-centric 
• Rejects non-Turkish entities 
• Opposes pan-Turkism 
 
Secularism 
• An undertaking aimed to remove the influence of  
Islam in state and society 
• Goes hand in hand with positivist modernity  
in Turkey 
• Classified as assertive secularism. 
• It was largely imposed as a top down elite project. 
• The state controls how Islam is practiced 
• The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established  
in 1926 
 
The nature of NSC and how it steered the politics in Turkey will be extensively 
discussed in the next chapter. 
3.5 Goals and Priorities of Kemalist Foreign Policy 
The Turkish foreign policy during the M. Kemal era evidently was a reflection of 
his personality and worldviews. First and foremost, the new republic had an existential 
goal of recognition as a sovereign state in the international arena. Having realized the 
fundamental relationship between the domestic and foreign policy, M. Kemal made 
domestic consolidation his priority in order to succeed in foreign policy. Therefore, his 
                                                 





main focus was the reforms that he embarked on to transform the Turkish people and 
state.82 
M. Kemal said, 'What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is 
founded is the internal organization of the state. It is necessary that foreign policy should 
agree with the internal organization.' Therefore, with his famous motto - 'peace at home, 
peace in the world' – Ataturk emphasized the relationship between internal stability with 
international peace and order, prioritizing the home front.83 
The hard earned independence and the struggles to draw the borders of new 
republic largely determined the official foreign policy priorities during M. Kemal’s time. 
More importantly, the reality that the entire nation and the territories it rests on came, in 
the WWI, to the brink of extinction was more than enough to create a severe trauma for 
the founding fathers. It is because of this reason that the Turkish foreign policy was 
erected on the premise that the 'physical protection of the country against potential or 
actual threats endangering or violating its territorial integrity, especially those 
originating in the immediate surroundings.’84 This situation has had long lasting impact 
on the way the Turkish policy makers handled both domestic and foreign affairs. One 
result of it was the prevalence of securitization, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
The makers of Turkish foreign policy largely pursued the policy of upholding the 
state’s security and territorial integrity. Yasemin Celik calls the Turkish foreign policy 
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between 1923-1945 ‘cautious, realistic and generally aimed at the preservation of the 
status-quo and the hard won victory of 1923’.85 Moreover, the Ottoman immersion in 
multiple conflicts in the late years of the empire that brought the empire down to its knees 
taught an important lesson to the new republican elite; the Turkish republic was to pursue 
an independent foreign policy and it was only possible by remaining neutral to the 
conflicts that surrounded it.86 The rare exceptions to this policy were the resolution of the 
Mosul problem with the Great Britain and the Sancak (Hatay) issue with France, which 
stemmed from the Treaty of Lousanne.87 This isolationists and neutral tendency in 
Turkish foreign policy was later to be criticized by such statesmen as Turgut Ozal, 
Necmeddin Erbakan and Ahmet Davutoglu, who put forward a more pro-active foreign 
policy, for becoming an obstacle on Turkey’s rising influence in its region. 
In the same vein, the newborn Turkish republic refrained from pursuing such 
revisionist policies as pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. Therefore, M. Kemal opted not to 
reclaim the lost Ottoman territories of the Western Thrace and the Middle Eas- although 
doing so could have been justified under the then existing status quo. One exception was 
the Hatay issue, which was resolved not through force but through diplomacy.88 This too 
became one of the fundamental doctrines of the Turkish foreign policy; the pursuit of 
international law, not resorting to forceful coercion.89 
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Simon V. Mayall agrees that if the settlements of the details of the Lousanne 
Treaty are held exception, the Kemalist foreign policy dictated non-expansion and non-
aggression. The source of legitimacy for the Ottoman sultans was the degree of territorial 
expansion. Being against the Ottoman principles, M. Kemal opposed this idea. 
Furthermore, although he was pro-Turkish, he did not pursue pan-Turanist foreign policy, 
which aims to unite the Turks. One reason why he did not adopt a pan-Turkist policy, 
besides the absence of means was to attract the Soviet support which was part of the 
essential international recognition effort. The Soviets had ascended to control much of 
the Turkish world in Central Asia and the Caucasus.90  
Needless to say, endeavoring to unite the Islamic world was the last thing M. 
Kemal would have done. That is to say M. Kemal declined ‘romantic foreign policy’. 
Instead, rebuilding the new republic from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and its 
strengthening became paramount. This would have been possible by rejecting assertive 
and revisionist foreign policy. What is more, a need for a strong military was justified 
given that preserving the territorial integrity of the new republic was another priority.91  
According to Baskin Oran, the Kemalist foreign policy can be defined as ‘pro-
Western’ and ‘status-quo preserving’. He says ‘maintaining the established order within 
the existing borders and balances’ and ‘realization of a Western oriented foreign policy 
formation’ are the fundamentals of the Kemalist foreign policy.92  
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Emphasizing the ‘non-aligned’ aspect of the Kemalist foreign policy, Nur Bilge 
Criss states that ‘to create a strong, modern state which could defend its territorial 
integrity and political independence, without external assistance, against external 
aggression; and to make Turkey a full, equal member of the Western European 
community of nations’ became the fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy.93 
One of the indispensable components of the Kemalist Turkish foreign policy is 
that it is radically pro-western94 and has always wanted to be in the western camp. 
Turkey’s NATO membership, Turkish-American partnership and the age old Turkish bid 
for EU membership can all be considered as Turkey’s desire to be part of the western 
camp.95 Hence, it would not be wrong to assert that the ‘the Kemalist identity and its 
profound one dimensional pro-Western character was what dominated the Turkish 
foreign policy, which resulted in Turkey’s utter and deliberate political, cultural and 
economic negligence of the Middle East, North Africa’.96  
This brings us to one of the most criticized foreign policy practices of the 
Kemalist elite. The Turkish policy vis-à-vis the Middle East was largely framed by its 
staunch pro-Western state identity. The notion was ‘to keep the hands off the Middle 
East’. Despite the fact that the new republic established mutual relations with the Arab 
                                                 
93 Nur Bilge Criss (1997) Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East. MERIA Journal Volume 1, No.1. 
http://www.gloria-center.org/1997/01/criss-and-bilgin-1997-01-03/ 
94 For example: Bacik, Gökhan/ Aras Bülent (2004); Turkey’s Inescapable Dilemma:  
America or Europe? Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.1,  
Spring 2004, pp. 57-58; Çalış, Şaban (1996); The role of identity in the making of modern  
Turkish foreign policy, PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham, pp. 7-8; ; Aydin, Mustafa (2004); 
Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) Papers, December 
2004, Ankara, p 9; Enes Bayrakli (2012) Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition: The Emergence of Kantian 
Culture in Turkish Foreign Policy (A holistic Constructivist Approach) pp. 77-78. University of Wien PhD 
Doctoral Dissertation; Baskin Oran's speech "Turkey's Changing Place in the World in Old Alignments and 
New Neighbors" at the International Conference, Oxford 30 April-2 May 2010. Published by South East 
European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) in 2011. 
95 Bacik, Gökhan/Aras Bülent, p. 58 
96 Enes Bayrakli (2012) Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition: The Emergence of Kantian Culture in 




states, the rule of thumb was to ‘leave the Arabs alone’. The nature of the Sadabat Pact of 
1937 that Turkey signed with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan signifies that instead of 
engaging in pro-active alliance formation, Turkey chose to consolidate its non-
interference/neutral stance toward its eastern neighborhood.97 Therefore, it can be said 
that the early decades of the Turkish republic witnessed an utter deterioration of relations 
with the Muslim world, especially with the Middle East.98 
Several factors came into play in this regard. First is the presence of mutual 
distrust. The perception that the Arabs betrayed the Turks in WWI was reciprocated by 
the notion that the secular, pro-western nation building efforts of M. Kemal further 
alienated Turkey from the Islamic world. Saban Calis and Huseyin Bagci state; “Turkish 
and Arabic secular circles "sought to remove what was seen as the dead weight of Islam 
and the Ottoman Empire by exaggerating the differences between Arab and Turk and 
vilifying one another”99 In addition to this, the Kemalist reforms were disapproved by 
conservative Arabs and interpreted as Turkey's breakaway from Islam.100  
Another blow to the Turco-Arabic relations came when the Hatay province 
seceded to Turkey from Syria after the plebiscite in 1939.101 A source of further 
deterioration was the abrogation of the caliphate. One consequence of this move was that 
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Turkey ceased all of its claims to be the spearhead of the Islamic world.102 Calis and 
Bagci argue that the idea that Turkey was no longer the leader of the Muslim world was 
consolidated when the removal of the caliph disappointed the hopes of people of those 
territories that were under the Western colonial yoke.103  
Furthermore, due to its extreme pro-western attitude, Turkey largely overlooked 
the rising pan-Arab sentiments in its Middle Eastern neighborhood. For example, Turkey 
was the first Muslim state to recognize the state of Israel, supported the French claims 
against Algeria and gave permission to the American troops to use its Incirlik Base in 
their operations to Lebanon in 1958. Turkey further openly displayed its military along 
the Syrian border in 1957 after the communist military takeover in Damascus. Finally, 
Ankara’s call for a western intervention to reinstate the monarchy in Baghdad in 1958 
further deepened the chasm between the Arabs and Turks.104 
The Kemalist ruling elite saw the Middle East and Islamic world to be the 
representation of backwardness, which has persisted throughout the existence of the 
republic.105 In this regard Philip Robins states that“[T]he essence of Kemalism oriented 
Turkey firmly toward the West to transform it into an advanced and westernized state. 
For well more than half a century under the rule of Ataturkists, Turkey behaved almost 
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literally as if the Middle East did not exist. That region represented an unhappy 
association with Turkey's past.”106 
According to Calis and Bagci, the persistent anti-Middle Eastern/Islamic world 
attitude of the Kemalist elite is identity related, mandating that the republic face only 
towards the west, eradicating the religious traces of the Ottoman Empire. While cutting 
ties from its oriental and Islamic past107 for a new and secular state, religion was not a 
valid basis for a political relationship in international relations as well.108 This foreign 
policy implementation was consistent with the radical secularization of domestic scenery. 
Such a policy was "an extension of domestic law which [held] that the use of religion for 
political purposes is subversive to a secular state, and hence, illegal. To use religion in 
international politics would therefore be at odds with a clearly defined domestic policy.109  
Another disincentive for Ataturk to develop relations with the Middle East was 
the fact that the region had become a competition ground for the colonizing powers, 
which rendered it chaotic. Furthermore, to M. Kemal, the Middle East represented a 
mindset, which was devoid of man-woman equality, individual rights and technological 
advancements. These reasons being against his understanding of modernity, M. Kemal 
resorted to a complete disengagement with the Middle East. Thus, as a natural outcome, 
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his foreign policy neglected the Middle East and Islamic world solely concentrating on 
the west.110 
To sum up, the Kemalist foreign policy aimed to perpetuate the existing status 
quo, refraining from any revisionist ideals that would challenge the international system. 
In 1921, M. Kemal said; "Let us recognize our own limits, Turkey does not desire an inch 
of foreign territory, but will not give up an inch of what it holds."111 Turkey under M. 
Kemal respected the balance of power. It is because of the legacy of the early years of the 
republic that the Turkish foreign policy in principle was status quo oriented and stagnant. 
This maxim was followed by the Turkish policy makers and governments in the decades 
to come.  
3.5.1 Kemalist Foreign Policy in Practice 
The interwar period brought about important developments to the international 
political system, which increased the need for security. Turkey could not remain 
disengaged from these developments.112The dissolution and removal of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the international system and rapid 
proliferation of politically and economically unstable states indicated further turmoil. 
Once a multi-national empire, Turkey had been reduced to being a nation state. It neither 
possessed the means nor aspiration for territorial expansion. What it needed was a 
realistic foreign policy that would resist the dangers of the international system to the best 
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means possible without jeopardizing the well-being of the newly created fragile state.113 
Mustafa and Aysegul Kibaroglu state that the Kemalist answer to the emerging 
international security dilemma was “to create zones of peace and security in Turkey’s 
immediate neighborhood.”114 
M. Kemal’s concerns were not unjustifiable. The rising aggressive stance of the 
Italo-German alliance was heralding trouble for Turkey’s Aegean and Mediterranean 
shores. The Balkans and the Middle East were not exemptions from the threat. Therefore, 
M. Kemal set his focus on securing Turkey’s neighborhood.115  
In his conversation with Joseph Grew, the U.S Ambassador 1927-1932, Tevfik 
Rüstü Aras, the foreign minister of Turkey during the Ataturk era said; “Our foreign 
policy is simple and direct; we seek friendship with all, alliance or groupement with 
none.” Therefore, M. Kemal embarked on, what Mayall describes as, “a burst of 
pactomania.”116 
In January 1929, the Briand-Kellogg Pact was passed by the Turkish Grand 
Assembly stating that war was not an “instrument of national policy.” Turkey signed the 
pact directly after the Unites States and France even though it had already signed a 
neutrality agreement with Rome seven months before. This neutrality pact bound both 
Italy and Turkey regardless of third-party involvement. It also assured arbitration to be 
the first plan of attack. Even though there were still unresolved issues regarding 
Lausanne, The Turkish-Greek accord of June 1930 led the way for amicable relations. 
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Even though Turkey has these strategic relationships with countries in their general area, 
Ankara knew that strategic alliances with major world powers like Great Britain, France, 
and the Soviet Union were key to national security. This led to the Turko-Soviet Treaty 
of Friendship in December 1925, which assured continuous amiability with Moscow. 
Ankara bettered their relationship with London by welcoming the British Mediterranean 
fleet in October of 1929 leading to an official alliance in 1939.117 
The encroachment of Italians in the Horn of Africa and their designs towards the 
east Mediterranean got Turkey, Iran and Iraq together, with the signing of the Saadabat 
Pact on October 2, 1935, in Geneva. Kibaroglu and Kibaroglu point out that the entente 
should be classified as one, which was aimed at respecting each other’s territorial 
integrity, internal affairs and security, rather than a military agreement.118 Kibaroglu and 
Kibaroglu further state that the Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, the Middle East 
and eastern Mediterranean can be viewed as a “pursuit of concerted action with 
involvement of regional states against the threats emanating from outside the region.” 
Turkey, as a newly established state, greatly benefited from the peace treaties. The 
treaties denoted that the signatory states acknowledged and respected Turkey’s territorial 
integrity, leaving a great breathing space abroad, making it easier for Turkey to focus and 
consolidate the social and economic reforms, which were gravely needed to rebuild the 
country from the ashes of the WWI. It can be said the successful solution of the problems 
inherited from the Lausanne Treaty, except for the Mosul issue, can largely be considered 
a diplomatic achievement.119 
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Whereas the diplomatic maneuvers of Turkey between two world wars may imply 
an active foreign policy, it was not the desire to pursue a pro-active foreign policy, but 
the international system of the time required a more cautious and defense oriented foreign 
policy. In a sense, the Turkish foreign policy was isolationist and neutral. Brock Millman 
states that the purpose of Kemalist foreign policy in the early years of the republic was to; 
 “...keep the alliance and cooperation with Russia in order to have secure borders 
in the East and the Black Sea, to ensure common action of Balkans in case of any 
external threat, as in the example of the Balkan Entente, and lastly the rapprochement 
with the West with the aim of providing security against the Italian and German threats, 
and to guarantee security in his South borders with Iraq and Syria.” 120 
3.6 Summarizing the Main Principles of the Kemalist Foreign Policy 
If we take into account the model used by the Kemalists, we can say that his 
foreign policy can be categorized as “pacifist and isolationist, legalist, pragmatist and 
realist.”121 These early foreign policy paradigms are a result of several different major 
events in Turkish history including the War of Turkish Independence, the Ottoman 
Empire’s legacy, and the personal traits of Ataturk. Ataturk was opposed to elongated 
military action as Turkey was a new nation with little financial reserve, few military 
resources, and little energy left in the people to take on another conflict. These factors led 
the government to believe that their best course of action was to work on reforming 
themselves internally and become a passive and isolated country internationally. The 
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Kemalist elite was under the impression that Turkey, like other weaker states, would 
benefit from the international law given that Turkey was somewhat insignificant in 
relation to large countries such as the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and other major 
powers that surrounded it. Turkey believed it was wise not to resort to military action, 
even for those concerning borders such as the Hatay problem and the Straits issue in 
order to conserve military resources and energy. Even though it would have been easy for 
Turkey to step in with force, it chose to utilize legal action to resolve these problems. It 
was the Kemalist elite who led the charge on this legalist approach in order to be 
considered part of the “civilized” Western world. This legalistic approach continued to be 
an important strategy even after the era of Ataturk.122 
Neutrality is also a cornerstone of foreign policy for the Kemalist elites due to the 
reasons stated above as well as the unfortunate alliance of the Ottoman Empire with 
Germany leading to disaster. This led Turkey to avoid partnerships politically or 
militarily in order to keep the peace with strong countries within their region such as Italy 
or the Soviet Union. The Balkan Pact and the Bagdad Pact don’t seem to align with 
Turkey’s neutral stance except that they were entered into as a defensive measure and not 
in relation to any particular third party. One of the strongest examples of Turkey’s neutral 
stance in foreign relations was during World War II, during which time Turkey 
adamantly remained neutral.123  
Sedat Laciner concurs that Kemalism was a revolutionary movement with 
unbendable dogmas but adds that it was a pragmatic one too. Just as the Ottoman Empire 
had to play off between the great powers for its survival, exploiting their competition, M. 
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Kemal too followed the same balancing policy. Whereas Turkey benefited from the 
Communist Soviet Union in military and financial aid, it also pursued good relations with 
the British, Italians and the French to counterbalance Russia. 124 Even at the time when 
Hitler and Mussolini were rising, Turkey sought to maintain relations both with Germany 
and Italy as well as Britain, the United States and France.125 
3.7 Conclusion 
Understanding conditions out of which the Kemalist ideology was born, the 
process whereby it gained prominence as well as the course it took to consolidate itself in 
the early decades of newly created republic are important to elaborate and understand for 
there is a strong relationship between the aforementioned aspects of Kemalism and the 
manner in which the Turkish foreign policy was shaped and implemented in the decades 
during and after the time of Mustafa Kemal, the founder and the ideological father of the 
Republic of Turkey. 
Mustafa Kemal was a prominent soldier, who served in the ever crumbling 
Ottoman Empire. More importantly he took part in the Turco-Italian War of 1911-1912, 
the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, and World War I that sealed the fate of the empire as well 
as the subsequent War of Turkish Independence after which he became the sole leader of 
Turkey. 
Several ideologies surfaced aspiring to save the empire from collapsing. The 
relevance and fate of these ideologies were largely determined by the political and 
military developments that took place in the last decades of the empire. For instance the 
Ottomanism was proposed to create a feeling of unity among the Ottoman subjects 
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(especially Muslims and Christians) by elevating the status of the latter to the former 
throughout the empire. Although this idea gained prominence after the Greek 
independence in 1832 to prevent other non-Muslim entities rising and declaring 
independence, the increasing Russian, British and French intervention in the Ottoman 
domestic affairs, (especially with regards to Bulgarians and Armenians as well as the 
territories lost in the Balkans), rendered the Ottomanist ideology irrelevant. The Ottoman 
statesmen turned to Islam, thus pan-Islamism, in their attempt to gain the support of the 
Muslim subjects especially in the Middle East, which came to be the last remaining 
territory outside of Anatolia, (today’s Turkey). However, as was the case with the 
Greeks, Armenians and other non-Muslim subjects, the Muslims of the Middle East were 
not immune to the European meddling. The rise of the Arab nationalistic sentiments 
among the Muslims in the Middle East, especially instigated by the British and the 
French and the subsequent Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire surely showed that 
the efforts to promote the concept of Ummah, the unity among Muslims, was pointless. 
The apparent failure of the Ottomanism and pan-Islamism justified the rise of the 
pro-western, secular/positivist and nationalistic pan-Turkist ideology. Having lost the 
Balkan and Middle Eastern territories, for the Ottoman Turks, Anatolia was left to be the 
only remaining territorial entity on which they could survive. In other words, Anatolia 
represented the maximum extent of the territorial retreat. It is this point that Mustafa 
Kemal gained prominence. He and his comrades not only fought against the invading 
forces of Britain, France, Italy, Greece, Russia and Armenia, they embarked on a struggle 
against the Ottoman sultan, who they accused of being a collaborator and traitor in the 




The end of the World War I sealed the fate of the 600 year old Ottoman Empire. It 
is this point that Mustafa Kemal rose to prominence by cleaning the Turkish heartland of 
the invading forces after the Turkish War of Independence and establishing the Republic 
out of the ashes of the imploded Ottoman Empire. His policies in the aftermath of the 
declaration of the republic were reflective of his world view as well as his experiences 
when he was an officer in the Ottoman Army. For once, he wanted a clean slate and 
completely detached the newly established state from its predecessor. This required 
radical decisions and their implementation in the same manner they had been envisaged. 
Not only was the state to be created but also the society, (which had inherited the 
Ottoman past), had to be molded and modified into the newly created state and its 
machinery. Therefore, anything reminiscence of the Ottoman was to be eradicated. The 
influence of Islam in state and society was reduced to the lowest level possible. The 
caliphate and monarchy were abolished. Secularism became one of the most important 
pillars of the Kemalist worldview. This Kemalist ideology impacted the foreign policy. 
The perception that the Arabs sided with the invading forces during the WWI as well as 
the perception that the Middle East represented backwardness and Islam created two of 
the Kemalist foreign policy principles; to remain distant from the Middle East as much as 
possible and to not conduct foreign policy based on religious affiliation. The extent of 
Turkey’s relations with the Middle East, therefore, was limited to establishing defensive 
pacts; such was the case with the Sadabad Pact of 1937. As Larrabee put; “… more than 
half a century under the rule of Kemalists, Turkey behaved almost literally as if the 
Middle East did not exist. That region represented an unhappy association with Turkey's 
past.”126 
                                                 




This is in conjunction with another important aspect of the Turkish foreign policy; 
overwhelming pro-Westernism - the new republic and its people ought to solely pursue 
Western/European values, which would promote advancement and prosperity in Turkey. 
The Kemalist paradigm, therefore, staunchly aspired for Turkey to be part of the West. 
Turkey’s desire to become a member of the European Union and the NATO membership, 
although the Soviet threat played a role to a great extent, can be cited as notable examples 
of this aspect of Turkish foreign policy. 
Furthermore, despite the victory in the war of independence, the newly 
established republic was rather frail due to the devastation of WWI, therefore M. Kemal 
focused on reinforcing its existence through international recognition, which led to a very 
cautious, status quo oriented foreign policy understanding. In fact, it can be said that M. 
Kemal spent most of his energy to domestically consolidate the foundations of the 
republic as well as to preserve the hard earned borders of the country.  
Finally, the painful experiences of WWI traumatized the Turkish policy makers 
and people, which generated the perception that Turkey is surrounded, from within and 
abroad, by enemies. They, who have intended to destroy the Turkish nation before, are 
relentless in their aspirations and if the Turkish state is rendered weak, especially 
militarily, they would not hesitate to accomplish their unfinished task of destroying the 
Turkish nation. The Sevres Syndrome, in other words, led to the securitization of Turkish 
foreign policy throughout the decades to come. This notion later was perpetuated by the 
Turkish Armed Forces and its intervention in civilian politics was thereby encouraged 
and justified by the Kemalist elite. 
                                                                                                                                                 




All the above mentioned considered, M. Kemal and the new Kemalist elite crafted 
a new foreign policy culture whereby Turkey is to be part of the west, keeps its relations 
with the Middle East and the Muslim world minimum, remains reserved, status quo 
oriented and reactive. Such new policy culture called for a state machine that would 
ensure its consolidation and perpetuation. 
The next chapter will examine the components of this machinery and how it 




CHAPTER 4. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION of THE KEMALIST 
ELITE AND THE KEMALIST BUREAUCRACY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The discussion of the elite formation and the subsequent institutionalization of the 
elite is an important part of the paradigm shift debate. As mentioned earlier, Reardon 
states that paradigm shifts can be either comprehensive or sectoral. The former takes 
place in such a radical manner that the new elite’s complex learning process may result in 
the complete rejection of the polity adaptations embraced by the country's ruling elites. 
For example in 1917 and 1949 when the Soviet and the Chinese communist 
revolutionaries became the new ruling elites; they fundamentally transformed the state's 
political, economic and social structures.127 Additionally, Carson et al. argue that 
replacing an earlier elite to institutionalize the new paradigm may occur by relying on 
force, as in coup d'état or violent revolution, through democratic process, such as 
elections or nominations, societal negotiation, or generational cohort shift. A new group 
or coalition with a new paradigm or model of institutional arrangements appears on the 
scene and assumes a position of power, enabling it to bring about a substantial shift in the 
institutional paradigm and arrangements. This may be, but is not necessarily, proceeded 
by a breakdown in consensus among established power elites about the appropriate 
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paradigm or about reform of the existing paradigm.128 This being said, in the following 
section I will discuss about the elite formation and consolidation process in Turkey. 
4.2 Creation of the Kemalist Elite 
Unlike most European modernity efforts, the Turkish modernity, for almost two 
hundred years, during the Ottoman and the Turkish Republic, was top-down. The 
Ottoman Empire, especially in the last decades of its life, had its own elitism culture. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the newly established Turkish republic, although 
having severed all ties with its predecessor, inherited this elitism culture. Considering the 
fact that the military-bureaucratic elite were the spearhead of modernity in the Ottoman 
Empire, they too became the new elite of the newly established republic.129 Therefore it is 
vital to examine the nature of the new Kemalist Turkish elite as it had effectively 
controlled the Turkish politics, military, legal system, economy and almost the entire 
aspect of life in the country. I believe that the establishment and the consolidation of the 
new elite created a new paradigm in the new republic, which was defined by their own 
terms. However, it is the increasing friction, especially after the 1950s, between the new 
elite (the core) and the rural Anatolia (the periphery) that determined the Turkish 
domestic and foreign politics for decades to come. Therefore, examination of the 
Kemalist elite is important to establish a solid ground in the discussion of the paradigm 
shift. 
Dietrich Jung and Wolfgang Picolli’s explanation of the nature of the new Turkish 
elite is precise. They argue that; 
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“In a clear analogy with still vivid forms of patriarchal authority, high-ranking 
Turkish bureaucrats view the state as a father figure acting with compassion and justice 
towards its children. Although an initiator of democratic procedures, the bureaucracy 
perceives democratic rules merely juridical forms. From the bureaucratic perspective, it 
is the bureaucracy itself that designates democratic structures as a formal set of rules. 
Democracy therefore has to facilitate policies thorough enlightened debate rather than 
organize conflicting ideas and interests through adversarial politics. Consequently, the 
bureaucratic detestation of party politics resembles that of military and like the generals; 
bureaucrats consider themselves as being apart from and above the rest of society.” 130 
M. Kemal moved forward with extensive reforms once he knew that the elite were 
the ruling party as he then had the power to redesign the way the government and society 
functioned. He found no opposition and even enjoyed loyalty from all institutions. M. 
Kemal instituted important societal changes to the Ottoman tradition.131 
In 1925, both the religious shrines and the dervish convents were closed followed 
by turban and fez from as far back as Sultan Mahmut II being prohibited and replaced 
with the more Western hat or cap. The general population stubbornly resisted these 
cultural changes as the shrines and convents played an important role in the Muslim life 
led by a majority of the population and the Westernized hat flew in the face of Islam as 
being a symbol of Christianity. In order to suppress the resistance to these changes, the 
Independence Tribunals were utilized under the power of the Law on the Maintenance of 
Order. This law brought about the arrest of 7500 Turks with 660 of them being executed. 
M. Kemal continue to deviate from the Ottoman culture in the beginning of 1926 by 
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replacing what was cultural with the European calendar, the civil code from Switzerland, 
and Italy’s penal code. Several laws passed to restructure the banking sector and all 
courtesy titles were done away with except for those in the military.132 The Kemalist 
government instituted these changes to usher the society into Western methods, which 
they considered more civilized. 133 
A final attempt to stop these reforms barely made it off the ground. Those 
attempting to obstruct the reforms by assassinating Kemal were arrested by security 
forces. Some of those groups who were involved in the alleged conspiracy included the 
Islamists. Some liberals claimed that the reports of an assassination attempt were simply 
a counter-conspiracy by the Kemal regime to blame those who opposed their changes. 
Whether this is true or not, M. Kemal took advantage of this supposed assassination 
attempt to put down any remaining opposition to his government. Most of the Unionists 
also known as the People’s Republican Party (or PRP), except Hüseyin Rauf and Adnan, 
they were arrested and charged with the planning of a rebellion. Sixteen of the PRP 
members were executed. Kazim Karabekir, All Fuat, Cafer Tayyar and Refet, leading 
military heroes, were handed pardons to placate the masses and because they were no 
longer a threat to the Kemalist regime.134  
The changes made by the Kemalist government flowed into the 1930s without 
much opposition. During these changes, M. Kemal strengthened the alliance among the 
Party (PRP), military, government, and the intellectuals, all Kemalist groups. The 
ideology set forth by Kemal was named Atatürkcülük or Kemalizm but was truly more a 
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description of the spirit behind his ideals than a true detailed ideology.135These reforms to 
modernize Turkey culturally and socially were unprecedented and were presented with 
the belief that the new Kemal elite were the only and best resort for the nation.136 
Due to the overwhelming control of Turkish politics by the Kemal regime, 
Kemalism, the state, and the PRP became considered one and the same; thus any 
opposition to any of these was considered treason.  In order for the regime to convert the 
Turkish nation to its Kemalist views of building a new Westernist nation, they launched a 
campaign by the state, the party, the official (and only legal) press, and schools.  This 
attempt to bring all Turks on board utilized not only Kemal’s ideals but also heroic 
images.  This campaign came to be called the Ataturkculestirme (convert people 
Kemalist) and even infiltrated elementary schools.  Kemal’s purpose was to create a new 
nation free from religion and negativity and filled with nationalists. Through heavy 
political propaganda, a new generation of Turks was growing up who would be taking 
over as the country’s elite.137    
The memoirs of journalist Selahaddin Gungor describes dramatically what effect 
this propaganda had on the people of Turkey: `It was nighttime, and I was sleeping. I 
woke up when my older brother started to shake. He was shouting `Wake up... Hurry. I 
will take you to Atatürk. ‘I thought I was in a dream: `Atatürk? You are kidding me. Can 
eyes see Atatürk? ‘I asked my parents, `Atatürk is God? Does he eat? Does he drink like 
us? '... '' 138  
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The group that claimed and consolidated the power were soon called the 
Kemalists139 or the Kemalist elite. Laciner argues that allegiance to the state of the 
Kemalist elite was not solely on ideological grounds but also stemmed from the fact that 
they deemed it to be their biggest source of wealth. The party of the Kemalist elite, 
People’s Republican Party, had quickly been turned into an instrument used to handle the 
state funds and offered the ruling Kemalist elite a social status and a lifestyle. To Laciner, 
this occurrence created a chasm between the ruling elite (the Kemalists) and the rest of 
the Turks (later called the “the Anatolian people”). The difference between the two could 
be seen in their lifestyle. For example, whereas the Kemalists found such habits as 
drinking, dating, and wearing mini skirt acceptable, the Anatolian conservatives would 
frowned upon these habits. Over time, the Kemalist elite began to perceive itself as the 
guardian of the state, considering the party and the state integral. Because of this reason 
M. Kamal assigned the elite the duty of protecting and perpetuating the reforms.140 In one 
of his speeches he summarized the Kemalist elite's role as follows:  
`The duty of these citizens [intellectuals and the Kemalist elite] is to mix the best 
path to follow in order to ensure their progress and their renaissance. That is how I see 
our people. The interests of different groups can be reconciled perfectly and there are no 
means of dividing them into classes. All our citizens enter into the group, which we call 
the People. Thus the People's Party will be the school of education in citizenship for all 
our people. ' 141  
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Having monopolized the governance and possessed ‘locus standi’, the Kemalist 
elite differed from the European middle class, (which sought compromise between the 
upper and the lower classes), in that it was ideologically oriented and tends to possess 
autocratic leanings, which is very typical of the third world bureaucracy and 
intelligentsia.  This uncompromising nature of relations between the Kemalist elite (the 
core) and the Anatolian majority (the periphery) would, in the second part of the 20th 
century, become a major issue. Omer Taspinar states that the governments in this period 
ruled “For the people, despite the people!”142  
The party became a medium, in its conventions and meetings, where the state 
ideology and policies were discussed and created. One example of the symbiotic 
relations, to Laciner, was that the rural representatives of the party were, at the same 
time, the governors of their provinces, who represented the state there. Furthermore, the 
chief of the party was also the head of the state. This was placed in the constitution and 
the party program in 1937. 143 
While the party served as a means of governance, it was also used to educate the 
Kemalist class. The Halkevleri (People’s Houses) and schools played a great role in this. 
In addition, the party was used to make Kemalism, what Laciner calls, “a frozen 
ideology”, which cannot be disputed or revised. In time, the Kemalism grew not only to 
be an ideology but also it came to represent the interest of the Kemalist elite. The elite 
never wanted to lose the privileges and their yoke over the state they attained through 
Kemalism.144 The 1935 PRP Program stated; “the fundamental ideas that make up of the 
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PRP party program are the same as the implementations of the Kemalist Turkish 
revolution…and implementation of these extend well into the future.”145   
Furthermore, the party officials ensured that the Kemalist ideology become a 
“frozen ideology” by elevating it to such dogmatic levels so that is it not debated or 
opposed. That is to say any challenging counter argument against Kemalism not only 
meant a defamation of the ideology but the elite per se. The amalgamation of the party 
and the state affairs created a situation where, the opposition to the misdeeds of the 
Kemalist elite and the opposition to the state became blurry. Laciner argues that Ataturk 
used the foreign policy to underpin his political and economic reforms at home. 
Therefore, due to the autocratic nature of the Kemalist system, it would not have been 
possible to “produce a pluralistic foreign policy” in which he was the sole decision maker 
in foreign policy. 146 
The following section discusses the nature and the development of the Kemalist 
bureaucracy. The important point to be taken into consideration in the following is the 
reaction of the Kemalist elite/bureaucracy147 (the core) to the rise of the opposition, 
which is defined as the “periphery”. The power struggle between the two, especially after 
the advent of true democratic elections in 1950 defined the political, social and economic 
evolution of Turkey in the second half of the 20th century. 
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4.3 The Ruling Kemalist Bureaucracy  
4.3.1 Bureaucracy 
As mentioned earlier, there was an intricate cohabitation between the Kemalist 
bureaucracy and the leadership. The same was the case with the foreign policy 
bureaucracy. This bureaucracy had been the forerunners of the westernization attempts 
and reforms in the last phases of the Ottoman Empire. It did not change with the advent 
of the republic.  From Ismet Inonu to Tevfik Rustu Aras, the ministers were replaced but 
the bureaucracy remained largely unchanged. Dankwart A. Rustow states that 93% of the 
Ottoman staff officers and 85% of the civil servants had continued to occupy their 
positions even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.148 This ensured the continuity and 
constancy of foreign affairs bureaucracy. Moreover, the republic era foreign bureaucracy 
revered M. Kemal, hailing him as a hero.149 Therefore, the foreign ministry has been one 
of the staunchest advocates of Kemalism in Turkish bureaucracy. 150  
Ataturk believed that the bureaucrats had a duty to control the society from 
political, economic and social perspectives. Ilter Turan states that the Kemalist 
bureaucracy is regulative rather than representative or mobilizational when it comes to 
governance. As they are the representatives of the state across Turkey, they are 
responsible for the entirety of people. In the words of Turan, `the ruled were seen not as 
citizens but as subjects whose prime duty was obedience to their benevolent rulers.”151  
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Ataturk adopted what J.H.G. von Justi called the machine model. According to 
this, “A properly constituted state must be exactly analogous to a machine, in which all 
the wheels and gears are precisely adjusted to one another and the ruler must be the 
foreman, the mainspring, or the soul, which sets everything in motion.”152  
Metin Heper argues that M. Kemal believed that the government should function 
like a machine. Even the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which according to Ataturk 
was “substratum administrative”, was no exception. The civil bureaucracy was “a lesser 
part of the governmental machine, a mere instrument (kabil-i istimal bir cihaz)”. As in 
the Prussia of Frederick II (1740- 1786), it should be an impersonal organization 
structured on the basis of strict hierarchy and staffed by civil servants acting in 
accordance with the letter of the law; these functionaries should receive a practically 
oriented education. To Heper, Ataturk revived the Turkish version of Richelieu’s 
commissaire- the agent of monarchical discipline. 153  
Von Justi says Ataturk was not part of the machine but a supervisor of its 
working.154 He wanted more than efficiency; the civil servants were to be loyal to the 
Republic’s goals (Cumhuriyet Mefkuresi). For them, rationality would be defined in the 
form of the Kemalist principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, 
etatism and reformism.155 Finally, Heper argues that “the bureaucratic ruling tradition 
during the early republican period was similar to Plato’s government by guardians who 
personified the essence of the public interest and the approved ideology and, and who 
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were to be their devoted instruments.”156 As the perceived threat from the multi-party 
system mounted, the bureaucracy’s reflex was to resist the change, which also threatened 
their privileges and “caste characteristics”. In order to preserve it, they pursued “negative 
politics”, denouncing the legislation, to which they officially were accountable.157 
4.3.2 The Beginning of the Multi-Party Era and its Implications for the Kemalist Elite 
As was discussed previously, the earlier years of the republic was marked by the 
conception and implementation of top-to-down reforms, which turned the new regime 
into a more authoritarian one.  With the dominance of the single party and its intertwined 
relation with the state contributed to this authoritarian role even more. The year 1946 was 
a milestone for Turkish democracy. The devastating effects of WWII on Turkey, 
(although remaining neutral), were excruciating. The already weak economy was on the 
verge of collapse. The only immediate solution was to accept the American aid, which 
was to be released on the condition that the Inonu government allows for a multiparty 
democracy. Then head of PRP Ismet Inonu had no choice but to accept the American 
financial aid. The dissidents from the ruling People’s Republican Party (PRP), notably 
Adnan Menderes, Fatin Rustu Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan, formed the Democrat Party 
(DP). It was now evident that the PRP and DP were the embodiment of the ideological 
fissure that first surfaced during the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), those who 
advocated statist, centralized, strictly secular polity and those who advocated a more 
decentralized governance, liberal economy and less strict form of secularism.158 
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The first multi-party elections, although not considered fully fair, yielded 62 seats 
for the DP. However, the following elections in 1950 resulted in what Feroz Ahmad calls 
“A White Revolution”159 in which the DP gained a whopping 415 seats while the PRP 
got only 69.160 This marked an important shift in Turkish politics in that for the first time 
the change came from bottom to top, as people displayed their displeasure to the single 
party regime. What was important about the overwhelming victory of DP is that it 
showed that the party of M. Kemal had lost the support of the masses and when given a 
chance, those masses would display their dissatisfaction.161   
What was remarkable about the decisive victory of the DP was that the 
governance that had been limited to the privileged elite was now open to the vast 
majority of the republic.162 Furthermore, for the first time in history, the Turks 
determined their government with a bottom to top approach.163 
The DP government displayed considerable differences compared to the PRP. The 
majority of the DP members consisted of rural youth as well as those people who had 
little or no connection with the established Kemalist elite and bureaucracy. The DP 
election campaigns showed the ideological differences too. The party demanded religious 
freedom, support for private entrepreneurship, political and economic liberalization. 
Furthermore, as opposed to the heavily centralized Kemalist type bureaucracy, the DP 
advocated granting local governments more sovereignty. This created a conflict of 
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interest between the elected government and the established bureaucracy. In this regard 
Erik Jan Zurcher says:  “In the period of PRP government, the state administration and 
party organization were so bound up with each other that the party became one of means 
of state only to inspect and administrate society. With the coming of DP to power, 
eventually this relation was cut off. Democrats did not trust bureaucracy and army that 
were inherited from the previous administration, and thus they were struggling too much 
to take them under control. For this reason, there emerged a new tendency of unification 
between state and party, particularly at the top of state. In addition, what was different 
from the Kemalist period was that party controlled bureaucracy.”164 
Until the advent of the DP, the state and political elite coexisted harmoniously 
which are called ‘unity of elites’, Ali Yasar Saribay states; 
“Under the Kemalist rule, the elite is said to have become accustomed to unchallenged 
power and the prestige that accompanied it. Thus the PRP was bureaucratized and 
bureaucratic and political power was fused to create an apparatus to impose the 
officials’ will on the public.”165 
However, ‘unity of elite’ was disrupted with the DP in power. The Democrat’s 
distrust toward established bureaucracy and military prompted the new government to 
resort to some measures, one of which was ‘to try to separate the CHP from the state’. As 
Yapp argues, the new government launched several measures ‘to try to separate the CHP 
from the state’.166  
In 1951, the DP closed Halk Evleri (the People’s Houses), which were considered 
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to be the propaganda tools for the PRP. In 1953, the government usurped the CUP 
properties including the Ulus newspaper, which belonged to the party. 167 
Ercüment Yavuzalp, who served the foreign affairs in the Menderes period and 
used to be the private secretary of Menderes, summarizes the foreign policy of the 
Menderes era: 
“When Menderes came to power, the main purpose of foreign policy for Menderes 
remained behind what it should have been, and thus he believed that it needed the first 
priority. In order to achieve a substantial economic development, he thought that the 
security of country should be relied upon strong bases. The purpose of Menderes was to 
get rid of the state as being the state of a small minority and having a few developed 
centers but to make it a state which would expand from top to bottom throughout the 
country and to defeat poverty. For this reason, it was necessary to abandon the most 
praised past but to accept that our country was undeveloped without being in complex 
and then to make effort to get rid of this condition. Thus, it was necessary to resolve the 
question of security in the foreign policy, which was not only a vital priority, but at the 
same times it needed an urgent action.”168  
Another striking aspect of the DP government was that its support base was 
composed of businessmen, tradesmen, small businesses, conservatives, Islamists, 
religious people, villagers and liberals. Thanks to economic and political liberalization 
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the support base of the DP became wider. This support balanced the opposition, and gave 
the DP public support in foreign policy problems.169 
It was clear that the DP would follow policies different from those of traditional 
Kemalist. However, the members of the DP never argued that they were embarking on a 
cleansing project against the Kemalist revolution, but claimed to be against the PRP. As 
the anti-PRP rhetoric began to be uttered more explicitly, the threat perception of the 
established Kemalist elite became more grounded. While the DP became the government 
of the state, the Kemalists still had a tight grip on civil and military bureaucracy. Thus a 
hidden opposition against the DP, besides the PRP, began to form. Therefore, one can say 
that early 1950s witnessed the birth of the hidden opposition of the civil and military 
bureaucracy against future popularly elected governments. Such opposition would in later 
decades incite and/or stage military coups that would topple governments that they 
perceived non-Kemalist. 
Laciner argues that during the Inonu era, the Turkish bureaucracy gained its real 
class-consciousness. Therefore, when an outsider with different ideology and agenda, the 
DP, came to power, the civil and military bureaucracy, who had perceived themselves the 
owner and the protector of the Kemalist state, considered it as a source of threat to their 
privileges.  
This led to a situation where the Kemalists no longer constituted the sole owner of 
power but part of it. The business class and working class, which were not really 
represented by the previous PRP government now found an opportunity to express 
themselves. The economic and political liberalization allowed once suppressed portion of 
society to have more upward mobility. One of the results was the internal migration 
                                                 




where those people who lived in Anatolia, which also was called “the periphery”, began 
to move to the urban areas, which had traditionally been occupied by the elite. This social 
movement manifested itself in bureaucracy too.170   
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was no exception. Due to the inherent Kemalist 
structure of the ministry, the diplomats were uneasy about the ongoing changes in the 
society and the ministry. For instance, then ambassador Mahmut Dikerdem called 
Koprulu, the first Democratic Minister of Foreign Affairs, a koylu (villager, a pejorative 
term).The established bureaucracy in the Ministry opposed Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes’ overt pro-American stance. The Ministry had been the leader of the 
Westernism in Turkey, yet they were publicly against activist interventionism. The 
Turkish diplomats’ memoirs prove that the Ministry was particularly against the 
Democrats’ Middle Eastern policy as it was viewed as a clear deviation from Kemalist 
foreign policy.171  Indeed for the Kemalist bureaucracy the DP did not take the Kemalist 
foreign policy principles into consideration when it was forming Turkey’s external 
relations.  For them, the Democrats neglected secularism, pacifism, realism, legalism and 
the non-alignment of principles of Kemalism.172 
It did not take long for the DP to take aim at the foreign ministry bureaucracy. For 
example, ambassadors were being replaced with those who were close to the ideology of 
DP, even with the relatives of the DP members. For example, then foreign minister Fatin 
Rustu Zorlu’s brother, Rifki Rustu Zorlu served as the Turkish ambassador to Cairo 
between 1954 and 1957.173 
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The Arabic call to prayer was once again permitted throughout the country being 
reinstated in every mosque overnight and Islamic education was expanded to the point 
that instead of opting in to religious education, parents had to opt out which was rare due 
to social pressure. Even the number of schools for preachers was greater. More mosques 
were built every day and religious literature was once again published and sold 
throughout the country. The Democratic Party’s secular form of government was very 
similar to that seen in the 1950’s under the PRP. Even with all of the religious freedom, 
Kemal Pilavoğlu, leader of the Ticani dervish order, was arrested, sent to prison, and then 
put under house arrest after leading members of the Ticani dervish order chose to destroy 
busts of Atatürk after the victory of the DP’s election.174 
 The Democratic Party continued to integrate religion into the government and 
preachers remained civil servants. Even the existence of autonomous religious 
organizations like brotherhoods were accepted and validated when the DP accepted the 
help of the religious Nurcu movement in the elections of 1954 and 1957. All of this came 
together to support the DP’s belief that religion was compatible with development. 
However, this admission threatened the ruling power of the educated elite. Civil servants, 
teachers, academics, and officers who had internalized the Kemalist viewpoint owed their 
elite status to the fact that they supported the positivist, Western outlook. Zurcher states 
that all this led these Kemalist advocates to believe that the DP was betraying their 
traditions by openly supporting the Islam religion. This mindset was particularly held by 
the military, which saw themselves as the keepers of Atatürk’s heritage.175 
                                                 





Its rivals saw the DP as a party bent on integrating Islam back into Turkish 
politics. In actuality, the Democrats were trying to make the modernization project 
acceptable to the masses as opposed to it being considered elitist. In order to aid in this, 
the DP opened the secularization pillar to debate and allowed room for religion, thus 
uniting the rural masses behind capitalist development, nationalism, and greater support 
of Westernization.176 
With the Turkish rural population moving in larger numbers into urban areas, the 
relaxation of secularist policies allowed the masses to bring their Muslim faith with them 
into the cities. This is considered a great resurgence of Islam within Turkey by 
intellectuals at this time and later. Even though Muslim fundamentalist groups were at 
work, it was truly the traditional culture of the masses that reasserted its self to bring 
Islam back to the forefront.177 
With the Democratic Party coming to power, Turkey experienced a new 
Assembly and truly a new government as the DP members were dramatically different 
from those in the Kemalist regime. For example, the average age of the DP MPs was 
much younger than the Kemalists during their time of ruling. Also, their election districts 
and supporters were more intimate. Because the Kemalist regime was made up of the 
elite, there was a higher percentage of highly educated people than what was seen in the 
DP. Perhaps the most marked difference between the governments of the DP and the PRP 
was that the PRP leadership was made up of a lot of members of bureaucratic or military 
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backgrounds compared to the Democrats. These differences show that a dramatically 
dissimilar government came to power in Turkey with the Democratic Party.178 
4.3.3 The DP and Kemalist Foreign Policy Bureaucracy 
American-style Westernism was the goal of the Democratic Party as opposed to 
the PRP’s radical Republican Westernism based on the French Revolution. This new kind 
of Westernism was a slow change as opposed to a quick and complete revolution.179  
The goal of the Democratic Party was to create a “little United States” out of 
Turkey due to their belief in the political and financial model of the United States. It must 
be stated that the İnönü government too attempted to strengthen its friendship with the 
US after World War II and even suggested changing some of the Turkish politics to 
better resemble those in America. As a result, Turkey brought the multi-party regime into 
their system. However, the PRP’s embracing pro-American policies was tactical. 
Whereas İnönü, thus the Kemalists, were of the opinion that the pro-American foreign 
policy was purely instrumental for survival under the conditions of the time and required 
for American aid, to Menderes and the DP, Americanism was more than an instrument, it 
was considered a goal, which was liberal, Western and democratic. The Kemalist regime 
was against the Democratic Party’s form of Americanism, stating that the DP was not 
aiming to Westernize Turkey but to make it truly a Western institution.180 
                                                 
178 Cihan Goktepe, The Menderes Period (1950-1960) The Journal of Turkish Weekly, Quoted from: Erik 
Jan Zürcher, Moderleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi, İletişim, İstanbul 1998, p. 321 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/60/the-menderes-period-1950-1960.html  
179 Laciner states that while the Republican Westernism was revolutionary, the people’s choice and welfare 
were the priorities in DP policies. For the DP, people should decide their own fate, not the elite. They 
argued that the state was the servant of the people and the state was for the people. The Democratic 
Westernism was also secular, yet it did not consider religion as dangerous. 
180 Laciner, pp. 114-115 Quoted from: Niyazi Berkes, ‘Satılık Memleket’ (A Home-country to Sale), Yön, 




The Democratic Party viewed American civilization as the ultimate goal for 
Turkey as opposed to the PRP who left no doubt that they were opposed to American 
values. Because of this, the DP saw itself as representing the people of Turkey in their 
governmental transformation into a land that is modern, democratic, liberal, and lining up 
with the Western ideals. All of this led the DP to model a systematic American approach 
to politics and pioneered the Americanist political regime in their country.181 Therefore, 
the DP government greatly benefited from the economic boom and the ensuing rise in 
prosperity in the post WWII Europe. This was one reason why the DP yet again won in 
1954 with landslide. 182 
The rising communist threat from its north prompted Turkey to abandon its 
decade long ‘western skeptic’183 foreign policy to fully embracing the west, forcing the 
DP into strong alliance commitments with the West. This solidarity among various 
countries was also very advantageous for Turkish interests. Thus, the Democratic Party 
supported cooperation with international allies against attacks from the Soviet Union.184 
The passive principles of the Kemalists along with their policies for Middle 
Eastern relations were heavily criticized by the Democratic Party.  The DP sided more 
with not committing to any particular position with Middle Eastern countries which was 
quite different from the previous traditional policy.  It was the first time since the 
Ottoman Empire’s alliance with Germany that Turkey identified national interests with 
another country’s interests.  We see this in Turkey’s relationship with Iraq and Syria as 
Turkey came very close to involving themselves militarily in their affairs in order to side 
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with the United States.  This deviation from Kemalist policies challenged the original 
foreign policy bureaucracy of the Kemalist regime.185 
It was the induction of Turkey into the Western block seen during the Menderes 
government that largely resolved its position in both the Balkans and the Middle East. US 
Secretary of State John F. Dulles depended on Turkey as a key partner in the effort to 
counter the Soviet threat with NATO alliances.  The US first tried its hand in building 
alliances in the Middle East in 1951-52 by attempting to bring together Turkey and Egypt 
although neither country was very enthusiastic about the opportunity.  This was soon 
followed up by a treaty involving cooperation and mutual assistance between Turkey and 
the Kingdom of Iraq led by Nuri al-Said in February of 1955.  This treaty, called the 
“Baghdad Pact,” was also entered into by Great Britain, Iran and Pakistan, but the US 
simply observed the treaty.186 
Similar to the earlier Kemalist approach, Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy was a 
very important part of its policies of relations with the West.  However, instead of the 
earlier Kemalist direction of its dealing with the Middle East consisting of being 
defensive and an extension of relationships with the West, Turkey was now an active 
participant in Middle Eastern politics along with the West.  Turkey was actually a key 
component in the strategy put forth by Great Britain and the US to organize the Middle 
Eastern countries against the Soviets. The Democratic Party’s policies in the Middle East 
also differed from those of the Kemalists by being much more active.  To prove this, 
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Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü made it known that he was not happy with the former 
policies of Atatürk and İnönü in relationship to Arab states while promising a change.187 
As we’ve explored, the policies of the Democratic Party differed greatly from 
those followed by the Kemalist regime.  While the DP saw many things such as religion 
as an opportunity to bring people together, the Kemalists saw many of these same things 
as dangerous.  While the DP never came out directly against Kemalism, they actually 
claimed they were the “best Kemalists” and that they truly understood the true concept of 
Kemalism which the PRP had misunderstood.  Whether one agrees with this claim or not, 
those who supported traditional Kemalism such as the PRP and the civil and military 
bureaucracy saw the Democrats as a threat to their ideals and the whole Kemalist 
revolution.  Unexpectedly, history also saw that the Marxists joined in on lobbying 
against the DPs stating the DP regime was undemocratic especially compared to the one-
party regime seen under Ataturk.  188  
This led to a hidden opposition beginning; the government may have been under 
the control of the elected Democratic Party, but the Kemalists still ruled the bureaucracy.  
Under these conditions, conflict, whether ideological or even physical, between the 
Kemalist resistance (the army, bureaucracy, parliament, and press) and the DP elected 
was inexorable.189 
4.3.4 The End of the Menderes Era 
The military and its leaders began to lose their identity as a privileged group with 
the advent of multi-party rule.  The military also lost financial power as well as direct 
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representation in the political process compared to other classes due to the DP’s anti-
elitist policies and the inflation these policies caused. The government, which was once 
made up largely of military and formerly military leaders started becoming more civilian 
after the 1950 election as Menderes changed up the leadership.  Semih Vaner explains the 
results as, “the change in ruling elites, which derived from important social 
transformations and reflected a shift in political structures, was perceived by the army as 
the degradation of its own institutional prestige and a challenge to its image within 
society.”190  
The relationship between civilian and military continued to decline after control 
was taken decisively by the Democratic Party in the 1954 elections.  This worsened as the 
military realized they were now under civilian authority.191  
However, the perceived ‘dictatorial’ policies of the Democrats led to political 
upheaval within the military and PRP elite by the mid-1950s leading them to recognize 
that they were losing their authority among the bureaucrats of the regime. The DP began 
to resort to more controlling methods such as investigative committees.  In addition, the 
leaders of the Democratic Party began to censor the press leading, as well as bringing 
economic problems into the country, causing many university students and academic 
personnel to join the military and civil bureaucrats in their opposition to the DP. This led 
to university campuses being paralyzed by large-scale student demonstrations leading to 
violent confrontation with police.  Even the declaration of martial law was not able to 
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restore order to the situation. On top of the student uprisings, the military forces were 
also unhappy with the difference in rule from the traditional Kemalist program.  With so 
many groups in opposition, the leaders of the Democrats started offering special 
treatment to ministry groups to foster support and increase unity.192  
They also removed more religious restrictions hoping to gain support but only 
causing religious fundamentalists to feel more freedom to speak out against Ataturk. This 
attempt at building unity and grasping at support led to corruption in the highest levels of 
government leading the military to openly criticize the DP’s economic policies. 193 
Because of all of this upheaval, a majority of the military leaders asserted that 
they were truly Kemalist soldiers and that the Democrats had irrevocably damaged the 
Kemalist ideals.  The officers believed there was no other option but to stage a coup – 
which the Kemalist elite actually called a “revolution.”  The Constitution Commission 
was created out of the coup and claimed that the government led by Menderes was 
“antagonistic to the army, courts, university, and Ataturk’s reforms.”194
 
This coup, 
affirmed the presence of the military within the political195
 
arena as protectors of true 
Kemalism.196 In this revolution, the DP leaders including Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes, Foreign Minister Fatin Ruutu Zorlu and Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan 
were executed on September 16-17, 1961, by a military court with 12 more political 
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leaders sentenced to death.  The Democratic Party was shut down with 200 other 
governmental leaders put in prison. 197 
The removal of the Menderes government in 1960 was an attempt to decrease the 
political participation of leaders who were backed by the masses, who were more 
conservative and traditional. With regards to the 1960 coup, Samuel Huntington states; 
“In such societies politics is, so to speak, upside down rather than right side up, with the 
defenders of the traditional order on the bottom rather than on the top.”198  
This brings us to probably the most influential Kemalist institution in Turkey, the 
Turkish Military, which was steered, directly or indirectly, the Turkish domestic and the 
foreign policy until the AKP consolidated its power mid-2000s. 
4.4 The Most Influential Kemalist Institution: The Turkish Armed Forces 
 “The Turkish Armed Forces are the most effective guarantor of the Republic in Turkey, 
which is a secular, social, and lawful state.” 
Ex-Chief of Staff, İsmail Hakkı Karadayı 
One of the most important features of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is that it 
is the only other prominent institution besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turkey 
that is deeply pro-western, which rendered it the most trusted one for the Kemalists. M. 
Kemal, who was also a general and a hero, was also considered by the Turkish Military to 
be its congenial leader. Prominent founders and members of the PRP, like Fevzi Cakmak, 
Ismet Inönü, Kazun Özalp, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, Kazim Karabekir and Refet Bele were all 
once officers. Laciner states that this situation created a situation where the military 
practically was ruling. The military considered itself the protector of the Kemalists and 
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Kemalist principles. What is more, the law granted TAF unprecedented duties and rights 
to uphold those principles.199  
The PRP party program of 1935 stated: `We especially take care that the army of 
the Republic, which is the unshakable foundation of the high State organization, and 
which protects and guards the national ideal, the national existence, and the Revolution, 
as well as its valuable members, be always honored and respected...'200 
The supra-politic aspect of the army was affirmed at the same party program: 
`The Turkish army is above all political considerations and influences'.201 The 1935 Ordu 
Ic Hizmet Kanunu /1935 Law of the Army Internal Service and the Constitution endorsed 
this view. That the military and the single party government PRP shared the same 
ideology did not necessitate a military intervention in the early decades of the republic. 
Instead, the military’s main duty in those years, according to Devrim Pusat, was to repel 
the domestic threats to the foundation and the unity of the newly establish republic.202  
The TAF rose to prominence especially after it forcefully removed the politically 
elected Menderes government in 1960. In the decades to come, it acted as either a 
supervisor or as a decision maker, occasionally as ruler. These aspects of TAF were seen 
in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, when it directly or indirectly stepped in and intervened in 
democratically elected governments.203 
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Due to its unique sovereign status, TAF represents what Ilhan Uzgel calls 
“praetorian” characteristics, which denotes that the military has a self-perceived mission 
to keep the civilian rule under its control. Eric Nordlinger says the upper echelon in the 
military becomes praetorian when they make it clear that they may resort to force or 
actually do so, in the name of overseeing the political arena.204 A political system can be 
called to possess praetorian characteristics if the civilian government is perceived inept, 
devoid of legitimacy, weak or unstable and if there is deterioration of the political system. 
Under these circumstances military is inclined to intervene.205 An important point here is 
that the Turkish Military assumed the roles of modernizing and praetorian military and it 
has wielded its praetorian powers when it felt threatened that its modernizing role had 
been compromised.206 
The Turkish Armed Forces have utilized certain political, legal and economic 
institutions to perpetuate and reinforce its interventionist agenda and influence in civilian 
governance simultaneously retaining its institutional and social class sovereignty.207 In 
his study of Latin American military interventions, J. Johnson observes that ‘the direct 
control of government by high ranking officers or military juntas is only a crude 
indication of the role that the armed forces may be playing at a given moment, for men in 
uniform have sundry ways of making their will felt.’’208 Therefore, the role that TAF has 
played to shape Turkey’s political, social and economic life cannot be grasped unless the 
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sources of political and economic hegemony of TAF are fully understood. Equally 
important is the knowledge of conception and permanence of cultural, political, legal and 
financial instruments and institutions, thanks to which TAF has endured and reinforced 
its supremacy in Turkish politics.209 The following section will dwell on these issues. 
4.4.1 How the Kemalist Military Class Perpetuated its Supremacy 
According to Murinson TAF assumed the role of the definitive mediator in 
Turkish high politics predominantly because of the Sevres Syndrome/Phobia, which 
derives its name from the ominous peace treaty of 1920 that aimed for partitioning of the 
defeated Ottoman Empire among the Allied forces. Although the treaty was aborted and 
never was implemented, its legacy continued to remain entrenched in the minds of most 
Turks, exclusively the Kemalists, and the excessive concern that Turkey would be 
dismembered or the territorial integrity would be compromised by domestic and foreign 
enemies was used to justify military interventions, especially in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 
1997. This made the Turkish Armed Forces the most important driving force of Turkish 
domestic and foreign policy.210 Three most significant ideological threats to the Republic 
of Turkey throughout its lifetime have been identified as Communism, Kurdish 
nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. These ideological and other perceived foreign 
threats were used by TAF to rationalize its intervention in politics. 211 The military elite 
in Turkey established a long-standing practice of institutional supervision over the 
executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government. In the following section I am 
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going to explain the institutions and means by which TAF perpetuated its grip on Turkish 
polity. 
4.4.1.1 Military Tradition in Turkish Culture: A Culturalist Approach 
There are perhaps few things more important to the Turks than soldiering. As 
historian, Albert Lybyer puts; "The Ottoman government had been an army before it was 
anything else…in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the external purpose, 
Government the internal purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men”.212 
The Ottoman officers during the Young Turks period pioneered the modernizing 
efforts up until their miserable defeat subsequent to WWI. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who 
founded the Turkish republic out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, was a prominent 
soldier. He endeavored not only to establish a Western/secular nation-state, but also he 
accentuated the reciprocal relationship between the embryonic nation and its military. It 
was evident to Jenkins that, Ataturk, who was an Ottoman officer, had been greatly 
influenced by the beliefs of German General Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz (1843–1916), 
who had been assigned the duty to rehabilitate and vitalize the Ottoman officer 
contingents and died in Baghdad in 1916 fighting alongside the ranks of the Ottoman 
Empire against the British. His book Das Volk in Waffen (‘the nation in arms’), which 
was translated into Ottoman in 1884, was prescribed as a requisite textbook for the 
trainees in the Ottoman Army. Von der Goltz strongly believed that the armed forces 
represent the purest core of a nation and it should solemnly assume the responsibility of 
shaping the nation to which it belongs.213 
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Since the inception of the Turkish Republic, the notion of “military nation” was 
indoctrinated in the education system. Every Turkish child was taught that they were born 
soldiers and therefore part of the Turkish Army. 209 B.C is considered by the Turkish 
military as its birth date, when the Hun Emperor Mete Han first established the organized 
armed forces. According to the Turkish Armed Forces, “by personally devoting 
themselves to the military profession Turks have demonstrated to the entire world that 
they form an army-nation.”214 
The mandatory military service was first put into effect in 1927, which 
consolidated the ties between the nation and military. Jenkins argues that the scope of 
military service is not limited to giving military training but it also includes educational 
and ‘civilizing’ undertaking to shape the ideology of new recruits with the new republic’s 
principles. 215 
In explaining the military culture in Turkey, Nilifer Karli draws attention to the 
importance of such elements as convictions, beliefs, symbols, and certain ceremonies by 
which militarism is forged. According to this militaristic perception, there is a vital 
connection between the military and the society’s security, which renders the former the 
most important institution. Such strong views as “every Turk is a born soldier” and 
“being a martyr is the highest level of exaltation” bolster the reverence and heroic 
feelings towards the military.216 
Furthermore, the established conviction that “the military protects us against the 
internal and external enemies” only contributed to its “mystical supremacy”. The sanctity 
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of the military institution was further buttressed by calling the military “the home of the 
Prophet Mohammed” (Peygamber Ocagi”), a phrase that goes back to the Ottoman times. 
The militarist culture is perpetuated by the formal school institutions. On national day 
celebrations such as the Independence Day of October 29 and the Victory Day of August 
30, school students marched in formation as the soldiers do, (a practice which was 
abolished by the AKP). Also, the school textbooks contain substances that praise the 
military culture.217 
4.4.1.2 The Institutionalist Approach: The National Security Council (NSC) 
As mentioned earlier, the main principle for TAF to intervene in politics was to 
uphold the Kemalist principles and reprimand those parties and politicians who failed to 
do so.218 The 1960 Military Coup was a turning point in that it was the beginning of the 
true institutionalization of the hegemony of the TAF over the civilian authority. The 
quintessence of the institutionalization was the National Security Council (NSC).219 
Having first established in 1933 on a legal basis, it was the 1961 constitution that 
granted full scope of constitutional authority. Although its duty was, according to the 
constitution, to function as an advisory board, in fact it became a medium in which the 
ever-powerful military generals submitted their recommendations, which actually carried 
the weight of ‘orders’ to the civilian governments and representatives. The NSC’s 
functions are outlined in Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution as “the formulation, 
establishment and implementation of the national security policy of the State.” 220  
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The Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution defines the duties of the NSC as 
follows: “The NSC shall submit to the Council of Ministers the advisory decisions on the 
identification, formulation and implementation of the national security policy of the State 
and its opinions on necessary coordination. The decisions of the Council concerning the 
measures that are deemed imperative for the preservation of the existence and 
independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and 
security of the society shall be deliberated by the Council of Ministers.”221 
It important to note here that national security concept of the Republic of Turkey 
has passed through certain stages. In the following section I will analyze the evolution of 
the institutionalized concept of the national security in 4 stages; 1933 - 1949, 1949 - 
1962, 1962 - 1983, 1983 - 2003. I will discuss the context of NSC for the post-2003 era 
in the chapter where I discuss about the policies of AKP, as considerable amendments 
were made in this regard. 
4.4.1.2.1 The Era of 1933 - 1949 
Today’s National Security Council was first established under the name of The 
Supreme Defense Assembly (SDA) by Decree No.14443 of April 24, 1933. Its members 
were made up of the Prime Minister, the head of the Assembly, the Commander of the 
Turkish Armed Forces and members of the Council of Ministers. The duties of SDA were 
defined as “to determine the tasks of the Ministries and to prepare the necessary 
guidelines concerning national mobilization”, for which, “the Supreme Defense 
Assembly would hold successive meetings at given times in a year, although if necessary, 
it would also hold extraordinary meetings.”222 
                                                 
221 http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us  




The Secretary-General of the Supreme Defense Assembly, who was appointed by 
the Ministry of National Defense, was required to “to prepare the matters concerning 
national mobilization in advance, ensure necessary coordination among relevant 
institutions and draw assessments, submit findings to the Supreme Defense Assembly and 
follow the decisions to be taken by the Assembly.”223 
4.4.1.2.2 The Era of 1949 - 1962 
The name of the Supreme Defense Assembly was changed into the National 
Defense Supreme Council (NDSC) by Decree No. 5399 of June 3, 1949. The members of 
NDSC were the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense and the 
Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces. Per the decision of the Council of Minister on 
July 1, 1949, the body of NDSC grew to include the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign 
Affairs, Finance, Civil Works, Economy, Trade, Transportation, Agriculture and 
Enterprises. Under necessary conditions the members of the Military Council and other 
experts would be called for their opinions.224 
The duties of NDSC were defined as follows: 
1. To prepare the guidelines for the national defense policy to be pursued by the 
government; 
2. To determine the duties and responsibilities for national defense which would be 
assumed by the whole government establishment, every private enterprise and entity as 
well as the citizens and submit them to the competent authorities for adoption of 
necessary legal and administrative measures; and monitor the implementation of these 
measures; 
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3. To prepare the Total National Mobilization Plan in times of peace and ensure its full 
implementation when necessary; 
4. To express its observations on homeland-defense-related matters as required by the 
Prime Minister.225 
 
The NSDC assembled once a month. The Prime Minister was assigned to 
officially inform the related authorities of the decisions taken at the NSDC sessions. And, 
those decisions that were to be implemented by the ministers were submitted to the 
Council of Ministers.226 
Table 4.1 National Defense Supreme Council 
 
 
Source: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us  
 
4.4.1.2.3 The Era of the National Security Council (1961-1983) 
 
The National Security Council (NSC) was established according to the Law 
No.129 of December 11, 1962, which was derived from the Article 111 of the 1961 
Constitution, which was created in the aftermath of the military coup of 1960. The 
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members of NSC were the President, the Prime Minister, and the Commander of the 
Turkish Armed Forces, State Minister (s) and Deputy Prime Minister(s), Ministers of 
National Defense, the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Transportation and Labor as 
well as the Armed Forces Commanders. The Secretary-General of the NSC attended the 
meetings, but did not have the right to vote.227 
The duties of NSC included the following: 
1. To prepare the guidelines for the national security policy as well as to amend and 
revise this policy; 
2. With respect to the implementation of these guidelines, to prepare national plans and 
programs for each national security issue, determine intermediate and ultimate objectives 
towards their realization and harmonize activities in this area; 
3. To determine the services and responsibilities to be assumed by the whole government 
establishment, every private enterprise and entity as well as the citizens with respect to 
total defense and national mobilization and take necessary legal and administrative 
measures on this matter; 
4. To determine the guidelines on which the National Mobilization Plans (Civil 
Emergency Plans) would be based, harmonize, monitor and evaluate these plans. 
5. To submit to the Council of Ministers fundamental views regarding national security. 
In order to perform its functions, the NSC convened once a month. It could also meet at 
such other times, as the Chairman deemed necessary. Decisions were taken by majority 
vote. In case of a tie, the side with the vote of the Chairman was considered to have 
formed the majority.228 
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Source: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us  
 
4.4.1.2.4 The Era of the National Security Council (1982 - 2003) 
The Law No.2945 of November 1, 1983, which emanated from the Article of the 
1982 Constitution, determined the nature of the National Security Council, which was a 
product of the 1980 military coup. The members included the Prime Minister, the 
Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, Ministers of National Defense, the Interior, 
Foreign Affairs, and Commanders of the Land, Naval and Air Forces and the General 
Commander of the Gendarmerie. The council would convene once a month to evaluate 
the stated goals below. 
The duties of NSC were as follows: 
1. To formulate views with regard to taking decisions on the identification, formulation 
and implementation of the national security policy and ensuring the necessary 
coordination; 
2. To establish the measures for the realization of national objectives as well as plans and 




3. To continuously monitor and evaluate the components of national power that would 
influence the national security policy of the state and the political, social, economic, 
cultural and technological situation and developments in the country; and determine the 
basic principles by which the aforementioned factors could be improved in accordance 
with national objectives; 
4. To determine the measures that are deemed imperative for the preservation of the 
existence and independence of the state, territorial integrity and indivisibility of the 
country and the maintenance of peace and security of the society; 
5. To determine the measures necessary for preserving the constitutional order, 
maintaining the national unity and integrity and bringing together the Turkish nation 
around the national ideals and values in accordance with the principles and reforms of 
Atatürk; counteract the internal and external threats directed against these aspects; in 
order to eliminate these threats, to determine strategies and guidelines as well as 
opinions, requirements and necessary precautions regarding the planning and 
implementation services; 
6. To formulate opinions on the declaration of emergency, martial law, mobilization or 
war; 
7. To determine the duties and responsibilities to be assumed by the public and private 
sector organizations and institutions as well as the citizens with respect to total defense, 
national mobilization and other related issues at times of peace, war, imminent threat of 
war and at post-war times and establish the guidelines for planning on these matters; 
8. To determine the guidelines for ensuring the inclusion into the development plans, 




economic, social, cultural and other aspects necessitated by the requirements of the 
national security policy and by the services for society and total defense services; 
9. To formulate views on international agreements pertaining to national security, which 
are already made or foreseen; 
10. To submit these views, measures and guidelines to the Council of Ministers in the 
form of a “Council decision” and carry out other assignments mandated by laws.229 




Source: http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us  
 
4.4.1.2.5 Concluding Remarks on the National Security Concept  
As seen above, the traces of institutionalized control of civilian governments by 
the military goes back to 1933 when the first such institution was established under the 
name of the Supreme Defense Assembly (SDA). The in the first decades of the republic, 
the military did not have the need to intervene in civilian politics as the undisputed 
Republican party was in the same line with it. The military, however, felt obliged to 
consolidate the newly established state by upholding its Kemalist principles. This 
                                                 




manifested itself, for example, the Turkish Military quell the Kurdish rebellion in the 
Tunceli Province in 1937-38. It was not until the ‘compulsory’ transition to multi-party 
democracy and the rise of the ‘other’, the Democrat Party that changed the equilibrium. 
The ten-year period between 1950 and 1960 marked the Democrat Party rule in Turkey, 
which ended with the execution of the prominent figures of DP, the Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rustu Zorlu and the Minister of 
Finance Hasan Polatkan. Therefore, the 1960 coup signaled the rise of the Turkish Armed 
Forces to the fore in regards to military-civilian relations. 
The inclusion of NSC in the 1961 constitution was due to the need of military 
bureaucracy to strong handedly control the policymaking in Turkey. This need was 
actually triggered by the perceived threat of the military from the Menderes government, 
who, for the first time in the history of republic, attempted to challenge, subdue the 
Turkish military and eliminate its overwhelming influence in civilian politics. 230  
The late prominent law professor, Tarik Zafer Tunaya, who was among the seven 
academicians that issued a declaration on May 28, 1960 in defense of the military coup 
and who was among the constitutional assembly members gives us an idea about the 
mindset behind the establishment of NSC and coup: 
“The NSC aimed to possess a mixture of civilians and military representatives. 
The purpose of establishing such an institution was to build a “Kemalist dam”, through 
which the Turkish military would prevent the principles of the Turkish Revolution (the 
Kemalist Revolution) to be spent like coin in the market of politics. In the face of 
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changing political environment, the Kemalism would find its unchanging protector. The 
security of our nation depended on this notion.”231 
It is also important to note that before 1961, the NSC had initially been named as 
High Council of National Defense in 1949, given the post-world war atmosphere. 
However, with the 1960 coup, the generals that staged it replaced the term “defense” with 
“security”. 232 It is safe to assume that this change of name indicates the institutional 
securitization of Turkish politics. 
At the same time the scope of “security” as defined by the Turkish Military, is so 
broad that it includes “almost any policy area, from education and environment to 
defense and foreign policy.” 233 But “national security” is a wide concept, subject to 
interpretations that can be expanded according to personal opinions and understandings. 
One definition is found in Article 3(a) of the By-Law of Secretariat General of National 
Security Council: National Security: Being able to resist all external or internal attacks, 
defeatist attempts, natural disasters and conflagrations. National security means to 
protect and maintain the state authority and using all national strength, efforts and 
activities for being victorious in a war.234 
The extent of “security” understood by the Turkish Military was so vast that it 
included “almost any policy area, from education and environment to defense and 
foreign policy.” Therefore, the interpretation of ‘national security’ may vary by 
individuals. One of the examples is in Article 3(a) of the By-Law of Secretariat General 
of National Security Council: Being able to resist all external or internal attacks, 
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defeatist attempts, natural disasters and conflagrations. National security means to 
protect and maintain the state authority and using all national strength, efforts and 
activities for being victorious in a war. 
In the 1983 “Law of the National Security Council and Secretariat General of the 
National Security Council” number 2945, the definition is: 
National Security; The protection and maintenance of the constitutional order, 
national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in 
international field as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the 
State (md.2/a) 235 
While the Article 118 of the 1982 constitution says that the decisions of NSC 
were solely of advisory nature, the way that the law 2945 defines ‘national security’ 
urged the government to comply with the decisions taken in NSC.236  
Due to the nature of the threat perception and definition of national security, the 
range of issues that NSC dealt with was not limited to politics. NSC has given 
recommendations with regards to cultural, educational, social and economic issues. NSC 
has, for example, discussed, especially before the 1980 coup, the massive student 
demonstrations, as it perceived them as threat to national security. After the 1980 coup, 
the authority of NSC was considerably increased by the regulation of 84/7706 of 
February 10, 1984, by which it had effect on economic and social issues. One striking 
example was that the state budget was negotiated and prepared in NSC meetings.237 
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The Red Book, also called the National Security Document, in which the threats 
to national security and the measures to be taken in response to them, has been produced 
by NSC. Gareth Jenkins says; “In practice, the military’s informal authority is such that, 
when it expresses opinion, civilian governments rarely try to implement a policy which 
contradicts it.”238 One unusual exception to this was then President Turgut Ozal, who 
adopted an unconditional pro-American foreign policy and supported the US-led invasion 
of Iraq in 1991, although the military vehemently opposed him.239 
The military wing dominated NSC not only because the chief of staff and 
commanders of land, air, navy and gendarmerie forces were represented, but also the 
secretariat-general position was occupied by a high ranking military, until October 1, 
2004, by which time the ambassador Mehmet Yigit Apogan was appointed to be the first 
civilian secretary to NSC during the first term of the AKP government.240 This date 
marks a milestone in the civilianization of Turkish politics.  
4.4.2 Institutional Sovereignty of the Turkish Armed Forces 
The Turkish Armed Forces continued to enjoy a powerful status partially because 
of its institutional privileges or what Alfred Stefan calls ‘prerogatives’. According to 
him; “…the dimension of military institutional prerogatives refers to those areas where, 
whether challenged or not, the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired 
right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal 
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governance, to play a role within extra military areas within the state apparatus, or even 
to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society.”241 
Certain laws and past experiences gave the Turkish military institutional 
sovereignty and unaccountability, which created a perception among the upper echelon of 
the military that they were not liable to civilian authority.242 Just as the Turkish military is 
obliged to protect the Turkish constitution, the very constitution it protected gave the 
military legitimacy to wield its power when it perceives necessary. According to the 
Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Service Internal Service Code, a product of the 1960 
Coup, stipulated that "duty of the armed forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish 
territory and the Turkish Republic as stipulated by the constitution."243 
The privileged position of the military in the Turkish state structure can be seen in 
the order of precedence.244 The Chief of Staff of Turkey comes third in protocol after the 
Chairman of the Grand National Assembly and the Prime Minister of Turkey.245 In fully 
democratic countries this is not the case. For example, in the order of precedence in the 
United States, the joint chief of staff ranks 76th, after the Chairman of American Battle 
Monuments Commission.246  
To Jung and Picolli the special education system in the military, which is strictly 
based on Kemalist ideology, is one of the most important reasons that TAF and the 
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military elite have a sovereign status. Through education, this system creates a ‘caste 
system’ and ideologically homogenous group, which keeps itself separate from the rest of 
society.247  
It is perceived, as elite status to be an officer in TAF and it provides individuals 
an upward mobility. The way that TAF enlists new member is a reflection of ‘classical 
military-bureaucratic’ elite as the new recruits mostly come from military or civil servant 
culture.248  
Another important indication of the autonomy that TAF enjoys is that its 
education curriculum is outside the scope of civilian supervision. Furthermore, 
promotions and appointments of officers in higher strata of TAF are made in the High 
Military Council (YAS), which has little civilian oversight. Furthermore, out of its 15 
members only two, the prime minister and the minister of national defense are civilians. 
This makes the civilian presence virtually symbolic as the decisions in the council are 
taken by majority of votes.  Before, the 2010 constitutional amendment, the decisions of 
YAS were exempt from judicial oversight too.249 
This is important because between 1990 and 2009, 1,655 officers were expelled, most of 
whom for religious reaction, by the decisions of YAS.250 However, after the amendment, 
the Article 11 of the Law: 5982 of May 7, 2010 stipulates that all decisions of YAS, 
except those of the promotion and retirement cases, can be appealed. The Article 15 of 
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the same law amends the Article 145 by saying that except in the state of war, the 
military courts cannot trail civilians.251  
M. Ali Birand likens the contemporary Turkish officers to the Janissaries in the 
Ottoman times, who had pledged their loyalty to the sultan, in that they identify 
themselves with M. Kemal and his principles, which compels them to protect the republic 
he founded as well as his principles he set forth.252The unconditional allegiance to the 
fatherland, strict discipline and absolute obedience to commanders define the culture in 
TAF, which, to Birand, is based on the Prussian principles. This and the Kemalist 
doctrine make up the core of TAF character.253As mentioned earlier, TAF leads an 
isolated life style from the rest of Turkish public. Its own guesthouses, restaurants, and 
summer camps facilitate this. 254 
It would be no exaggeration, as Jung and Picolli agree, that the unprecedented 
autonomy that the Turkish Military enjoyed in political, economic and social areas 
rendered it literally a ‘state within a state.255 The following section will examine the 
financial aspect of autonomy of the Turkish Armed Forces. 
4.4.2.1 Financial Sovereignty and Unaccountability of the Turkish Armed Forces 
The Turkish Armed Forces has wielded its unparalleled influence not only over 
the Turkish politics but also with little or no oversight it has created a power center that 
manages economic assets that are worth a massive $50 billion.256   
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Ismail Akca examines Turkey’s military-economic structure by dividing it into 
three sections, all of which are controlled by the military; the Armed Forces Trust and 
Pension Fund (OYAK), which has become one of the largest business conglomerates in 
Turkey, the military spending,257 which totaled $14 billion in 2014 and made up 3.7% of 
the state budget,258 making Turkey the 15th largest military spender,259 and the military 
industry. 
4.4.2.1.1 The Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK) 
The Turkish Armed Forces began to assert itself in Turkish economy after the 
1960 military coup. The epitome of the military dominance in Turkish economy is the 
Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK)260 The Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK),261 
which was established in 1961 by Article 205262 with the aim of providing social security 
to military personnel has become one of the largest financial conglomerates in Turkey.   
Five years into its establishment, OYAK became a focal point where those 
supporters of the 1960 coup from the military, bureaucracy, intelligentsia and the 
bourgeoisie find their way to the top administrative ranks. The generals in the junta 
rationalize the establishment of OYAK for the reason that “retired military officers are 
only provided a modest living and are unable to retain lifestyles that correspond to their 
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social status; OYAK was prepared so that retired officers would no longer be worried 
about their future and could enjoy financial and spiritual peace.”263  This shows the 
“privileged” mentality among the officers in the Turkish military. It is also interesting to 
see how OYAK has grown and spread out from a ‘retirement pension fund’ such that it 
has become virtually the biggest conglomerate in Turkey. 
It is not surprising that OYAK functions as a privileged entity, just as TAF to 
which it belongs. Karabelias states that; “OYAK is exempt from corporation tax, from all 
other kinds of income tax, from the special income tax collected from all organizations 
that withhold dues and fees from members from all sales and excise taxes, from the state 
stamp tax imposed on all legal transactions. Furthermore, OYAK’s assets, earnings and 
accounts receivable enjoy preemptive priority vis-à-vis third parties”264   
With the boost that it gets from subsidies, legal advantages and tax exemptions, 
OYAK has been able to diversify its area of operations greatly. These include 
automobiles, cement, iron and steel, finance, energy, mining, agricultural chemicals, 
foodstuffs, construction, transportation and logistics, private security and information 
technology.265 OYAK has grown so much that it has iron/steel and cement/concrete 
production facilities as well as automotive/logistic subsidiaries in France, Bulgaria, 
Russia and Spain.266 Finally, the fact that, in 2013, its automotive branch Oyak-Renault 
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alone came in 3rd in the biggest industrial firms list of Turkey267 is enough to tell us about 
the clout that OYAK has in Turkish economy. 
Ismet Akca voices some concerns that arise out of OYAK’s presence. He asserts 
that a military that is privately involved in economic activities “breaches the basic and 
time-tested principle of the separation between power-holders with guns and power-
holders engaged in economic activity in modern economies.”268 This naturally poses a 
threat to development of democracy. Another issue is the claim that while it is believed 
that OYAK reinforces the integration in military by extending privileges to its members, 
it is a fact not all of its members can benefit from the blessings equally, there is actually a 
division, especially between those high rank officers in the higher management and the 
low ranking officers.  The latter have voiced their concerns that the former have 
“operating outside of the immediate interests of its members” by not focusing on service 
provision and in some cases they are unable to receive the compensations promised by 
OYAK.269 The situation created so much resentment among the low ranking officers of 
the military that the Turkish Retired Noncommissioned Officers Association (TEMAD), 
having exhausted the domestic means, (the Supreme Court rejected their plea) appealed 
to the European Court of Human Rights in 2007 for not being able to take part neither in 
the administrative and auditing boards or general assembly meetings of OYAK or its 
affiliates such as Oyak Bank. TEMAD Deputy Chairperson Galip Kaplan said:  
 “We have found out that Law No. 205 [relating to the establishment of OYAK] is 
not in line with principles of equality and fairness. Although we are members of OYAK, 
                                                 
267 “İSO Türkiye'nin en büyük şirketlerini açıkladı” CNN Turk, June 24, 2014 
http://www.cnnturk.com/haber/ekonomi/sirketler/iso-turkiyenin-en-buyuk-sirketlerini-acikladi  
268 Akca, p. 13 




we are not mentioned among those who will be assigned to administrative and auditing 
boards. As the TEMAD Administrative Board, we have decided to go to the European 
Court of Human Rights on behalf of our 75 branches and 95,000 members”270 
Finally, having drawn attention that due to the nature of OYAK, it may pose an 
obstacle in Turkey’s path to membership to the European Union, Akca raises an 
interesting point. He is surprised that not a single EU progress report mentions OYAK. 
He goes on: “While no other EU member state would tolerate a structure like OYAK, the 
EU overlooked the fact that OYAK’s existence is a challenge to democratic oversight and 
regulation of the military in Turkey.”271 He explains this situation with OYAK’s long-
standing partnership with Renault and AXA Group as well as the fact that Turkey is one 
of Germany’s largest arms importers.272 
4.4.2.1.2 The Defense Industry  
Domestic military industry has been the focal point for the military leadership in 
Turkey. Some of the companies that have been part of the domestic defense industry are: 
the Military Electronic Industries Inc. (ASELSAN), the Military Battery Industry 
(ASPILSAN), the PETLAS Tire Co., the Electric Industry (ISBIR), the Sivas Textile 
Industry (SIDAS), the Machinery and Chemical Industries Establishment (MKE), the 
Turkish Aircraft Industries (TUSAS), the Turkish Engine Industries (TEI), the Turkish 
Airspace Industries (TAI), the Turkish Electronics Industry and Trade Corporation 
(TESTAS), the Taskizak and the Golcuk shipyards, the Heavy Maintenance Factories 
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located in Kayseri and Arifiye Air Force complexes in Kayseri and Eskisehir and 
others.273 
Per the law 3388 of 1987, the Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TSKGV) was founded, which combined the aforementioned companies into an 
incorporated defense industry. The purpose of the Law 3388 is: “to constitute the Turkish 
Armed Forces Foundation in order to work towards increasing the fighting strength of 
the Turkish Armed Forces by developing the national armaments industry of Turkey, 
establishing new branches of the armaments industry, and purchasing weapons, vehicles 
and equipment.”274 Like OYAK, TSKGV was established based on privileges. According 
to the clause 3 of the same law; “The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation as established 
by this Law is exempt from; a. Corporate Tax (except for Financial Enterprises), b. 
inheritance tax and death duty for donations and grants, c. stamp duty on any kind of 
transaction. Donations and grants given to the foundation are exempt from all kinds of 
taxes and other legal dues. Donations and grants may be set off against income tax and 
corporate tax.”275 
With the total employees reaching up to 40,000, and with 55 joint ventures, 
OYAK and TSKGV became the epitome of a symbiotic relationship between the Turkish 
Army, the State and the Capital.276  
The capitalistic nature that the Turkish Armed Forces expansions over the 
decades not only helped the upper echelon of the officers to gain a privileged status but 
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they also developed intimate relations with the leading industrial conglomerates such as 
Koc, Eczacibasi and Sabanci Holdings as well as foreign entities in USA, Germany, 
France, Israel and Russia.)277 
 The Law 3238 of 1985 founded the Defense Industry Development and Support 
Administration Directorate (DIDSAC). According to this, the law 3238; “established an 
institution capable of generating long term defense policies and principles and 
supplementing them with a continuous flow of financial resources. The organization 
founded to fulfill these functions is the Under Secretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), 
assigned with the major task to constitute a modern defense industry in Turkey and to 
achieve the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces. In order to attain this objective, 
the main principle applied by SSM is to meet military requirements through domestic 
suppliers in the most technically and economically feasible way possible.”278 
All these considered, the privileged position of the Turkish Military was coupled 
with the fact that the military appropriations, which amounted to about 10%279 of the 
annual government budget, were accepted with little or no opposition. The Court of 
Accounts, the highest authority that oversees public expenditure, did not have judicial 
power over the defense expenditures until 2010. 280 In this context, the former vice 
admiral Atilla Kiyat’s statements in January 2001 show the extent of political and 
financial immunity that the Turkish Armed Forces had. Kıyat further explained the 
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tremendous control of TAF over the civilian administration in regards to threat and policy 
analysis. He said; 
 “Terror began in the Southeast in early 1980s. Now we say that we have been 
very successful against terror.... It is true that under the designated strategy, we have 
been successful. We have stopped the bloodshed. But it lasted fifteen years and thousands 
of people died. In the future, we might face something like the Vietnam syndrome that 
America had to face. Large amounts of money were poured into this conflict at the 
expense of the country’s development. Mistakes were made back in the 1970s. We built 
the problem on the assumption that Turkey could be divided. If we had built it on the 
assumption that Turkey is strong enough not to be divided... perhaps there would have 
been no need for [an armed struggle]. We could have chosen to solve this problem by 
promoting freedom and not prohibitions, in which case our preventive measures would 
have been different. We could have succeeded with such measures in those days. We 
could perhaps have been a member of the European Union today.”281  
4.4.2.2 Judicial Oversight 
The Turkish Military also maintained its supremacy through the State Security 
Courts (DGMs). The 1982 constitution established the DGMs to deal with the cases 
involving the security of the state.282 DGMs replaced the military courts that were 
established during the martial law era subsequent to the military coup of 1980. (Now, 
81)283  In 1991, the law to Fight Terrorism284 was adopted and the cases involving the 
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state’s security, including terrorism were now dealt with under this law. According to 
this, the sessions were to be presided by three judges, one of whom ought to be an officer. 
The presence of the military judge unavoidably created pressure on the civilian judges. 
Glenn Sulmasy compares the SSCs to the U.S military commissions in Guantanamo 
regarding unlawful command influence.285 According to Gerassimos Karabelias the 
presence of military in judiciary indicated a lack of confidence of the Turkish Military on 
the civilian authorities.286 However, as part of the European Union membership 
negotiations, DGMs were completely abolished on June 30, 2004.287 
Lastly, the Constitutional Court, which was established after the 1960 coup, 
served to strengthen the military supremacy. Karabelias states that through the 
Constitutional Court, the TAF gained another “legitimate” and non-partisan institution 
through which it would control the actions of the elected governments, and acts as “a 
watchdog of the regime.”288 Although, the constitutional courts in many countries are 
considered to be the protectors of civil rights from the possible attacks of the legislative 
and executive branches of the government,289 in Turkey, it has foregone the principle 
rights of individuals and institutions for the sake of the perpetuation and security of the 
state.  The Constitutional Court has done this by aggressively defining the boundaries of 
the constitution through employing the principles of Kemalism, especially the secularism 
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and the nationalism aspects of it. For example, the court has closed more than eight 
political parties in the post-Ozal period on the grounds that they were undermining the 
Turkish secularism and territorial integrity. Karabelias concludes that the fact that 
Constitutional court functioned as the protector of the Kemalist constitution gave the 
military power to control over civilian rule. 290 
These privileges that the Turkish Military enjoyed were established and 
consolidated during the periods of the military rule (in 1960-1961, 1971-1973, and 1980-
1983) by constitutional amendments. The civilian governments mostly shied away from 
blocking or rejecting these prerogatives. However, with the decisive victory of the AKP 
in 2002, the dominance of TAF began to gradually erode. In February 2010, the Security 
and Public Order Cooperation (EMASYA) Protocols, which had vested the military with 
extraordinary rights to deal with any perceived threat without the need for civilian 
permission, was abolished. Thanks to the constitutional amendments that were made after 
the 2010 referendum, the decisions of the High Military Council (YAS) were, for the first 
time, opened to judicial review. Thereby, those officers who have been expelled from the 
military due to the YAS decisions are now able to appeal their cases. Moreover, the 
civilian courts are now eligible to try military officers, especially those who have been 
involved in coup plots. 291 The law that passed in February 2011 states that the police 
officers are exempt from the compulsory military service. 292   
One of the most important steps to put the military under civilian rule came after 
the adoption of the constitutional amendments in the 2010 referendum. As mentioned 
earlier, the military spending was outside civilian oversight and not transparent. 
                                                 
290 Karabelias, pp. 16-17 
291 Today’s Zaman “Newly approved bill reinstates all rights of YAŞ victims” March 12, 2011 




However, the new Law on the Court of Accounts (no. 6085) subsequent to the 
constitutional amendments of the 2010 gave the Court of Accounts authority to supervise 
military spending “on behalf of the Parliament.”293 However, a last minute modification 
of a significant portion of the military spending was omitted from judicial oversight. Still, 
thanks to the new law, inspectors are allowed to audit whether or not resources are used 
effectively.294 Moreover, the way that certain military facilities, such as dining (orduevi), 
night clubs and canteens was controversial in that they were said to be run inefficiently 
and sources used for private purposes. For the first time, these facilities are not under the 
supervision of the Court of Accountants.295 
The Turkish Armed Forces kept its authority and supremacy alive by perpetuating 
certain fears, which is called ‘the Sevres Phobia’, that it deemed detrimental to the 
existence of the Turkish Republic. Therefore, the next part will examine these aspects of 
‘the Sevres Phobia’. 
4.4.3 Role of Military in Foreign Policy: The Sevres Phobia and Securitization of TFP 
The Sevres Phobia gets its name from the notorious Sevres Treaty, which was 
signed on August 10, 1920, between the defeated Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers, 
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Greece and Armenia, who partitioned what was left 
of the Ottoman Empire, which is today’s Turkey. After the successful resistance of the 
Turkish nationalists headed by Mustafa Kemal, the treaty of Sevres was never 
implemented and was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Because, the 
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remaining Turks came to the brink of extinction as the result of catastrophic defeat in 
World War I, and the partition of the nuclei of the Turkish homeland, Anatolia, the 
Treaty of Sevres created a “xenophobic causation” 296, which is also called the Sevres 
Syndrome or Phobia.  
Although the Turkish War of Independence was won and the new republic was 
established in 1923, the legacy of the Sevres syndrome persisted and created insecurity in 
the Turkish state and it later became one of the most important undeclared columns of 
Turkish foreign and domestic policy. Karabelias and Mikelis state that this situation 
created a paradox that whereas the Kemalist Turkish republic was established based on 
unconditional adoption of the Western values, it was also very mistrustful and suspicious 
of the very civilization to which it had turned. More importantly, this situation led to the 
creation and perpetuation of a “profound security culture” or “security syndrome” as well 
as the notion of “encirclement by hostile neighbors or major powers that are posing a 
threat to national unity and sovereignty.297  For example, the Eurosceptic Turkish elite 
believes that the EU’s hidden agenda is, through accession negations, to establish 
Armenian and Kurdish states in today’s Turkey.298 
The syndrome has been prevalent among the Kemalist state elite, and political 
culture.299 One important feature of the Turkish political culture in the new republic era 
                                                 
296 Nicole E. Farina, "Revitalizing Relations with Turkey" in William A. Rugh ed. "The Practice of 
Diplomacy: Confronting Challenges Abroad, Palgrave MacMillan, 2011. p. 35, the footnote 19. 
297 Gerassimos Karabelias and Kyriakos Mikelis, Fear Not! Is Ahmet Davutoğlu’s ‘Strategic Depth’ a 
Threat to Atatürk’s ‘Peace in the Country, Peace in the World’? 8th Pan-European IR Conference, 2013 p. 
4. http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/warsaw2013/Karabelias-
Mikelis_Fear%20Not%20Is%20Ahmet%20Davutoglu%E2%80%99s%20'Strategic%20Depth'%20a%20Th
reat%20to%20Ataturk's%20'Peace%20in%20the%20Country,%20Peace%20in%20the%20World'.pdf   
298 Sahin Alpay, The Declining 'Soft Power' of the EU Regarding Turkey and its Consequences, 2009 
Centre for European Security Studies, pp. 165. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=109358   




has, to some extent, been the belief that the foreign entities, be it small or big, are still 
aspiring, overtly or covertly, to weaken and eventually finish what was left undone in the 
Sevres Treaty. Enemies that are adamant about their ill aspirations towards Turkey 
encircle Turkey.300 
Kemal Kirisci argues that due to the Sevres Syndrome, the Turkish policymakers 
saw the world from a realpolitik perspective. He goes on saying that the syndrome is also 
a representation of the Ottoman Empire’s relations vis-à-vis the European power, to 
which the former had constantly lost territories in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This 
historical standpoint has profoundly affected the Turkish policy makers.301Although 
never implemented, the articles of the Sevres became the embodiment of the Kemalist 
ideology, making it vital for an understanding of Kemalist threat perception.302 More 
importantly, the syndrome has been used by the Kemalist elite to manipulate and shape 
the public perception of external and internal affairs. Kemal Kirisci’s following 
observation is valid;  
“In this manner, 'national security' becomes defined and stressed with respect to 
concerns and threats, real or imagined, that might undermine territorial integrity…in 
Turkey, the military plays a critical role in perpetuating the Sevres phobia. Turkish 
national security culture, which is heavily influenced by the military establishment, 
emphasizes thinking and analysis influenced by the Sevres phobia. Military education 
and socialization is very important process for the dissemination of this culture. All men 
in Turkey serve in the army and most top bureaucrats attend a training program on 
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national security run by military. In this program, bureaucrats are exposed to a similar 
perspective on world affairs to that which all the officers corps of the Turkish military 
experience. The military perspective is very much based on the realpolitik view of world 
politics that is characterized by a deep sense of suspicion and tendency to shy away from 
cooperation” 303  
As we saw previously, the traditional security trajectory has been determined by 
the military-civilian bureaucratic elite since the inception of the republic. The Turkish 
national security concept had two dominant pillars; a fear of abandonment and fear of 
loss of territory.304 
In this regard, Alexander Murinson calls Turkey “a lonely state”. He argues that 
main tenets of Turkish foreign policy are; “the historical experience of Ottoman Empire 
(the tradition of the balance of power); nationalist Kemalist ideology and the creation of 
the Turkish Republic on the remnants of the Ottoman territory in Anatolia (hence, 
isolationism)’ a Western orientation expressed in the policy of Europeanization and 
modernization (later, NATO membership) and lastly, a suspicion of foreign powers and 
interests (the Sevres Syndrome)”.305 
Sedat Laciner expounds on the skepticism in Turkish foreign policy. Whereas the 
skepticism is not a declared aspect of Turkish foreign policy, Laciner states, it is actually 
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the most important characteristics of Kemalism.306 The Kemalist regime’s insecurity 
about its political capability to maintain power internally and externally can be seen in 
Ismet (Inönü) Pasha's speech to the army officers in the Inönü Wars:  
`You must know the situation you are in. The Padisah (Sultan) is your enemy. The 
entire Western world is your enemy. Listen, don't tell anybody, but the Turkish nation is 
also your enemy. They think you are the reason of the war." 307 
Among the entities that the Kemalist insecurity was directed are the former 
Ottoman subjects (Arabs, Armenians and Greeks) minorities, religious groups, liberals 
and all those who are perceived opposing the Kemalist principles. Laciner concludes that 
the Kemalist skepticism is the result of three factors: a) the Ottoman experience; b) 
Turkey's limitations and the Kemalist regime's lack of confidence; and finally c) 
European biased attitude towards the Turks. 308 
The roots of this skepticism and cautiousness towards the west can actually be 
found during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, well before the Treaty of Sevres. 
Due to the weakening nature of the Empire and the rapid rise of the west, it prompted the 
Ottomans to develop the same security paranoia. What really molded the minds of the 
Turkish elite with insecurity and suspicion was the rise of the minorities (Greeks, 
Armenians and later Arabs) against the Sultan and their demands for independence, 
which played a great role in the implosion of the Empire. Pinar Bilgin says; “the acts of 
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minorities left a negative imprint on the psyche of many in Turkey.”309 Therefore, it can 
be said that one reason why the Kemalist elite have been minimally involved in 
international affairs and refrained from following a proactive foreign policy is the fear of 
abandonment and loss of territory. 310 
 In the same manner, Laciner agrees that the Kemalist Turkey unavoidably 
inherited certain Ottoman foreign policy practices. These are Turkish Aloofness; 
Paradoxical Westernism; Skepticism towards the West; Skepticism towards minorities.311 
The dissolution of the empire created far-reaching fears among the Turkish elite. 
They developed the perception that the Turks are on their own and only they have no 
friends but themselves. “The Muslim brothers” in the Middle East too were considered 
adversaries based on the bitter experiences before and during the WWI. The former 
minorities, the Armenians and the Greeks, who sided with the “enemy” and united 
against the Turks for their annihilation, have become enemies too.312 This situation is 
ironic in that before the rise of nationalism and the independence movements in Europe 
and their catastrophic effects on the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians were considered 
“millet-i sadika” (the loyal nation) as they were very loyal and attached to the sultan 313 
and had a privileged position in the Ottoman society.  
Finally, the Kemalist elite in Turkey conserved the legacy of the Ottoman Empire 
in two ways. One is the patriarchal elitism that was used to justify a rigidly authoritarian 
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state administration. The military-bureaucratic modernity, which was promoted by the 
newly rising elite of Turkey, retarded the advent and the development of democracy. 
Two, the Sevres syndrome that produced the paranoia that the external and internal 
enemies would try to divide and eventually put an end to the newly established republic 
became an integral part of the Kemalist elite’s worldview created impediments towards 
the solution of major internal and external problems. 314 The Kurdish issue and the 
strained relations with neighbors are some of them, which will be elaborated in the next 
chapters. 
4.4.4 Securitization of the Turkish Domestic and Foreign Policy 
4.4.4.1 The Concept of Securitization 
The abovementioned traits of the traditional Turkish foreign policy making 
resulted in excessive securitization of the Turkish domestic and foreign policy, which has 
had enormous implications. Therefore, I am going to analyze the concept of 
“securitization” and how it has been applied to the Turkish domestic and foreign policy, 
which helped perpetuate the Kemalist elite’s hegemony. 
In their study of the Turkish-Israeli relations, Ali Balci and Tuncay Kardas 
conclude that securitization consisted of three stages. The first one is the portrayal of a 
certain issue such as an “existential threat to a referent object.” This stage is not actually 
securitization but a prelude to it, which they call “securitization attempt”.315 In order for 
an issue to be “securitized”, the target audience ought to accept it so. Therefore, the 
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second stage is the endeavor of the securitizing actor to persuade the audience that “the 
referent object is existential threat.” It is important that the target audience does not 
necessarily have to be the public. An array of political decision makers, bureaucracy and 
military officers can be considered as target. Therefore, Balci and Kardas state that 
“Hence a securitization move becomes successful when it conceives ‘a more restrictive 
audience’ on the presence of an ‘existential threat’ to a referent object.” Hence, even if 
the general population refuses the securitization rhetoric and deem the proposed solutions 
not acceptable, an issue can still become securitized if part or whole of bureaucratic, 
political and/or military believe so.316 Finally, the third stage of securitization is the 
execution of certain measures to defeat the perceived threat.317 
According to Barry Buzan et al., one important aspect of securitization is a 
specific rhetorical structure, such as survival and priority action (because if the problem 
is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure.) This 
helps to find security actors and phenomena besides military-political sector. 318 In terms 
of security, an agent presents extraordinary measures by greatly exaggerating and 
prioritizing an issue. One of the most important things to consider here is to understand 
what amounts to a threat and collective response to it. Buzan et al. argues that the process 
of securitization is a “speech act”. The speech act does not necessarily contain the word 
‘security’. The fundamental issue here is to create an existential threat, which calls for 
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extraordinary response and to get a significant audience to acknowledge it. 319  
Securitization can be divided into ad hoc or institutionalized. The emergence of 
the latter depends greatly to the nature of the threat and the response given to it. 
Persistent or recurrent threats will greatly lead to institutionalized security solutions. The 
most discernible manifestation of this situation is in the military sector where states have 
constructed bureaucracies, procedures, and military establishments in the name of a 
solution to the problems. 320 
One of the most important consequences of securitization is that the authorities 
are inclined to repress internal opposition, resorting to undemocratic means and justifying 
their actions by creating threat perceptions. 321 
On the other hand, desecuritization is reversing the course and means, “the 
shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the 
political sphere.” Put differently, the extraordinary measures and processes are 
abandoned and the security issues are restored to their acceptable courses. 
Desecuritization requires the securitized referent objects to be re-politicized by 
designated actors with the help of a smooth process. A successful desecuritization entails 
convincing the target audience that “the referent object is not existentially threatened and 
that the measures are counterproductive and that they need to reverse the outcomes of 
the successful securitization.” 322 
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4.4.4.2 Securitization of Turkish Politics 
In Turkey, national security is perceived as the threats that may be posed against 
the state sovereignty, territorial and national integrity of the republic, and the Kemalist 
ideology. The definition of national security had long been defined by the military circles 
thus has had a ‘military oriented’ approach. As mentioned earlier, due to the 
unchallenged nature of the armed forces, the officers, especially those in the National 
Security Council, would determine the national security agenda and the civilians were 
obliged to implement the agenda. The Sevres Syndrome was part of the agenda set by the 
Kemalist military. 323 The military elite as well as their civilian counterparts would 
constantly bring up the threat agenda in order to continue their legitimacy in the 
governance of the country. Levon Hovsepian goes so far as arguing, “It is possible to say 
that the military also became interested in sowing such perceptions with which it was 
solving “the issue of ensuring national unity for confronting external enemy.” 324 
One important feature of the security approach of TAF is that it sees internal 
threats as extension of those of external. Therefore, they are intertwined. For example, 
during the Cold War era, the socialists, far leftists in Turkey were regarded by the 
military as the Soviet proxy. The Islamists and certain Islamic sects in Turkey were 
considered to be the tools of Iran and Saudi Arabia that were believed to undermine 
Turkey’s Kemalist/secular ideology and territorial integrity. Due to the nature of the PKK 
terrorism and the damage it had inflicted for the last three decades, the military circles 
consider the organization to be a tool that is used by many international actors against 
Turkey. However, the last example is not far from truth. It is well documented that the 
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PKK has received a great deal of support from Syria, where the PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan found safe heaven until he was captured in the Greek Embassy in Kenya, with a 
Greek-Cypriot passport. 325 After his capture, Ocalan told authorities that Greece had 
supported PKK by providing ‘arms and rockets’.326 Turkish authorities claimed PKK 
received military training in Lavrion, which is 30 miles outside of Athens, Greece.327 One 
of the incidents that confirmed this claim was when 6 members of the Greek Parliament, 
Leandras Hacidimitrio, Dimitris Vunacos, Yanis Stathopoulos, Maria Mahera, Kostas 
Baduvas, and Panayotis Sguridis visited the PKK leader in the Bekaa Valley training 
camp in Lebanon, in 1995.328  
Furthermore, Iran is said to have PKK camps in its territory. Stephan Larabee argues, 
“Iran has little interest in the PKK insurgency coming to an end, since that would 
eliminate one of Tehran's main levers for putting pressure on Turkey.”329 
The above mentioned ‘referent objects’ were presented as existential threat to 
national security especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, in the 1990s. For the 
military elite, the main reference objects became territorial integrity and secularism.330 
For example, then Brigadier General and Secretary to the Chief of Staff, Hursit Tolon, 
who later became a very influential general in Turkish Army stated in 1989 that the threat 
that came from the north (the Soviet Union and Bulgaria) had been replaced by the one 
that come from the south (Syria [the PKK and the Euphrates issues], Iraq and Iran. 
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He said; “The countries that lies along our southern border possess missiles 
whose range exceeds 1000km. Furthermore, the fact that these countries support 
terrorism against Turkey means that our country is facing a severe threat to its security. 
All these developments will affect power structure, qualitative and quantitative aspect of 
our military. All viable options against these threats are being evaluated and we will 
continue to keep our country safe against these threats.” 331 
Then Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces Ismail Hakki Karadayi 
explained in 1995 the threat perception of the country in an interview. He said, “The heir 
to the former Soviet Union, Russia is aspiring to revive its olden glorious days by 
pursuing expansionist foreign policy in the Caucasus and the Balkans. This is against our 
interest. Iran’s official state policy is to export its state ideology, radical Islamism. Syria 
still could not accept that the Hatay Province became part of Turkey in 1939. Moreover, 
Damascus has been trying to defame Turkey among the Arab League members due to its 
uneasiness of the South East Anatolian Project (GAP). Syria has been giving the biggest 
support to the terrorist organization (PKK). Greece is arming the Aegean islands, which 
is against international treaties. The policies that Athens is pursuing in Western Trace 
against ethnic Turks aim at assimilating the Turkish minority there.”332 Finally, the 
Office of Chief of Staff declared that the Greek provocations in the Aegean Sea and a 
Greek military action in Cyprus was a casus belli.333 
                                                 
331  Aydin Ozdalga, “Tehdit Suriye, Irak ve Iran’dan”, Milliyet December 13, 1989 
332 “Karadayi Tam Konuştu,” Milliyet, February 12, 1995, p. 14. 




One of the internal threats that TAF perceives existential is irtica, religious 
reactionism. Even though the issue dates back to the late 80s,334  the irtica “threat” gained 
prominence among the Kemalist military and civilian elite in the mid-90s, when the 
Welfare Party (RP), the first party with an openly declared Islamic agenda, became part 
of the ruling coalition government in 1994. After the postmodern coup of 1997, the 
military replaced irtica with the Kurdish separatism as the number one threat to the 
existence of Turkey.335 Çevik Bir, the then deputy chief of the General Staff, who was a 
very influential figure that shaped the Turkish politics in the second half of the 90s 
named Iran a “terrorist state” and said it was exporting its anti-secular ideology to 
Turkey. 336 He went as far as calling on the United States to list Iran as “a terrorist 
state.”337 
The rising securitization in Turkey in the 90s led to an unprecedented 
rapproacment between Turkey and Israel. The main driving force behind this “axis”338 
according to Çevik Bir, then deputy chief of the General Staff, who was a very influential 
figure, was “the circumstances in the region that dictated an inevitable cooperation of 
two countries” 339 Defending the mutual cooperation between Turkey and Israel, a 
Turkish senior officer stated, “we are surrounded on all sides by trouble. We are in the 
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hot seat. It is critical for us to jump outside this circle of chaos and find friends in the 
region. Israel was the perfect choice.” 340 
The top military brass saw the rapprochement as a way to deal with the threats. In 
his opinion piece published by the Washington Institute, Cevik Bir said, the military 
agreement signed between Turkey and Israel paved the way for resolution of the Turkish-
Syrian crisis and the irtica.341   
Cevik Bir further stated, “Under the provisions of Turkey's constitutional system, 
the military is charged with protecting the secular republican legacy of Kemal Atäturk, 
the founder of modern Turkey. The army made it clear to Erbakan (the head of Islamist 
RP) that it would not sit idly by and watch Turkey turn toward Islam or allow Israeli-
Turkish military relations to be jeopardized. In a reaffirmation of secularist supremacy, 
the secretary general of the powerful National Security Council (MGK)—a body made up 
of both military and political leaders—declared that Turkey's secular society and 
educational system formed basic tenets of the country's national security.”342 
The extent of the security syndrome went such that in 1999, the four star general, 
Nahil Seneloglu, during the opening ceremony of the new academic year, warned the 
young officers that “they were there to learn how Turkey was the most lonely country in 
the world and that the country was surrounded by the largest number of internal and 
external enemies in the world.”343  
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The Kemalist civilian elite also contributed to the continuation of the Sevres 
Syrndrome. For instance, according to the former ambassador Sükrü Elekdag; “there are valid 
reasons for Turkey's regarding other neighbors with skepticism and as a source of threat. Two countries 
among these neighbors, namely Greece and Syria, both of whom have territorial claims over Turkey 
and have supported the terrorist PKK organization” Cetin further claimed; Turkey benefiting from 
NATO's collective defense should not be counted on any more. From now on Turkey has to fight against 
any threat directed to her survival and security solely by her own national means.344   
In 1993, then foreign minister Sukru Elekdag stated “Because its geopolitical and 
geostrategic location places Turkey in the neighborhood of the most unstable, uncertain 
and unpredictable region of the world … it has turned into a frontline state faced with 
multiple fronts. It is at all possible for the crises and conflicts in these regions (the 
Balkans, the Caucasus and the Balkans) to spread and engulf Turkey.”345 He further 
argued in April 1996 that "[i]n terms of foreign relations, our nation is experiencing what 
is perhaps the most problematic period of the last fifty years of the Republican era. ... 
Turkey is besieged by a veritable ring of evil."346  
Given the developments in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East, some 
experts used the concept of “Bermuda Triangle” to define the post-Cold War security 
perception in Turkey.347  
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Hikmet Sami Turk, the former Turkish Minister of Defense, for example, stated in 
1999 that: "In the midst of destruction and reconstruction, Turkey stood and continues to 
stand as an anchor of stability in its region. Geographic destiny placed Turkey in the 
virtual epicenter of a ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of post-Cold War volatility and uncertainty, 
with the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East encircling us."348  
While Turkey’s security concerns have emanated from its immediate 
neighborhood, its implications have also included the European Union and the United 
States, long-term Turkey’s ally. For instance, the EU persistence in democratic reforms, 
especially in the context of the Kurdish problem, perpetuated the Sevres syndrome and 
contributed to many decision makers’ conviction that the EU is trying to divide the 
country, compromising the territorial integrity, as they did after the WWI.349   
The former president of Turkey Suleyman Demirel responded to the European 
insistence of democratic solution to the Kurdish problem by accusing the EU, saying that 
“West wants to involve the Sèvres Treaty to set up a Kurdish state in the region, (...) and 
that this was what they meant by political solution."350 In an interview with the German 
weekly Die Zeit, the then Interim Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit from the Democratic Left 
Party denied that there is a Kurdish problem in Turkey but the PKK terrorism problem, 
which certain external powers supported in order to divide the country.351  
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This fear and suspicion about preconditions set to Turkish membership aroused a 
great deal of wariness among the Turkish decision makers. The then Chief of the Strategy 
and Force Planning Division at the General Staff, Sadi Erguvenc,  argued that; “…while 
Turkey expects its allies to give support that it deserves from them in its fight against the 
PKK terror, it receives an unwarranted embargo on associated weapons sales. And, 
when Turkey adamantly defends its unitary state structure it becomes frustrated when its 
allies would like to see the Kurds be treated not as regular citizens but as minorities.”352 
For instance, the German government in 2000 cancelled the $7.1 billion sale of some 
1000 Leopard-II tanks to Turkey, citing Turkey’s human right records.353  
Another example was in 1995 when the US Congress blocked the order of ten 
Super Cobra AH-1 gunships arguing that they would be used against Kurds.354 Likewise 
in 1996, the US Congress cancelled the delivery of three Perry class frigates to Turkey 
fearing that the balance of power between Turkey and Greece would be tipped in favor of 
the former. Efraim Inbar states that the success of the Greek and Armenian lobbies in 
Washington played a great role in the cancellation of these deliveries.355 
The above-mentioned developments and entrenched “Sevres Syndrome” 
manifested itself in the Turkish society as the deep anti-American sentiments. Many 
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Turks believe that throughout the history of Turkish-American relations, the latter has 
most of the time acted contrary to the former’s national interests. Such incidents were the 
Cuban Crisis and ensuing removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey, the 1975 arms 
embargo, Economic losses incurred by the American invasions of Iraq and the U.S 
support for the Kurdish autonomy and possible Kurdish independence in north of Iraq.356  
Finally, the reluctance of U.S support for Turkey in its war against the PKK is one of the 
biggest reasons the Turks rank among the most anti-American nations in the world, 
although Turkey is a NATO member.357 
4.5 Conclusion 
The Turkish war of independence witnessed the rise of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. He 
waged the war not only against the European allied forces but also against the Ottoman 
Empire and the Sultan, who according to M. Kemal, was a collaborator with the 
occupying forces. As seen from the previous chapter M. Kemal’s experiences during his 
time as an officer in the Ottoman Army greatly shaped his worldview, which he applied 
after his success in the war of independence. Complete rejection to the entire Ottoman 
past was a daunting task and required reforms of quite radical and aggressive nature well 
as determination to implement them. Having won the war and established the new 
republic, M. Kemal set to implement those reforms. However, the nature of the reforms 
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and the people to whom they were applied were not compatible. The western oriented 
ethno centrist and secular reforms were to be applied to Turkish people who are 
predominantly made up of people for whom religion was an important part of their life. 
Moreover, the Kurds had already attained their group identity well before the war of 
independence and the Turkish ethnocentric policies in post-war era created resentment 
among them. The top to bottom reform agenda had to be employed by an emerging group 
of few, the ruler or the center, which did not necessarily share the same worldview as the 
majority or the periphery, the ruled. 
It was not long before the Kemalist elite, which was made up of civilian bureaucracy, 
the legislation and the military, take full control of the sources of the new republic and 
see themselves as the sole owner of it and became the power center. The Kemalist 
principles were engrained in the PRP party program, which also became the core of the 
constitution. That is to say, PRP came to be equal to the state. It was after Ataturk’s death 
and during the Inonu rule (1938-1950) that the Kemalist elite acquired its class-
consciousness.  During this time the elite continued to consolidate their grip on the state 
and the Turkish people by using the Kemalist principles against any opposition, such as 
Islamists, Ottomanist or Communists/Leftists that may have arisen. Therefore, the 
Kemalist bureaucratic elite turned into a quasi-authoritarian state machine. The notion 
that any entity outside of the Kemalist realm constituted a threat to Kemalism thus the 
state no doubt retarded the advent of pluralistic rule in Turkey.  
It was not until the end of the World War II, the subsequent grave economic 
hardships and the urgent need for western financial assistance that compelled the PRP 




victory of the Democratic Party (DP) of Adnan Menderes proved that the top-to-bottom 
reforms and the center-periphery relations failed. For the first time, an entity outside of 
the Kemalist realm, although DP reiterated that it was Kemalist but was against the 
interpretation of Kemalism by PRP, came to power challenging the state machine sent 
shockwaves across the Kemalist elite. The “Anatolian” majority/periphery, for the first 
time, began to find representation in Ankara, which was identified with the “center”. 
The DP began to touch one of the most sensitive points of the Kemalist 
establishment; Islam. By relaxing the Kemalist secular practices in Turkey, Adnan 
Menderes continued to harvest the support of the Anatolian mass (the periphery) while at 
the same time attracting reaction from the Kemalist establishment.  The DP brought 
change to Turkish foreign policy too. Menderes began to abandon traditional western-
skeptic, static and timid foreign policy practices by becoming a staunch pro-American 
and attempting to change the Middle Eastern discourse. 
The elite considered the ten-year DP rule as an attempt to unravel the Kemalist 
revolution, a threat to the foundation of state and most importantly defiance to their 
interest and unchallenged grip on the state resources.  The Kemalist elite struck back in 
the 1960 by flexing its military muscle, toppling the democratically elected government 
and executing its notables. The 1960 military coup was a turning point for Turkish 
politics. Having understood that the periphery could no longer be contained through 
civilian means, the elite began to rely on a crude form of coercion, the Turkish military, 
to preserve and perpetuate their interest in the name of protecting the Kemalist 
revolution. The coup also showed that the elite did not have tolerance to the rise of the 




The military takeover of 1960 marked the beginning of a new era for Turkish politics; 
the political hegemony of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF).  All through the next four 
decades the Turkish domestic and foreign politics would be heavily influenced and to a 
great degree steered by TAF. The military interventions of 1971, 1980 and 1997 are the 
quintessence of the TAF’s potency to exert its muscles over legislation, academia, 
judiciary, economy, press, and virtually all aspects of life in Turkey. Given the 
‘praetorian’ nature of and the overwhelming clout it has over the Turkish politics, in this 
chapter I examined the sources of and means by which TAF perpetuated its hegemony. 
First of all, the embedded military culture in Turkish society, in which TAF is revered 
and exalted, made it an unquestionable entity. The Turks viewed military from a sacred 
point of view, calling it “the home of Prophet Muhammed”. Furthermore, the founding 
father of the Turkish republic, M. Kemal, was a soldier, and assigned the military as the 
protector of the foundations of the newly established republic. Therefore, the military 
made it its fundamental obligation to protect and perpetuate the principles of the Kemalist 
revolution.  
The rise of the periphery and the subsequent 1960 coup prompted the military to 
assume a more precautionary and proactive role by institutionalizing its role in the rule of 
the country.  The first step was the establishment of the National Security Council, 
through which it held a tight grip on the civilian authority and if necessity arose, 
‘corrected’ them. This enabled the generals to have control over education, academia, 
foreign policy and daily life of Turks. Furthermore, TAF began to acquire a more 
sovereign nature by establishing the Armed Forces Mutual Fund (OYAK), which over 




not only politically and socially but also economically. The growing defense industry and 
military spending only helped TAF to consolidate its privileged position and hegemony. 
Finally, by propagating the notion that Turkey is surrounded by enemies both externally 
and from within and ensuing securitization of Turkish politics was another factor for the 
persistence of military dominance in Turkey.   
To sum up, the Kemalist elite (bureaucracy, academia, press and especially the 
military) continued to influence Turkish domestic and foreign policy all throughout the 
second half of the 20th century. The rise of the Anatolian periphery and the 1960 coup 
was the harbinger of fundamental changes in Turkish society and politics. In the 
following chapter, I will examine the Ozal Era Turkish politics, which is considered to be 
the continuation of the Menderes Era in terms of liberalization and democratization at 
home and dominance of pro-active foreign policy understanding abroad. Also discussed 
is the foreign policy architects of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) who adopted 
policies that were patterned after Ozal’s.  
1. Goals and Priorities of the Kemalist Paradigm 
• Restructuring social and state identities based on strict Kemalist/Western 
principles, which requires denouncing the Ottoman past. 
o Restricting Islam in society and state, adopting strict form of secularism. 
o Denouncing pluralism in favor of establishing an ethno-centric and 
exclusionist state and society. 
o Extremely centralized state structure. 
o Create and sustain the Kemalist elite to perpetuate the paradigm. 
• Foreign Policy Goals 
o Preserving the territorial integrity (anti-expansionist/revisionist) 
o Preserving regional/international status quo (Status quo oriented) 
o Seeking recognition in international system (Especially the Ataturk era) 
o Radical pro-Westernism (One-dimensional foreign policy) 
o Intentionally neglecting the Middle East based on cultural, religious and 
perceptional reasons. (Secular foreign policy) 





o Security oriented foreign policy. (Relying on hard power as the first 
means) 
o Isolationist 
o Non-Aligned (especially the Ataturk and Inonu Era) 
 
2. Instruments of the Kemalist Paradigm 
• The Kemalist Elite 
• Turkish Armed Forces (especially through the National Security Council) 
• Bureaucracy 
o The Presidency (Executive Branch) 
o The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
o The High Courts (Judiciary) 
o The Higher Education Council (especially universities) 
o The Directorate of Religious Affairs (to impose state controlled Islam) 
• The Secular Press 





CHAPTER 5. RISE OF ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM; NEO-
OTTOMANISM IN OZAL ERA (1983-1993) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
It is important to examine the Ozal era in the context of the AKP politics because 
the neo-Ottoman vision that AKP possesses has its roots in the teachings of Turgut 
Ozal.358 This can clearly be seen in Ahmet Davutoglu’s, the architect of AKP foreign 
policy, seminal work “the Strategic Depth”. Davutoglu states that the Ozalist approach to 
domestic and foreign politics is in line with the neo-Ottomanist approach. 359 This makes 
him the next important person after Menderes, who challenged the conventional wisdom 
in Turkish politics in terms of structure, methodology and style. His unprecedented 
activism and pragmatism in domestic and foreign Turkish policy set examples to the next 
generation politicians, especially those of AKP. His worldview coupled with fundamental 
changes in international politics, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, during his time 
helped him transform Turkey into a much different country, socially, economically and 
politically.360  
Although he had been the prime minister, it was his presidential term (1989-1993) 
that marked the greatest change in Turkish politics. However, the fact that his rise to 
presidency corresponded with the fall of Communism and the abrupt change in global 
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affairs made it difficult to discern the direction of causality. For the first time after 
Menderes, Ozal challenged the orthodox Kemalist foreign policy that has been blamed 
for the quiescence of Turkey in the international arena. Furthermore, he defied the 
Kemalist understanding of secularism and nationalism. He openly praised the Ottoman 
era domestic and foreign politics, at which M. Kemal and his revolution took an aim. His 
foreign policy, on the contrary to that of Kemalism, was pro-active. He believed that 
Turkey’s best interest was to extend its influence to territories which were formerly 
Ottoman, for which the term neo-Ottomanism was used for the first time.361  
One reflection of his neo-Ottoman aspirations was his willingness to embrace the 
Kurdish identity, which completely ran counter to the Kemalist understanding of mono-
ethnic nation state. His worldview dictated him to pursued multicultural policies.362 
Being a staunch pro-American, he praised the American and Ottoman multiculturalism 
and said; “Both allowed different cultures and gave people freedom to exercise their 
religion, nationality and economic preferences. From this perspective, Turkey had to 
desert its authoritarian official understanding, namely the Kemalist state ideology.” 363 
All these considered, it is very important to thoroughly examine the Ozal Era, 
which has had a profound impact on the AKP government. Therefore, this chapter is 
made up of an analysis of the military coup of 1980 and its impacts in Turkish politics, 
Ozal’s personality, Turkey’s changing economic and social structure of the 80s, the 
Kurdish question, Ozal’s neo-Ottomanist approach, and examples of Ozal’s foreign 
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policy practices. While the focus of this chapter is the Ozal era Turkish domestic and 
foreign policy, I will start with examining the conditions that brought him to power. 
5.2 Pre-Ozal Era: The 1980 Coup d’etat and Its Implications in Turkish Politics 
As was indicated in the previous chapter, the Turkish military is probably the 
single most important institution in the history of Turkish politics due in great part to the 
support it receive from the Kemalist civilian elite, which also controlled the high courts, 
universities, certain political parties and media outlets. This support was reinforced by the 
approval of Kemalist sections of society, which are known to be weary of Kurdish 
nationalism, Islamic and Communist movements.364 
In the first years of the republic, those who had Islamic and Kurdish tendencies 
were alienated from the state and governance due to the assertive secularism and 
nationalism. Therefore, any ideology besides Kemalism was suppressed by the elite and 
considered a threat to the foundations of the state formation. The post-1950 multi-party 
era showed that the Kemalist elite and PRP did not really attain the majority of support 
from the people. Having been concerned with this reality, the Kemalist elite resorted to 
military coercion to hold their control and dominance over the state.365  
The beginning of the Cold War convoluted the ideological balance of power in 
Turkey. While the Kemalist elite had been cohesive in their staunch opposition against 
Islamism and Kurdish nationalism, the rise of the leftist/Communist movements, 
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especially in the 1960s, created another group against which the Turkish Military 
fought.366  
The 1970s witnessed fierce clashes between the socialist/communist leaning (the leftists) 
and the nationalist and conservative Muslims (the rightists), which took its toll on 
Turkish society, politics and economy. The tumultuous years of 70s ended with the 
deposition of the civilian government by the Turkish in September 12, 1980, resulting in 
dissolution of the parliament and arresting all political and union members. The military 
indicated that it had taken over in order; “to suppress terrorism and radicalism; to restore 
economic growth and stability; to introduce a new constitution and legal arrangements 
that would stabilize the system and prevent anarchy; to re-establish civilian democracy 
on a Kemalist basis.”367 As was in 1960 and 1971, the Turkish military again stepped in 
to bring the country and society in line with the Kemalist ideology, fulfilling its main 
duty. 
It is important to note that although TAF have removed the civilian governments, 
it did not aim to stay in power longer than necessary, eventually turning the government 
over to the civilians after sufficient conditions were met.368 Laciner says that Turkish 
Armed Forces (TAF) was not against the democratic political system but the results. He 
states that the military would not have intervened in civilian politics as long as the system 
was kept fully Kemalist. Indeed, to justify the 1980 coup, TAF resorted to the Article 34 
of military by-law, which commissioned the military to defend the Republic, Kemalism 
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and territorial integrity of the country.369 The commander in chief of the 1980 coup, 
Kenan Evren, summarized the purpose of the coup in a press conference as; "to protect 
the national unity, to restore the safety of the citizens by preventing the terror and 
anarchy, to restore the state authority, to restore the secular republic and finally to enable 
a functional civilian rule."  He further emphasized that the path to the success is 
Kemalism and its creeds.370 
Once the internal anarchy and terror was quelled, TAF set to reinstate the 
Kemalist ideology. TAF held the radical leftist and rightist ideologies responsible for the 
setback and declared that Kemalism could only be the proper ideology for the Turks. 
Therefore, a comprehensive re-Kemalization attempt was initiated. The year of 1981 was 
declared the years of Kemalism, new institution and books were initiated. Ataturk’s name 
was given to streets, roads, stadiums and buildings.371 
The new constitution was written in 1982 and was overwhelmingly accepted in a 
national referendum, in which Kenan Evren was elected president and the National 
Security Council gained even more power over the rule of the country. The NSC halted 
all political activities (in October 16, 1981) and eventually banned political parties (in 
October 1982), detaining their members and members of the Parliament. The Provisional 
Article 4 banned those chairmen of the political parties from engaging in political 
activities for the next ten years. 4).372 The next political elections were set to take place in 
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1983 with the participation of those political parties that would get permission from the 
National Security Council.373 
5.3 The 1980s and Rise of Ozal 
The reason why Ozal rose to power deserves scrutiny because it is also closely 
associated with the success of the Welfare Party, (which is the subject matter of the next 
chapter), and the Justice and Development Party government. That is to say, the biggest 
contributing factor for success is the changing structure of the Turkish society in the 80s 
and the ensuing rise of political Islam. The rise of Islam is basically the result of the 
oppressive policies that the Kemalist ruling elite had imposed on the majority of 
population who identify themselves as conservative. 
Rasit Kasaba explains this important point in the history of Turkey; 
“During the early decades of the twentieth century, the tired and defeated people 
of Anatolia were in no position to debate or resist Ataturk’s radical message. Some were 
even enthusiastic in supporting the national leader in his determination to remake the 
Turkish state. By the 1980s, the situation had changed completely. The Turkish people, 
few of whom now remembered the early years of the republic, had grown extremely 
suspicious of, and downright cynical about, the latest incarnations of the promises of 
‘enlightened and prosperous tomorrows.’ Instead of making further sacrifices for a future 
that kept eluding them, they were starting to inquire about the histories, institutions, 
beliefs, identities, and cultures from which they had been forcefully separated. This 
reorientation of the social compass spread to all segments of the society, not only 
affecting people’s political outlook but also influencing the way they dressed, which 
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music they created and listened to, how they built their houses and office buildings, and 
how they thought about the history of modern Turkey...The nature and contents of these 
debates and conflicts show that as a monolithic force that tried to mold Turkish society 
and mentality, Kemalism is losing its grip.”374  
The above assertion “the Kemalism is losing its grip” is a significant one. The 
signs of this failure are manifold. The rise of Kurdish national identity and ensuing armed 
violence of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish name - PKK) against the Turkish state 
further deteriorated the situation for the Kemalist elite, as the perpetuation of the Kurdish 
problem meant a blow to the ‘nationalism’ principle of Kemalism. Furthermore, not only 
the Kemalist understanding of nationalism, but also secularism was starting to be 
questioned. It is this point that the Kemalist modernization project began to show serious 
signs of failure in the early 80s.375 
The goal of the founding fathers of Turkey that the new republic was going to go 
through a well-organized modernity in a linear manner, which would result in the Turkish 
people becoming staunchly secular and ethnically homogenous, turned out to be a 
disappointment. The end result of this project was the economic backwardness, social 
division, between “Muslim and secularist, Turk and Kurd, reason and faith, rural and 
urban, the old and the new.” 376  
One of the greatest results of the failure of the Kemalist ideology was the advent 
of Turgut Ozal, who came to the forefront after the 1980 coup, and his actions during his 
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tenure. Therefore, I would like to mention the coup and its impact in the Turkish politics. 
The 1980 coup provided a suitable venue for Ozal’s success.377 
As much as the National Security Council (NSC)/the generals banned the political 
parties, it aimed at bringing new blood to the Turkish politics by introducing the 
moderate right wings Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party, NDP), 
whose chairman was Turgut Sunalp, a retired general, which made NDP the choice of the 
Turkish Armed Forces in elections, and the moderate left Halkci Parti (Populist Party, 
PP), whose founder was Nejdet Calp, Ismet Inonu’s secretary, which meant that PP was 
the continuation of the People’s Republican Party. By creating two parties on the 
opposite end of political spectrum, the NSC aimed at creating a stable political system in 
Turkey.378 In 1983, NSC loosened the restrictions for establishing political parties albeit 
making it very difficult to form them.379 The prospective parties had to receive approval 
from NSC. Only Turgut Ozal’s party, the Motherland Party (MP, or ANAP) was granted 
permission to enter the 1983 elections. Therefore, the race was between NDP, PP and 
ANAP. To Kenan Evren’s, the coup leader, Ozal’s party won the elections by 45% of the 
votes, giving his party a super majority 212 of 400 seats in the Parliament.380 Eric J. 
Zurcher argues that the fact that the Army’s favorite, NDP came last in elections showed 
that the Turkish people were not necessarily happy with the military intervention and saw 
Ozal as the new face of politics.381  
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Thus, a new era in Turkish politics began with Ozal. His premiership (1983-1989) 
and presidency (1989-1993) would bring unprecedented economic, social and political 
changes to Turkey. Furthermore, his novel approach to Turkish politics, the like of which 
had not been seen since Menderes, was the harbinger of future revolutions in Turkish 
domestic and foreign politics. The foreign policy practices he pursued would later be 
called as Ozalism or neo-Ottomanism. 382 In the following section I will examine Ozal’s 
personality and worldview, the changes in international system and their implications for 
Turkish domestic and foreign policy practices during the Ozal Era (1983-1993) 
5.4 Özal's Personality 
One of Ozal’s most striking features was his diverse personality. He had 
successful business practices in private industry in 1970s thus he developed a great deal 
expertise and networking in business circles. This was one of the many signs that he was 
an economic liberal. Ozal was also a practicing Muslim and had strong connections with 
the Nakshibendi383 order of dervishes384, which helped him develop good relations with 
other religious sects in Turkey. He was an internationally renowned bureaucrat. He 
advised the World Bank as well as the US government and worked with the IMF.  In 
Turkey, he was a member of the technical Advisory Board of the Turkish Prime Ministry, 
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and from 1967 to 1971 was under-secretary of the State Planning Organization, served as 
undersecretary of the State Planning Organization.385 Laciner calls Ozal “a moderate who 
could do business with everyone regardless of their social or ideological background.”386 
For example, he was an Islamist candidate for the Izmir province in 1978.387  
Ozal was staunchly pro-American. This was due in great part to the time he spent 
in the United States after he graduated as an electrical engineer from the Istanbul 
Technical University in the 1950s. His experiences in America convinced him that 
liberalism was the key for American success. His time in America solidified his belief 
that there were similarities between US and the Ottoman Empire. To him, both were 
tolerant of different cultures, religions, nationality and economic preferences. Based on 
this, he believed that the authoritarian Kemalist state in Turkey had to be revised. 388  
Like Menderes, he aspired to turn Turkey into a “small” America. He went so far 
as calling the Turkish bureaucracy and economy Communist for its clumsiness. He found 
that the Kemalist statist understanding of economy and protectionism were the reasons 
for lack of development, inefficiency and lack of competitiveness of the Turkish 
economy. To him, the economic prosperity and democratic advancement coexist. He 
valued individual rights, which was in contrast to Kemalist state ideology. 389  
In 1979 Ozal said: 
`A strong state does not mean a patriarchal state. The aim is not richness of the 
state but richness of the nation. If people are rich, it means that the state is rich. In 
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economy or political spheres the state should not compete with the people, but support 
them. The people are not the servants of the state, but the state must be servant of the 
people. 390 This was a different approach from the Kemalist understanding of the state 
and the citizens. 
Morton Abramowitz, who served as the US ambassador to Turkey between 1989 
and 1991, states that Ozal needed extensive financial and political support from America 
to implement his liberal economic agenda. Also, the American military aid was important 
to quell the military. As will be examined, he wanted to transform Turkey into a regional 
power and have a say in the newly independent Central Asia region, for which he also 
needed the American support. Even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he continued to 
aspire to harness the American power to realize his goals. 391 
Abramowitz further states that Ozal’s perception of America went above his 
politico-economic aspirations. Abramowitz says, “Ozal had become, probably because of 
his time at the World Bank in Washington, somewhat infatuated with U.S and the nature 
of American life. An engineer by training, he valued the dynamism, the freedom and 
creativity he saw in US. On a number of occasions he talked about his hopes of 
eventually seeing it emulated in Turkey. Every time I saw him but once he had TV on, 
invariably CNN and he would occasionally look over to see what was playing. Ozal 
valued the openness and give and take in American political life and wanted to see it in 
Turkey.” 392  
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5.4.1 Ozal’s Approach to Religion  
Ozal’s approach to Turkish domestic politics, which is a reflection of his foreign 
policy understanding, deserves scrutiny too. His approach to religion and Islam differed 
greatly from his predecessors, with the exception of Adnan Menderes. His pro-Islamic 
views and their application in the Turkish politics clearly run counter to the traditional 
Kemalist ideology.   
Ozal was known to be a pious Muslim if not Islamist. Former US ambassador to 
Turkey Morton Abramowitz says Ozal was deeply religious and he did not hesitate to 
display it publicly. He went to Mecca for pilgrimage along with his entourage and 
regularly attended the Friday prayers, which was the first for a head of state in the history 
of the Turkish republic. 393  He invited diplomatic representatives to iftar dinners during 
Ramadan, which drew criticism from the secular establishment.394 He said; “I am the 
Muslim prime minister of the democratic Turkey. The Republic of Turkey is secular but 
personally I am not!”395 
Naturally, he was tolerant of the religious orders, which are part of the religious 
scenery of Turkey, although M. Kemal banned them as part of radical secularization 
attempt. Ozal actually belonged to one of the orders, Nakshibendi. He gave importance to 
the religious education and stated that the future bureaucrats and politicians must come 
from Imam Hatips (secondary schools that educate the religious functionaries of the 
future).396  
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Lacin argues that Ozal’s Islam was different from either the Kemalist or the NSP 
(National Salvation Party) Islam, which is more associated with Arab-Islam.  His friend 
and follower Cengiz Landar spelled out the difference: 
`Republican secularism was inspired by French and Soviet atheism. Therefore, in 
the 1920s Republican secularism became atheism. In time, Kemalist secularism became 
an anti-religion and anti-Islam concept. When Turkish Islam, rooted in the Ottoman and 
Seljuki Islamic cultures were suppressed by the State, Arabic Islam, which is a less 
moderate, more radical version, became the leader in the world. Now when Ozal and me 
visited the Turkish communities in the Balkans, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Central Asia, in 
Azerbaijan, in Kazakhstan, we saw a completely different Islam from the Arab version: a 
Turkified Islam - A more moderate Islam, an Islam which is suitable for liberalism and 
democracy. I mean Turkish Islam is so different. Kemalists cannot accept that a country 
needs religion as well, because their ideology was an imported ideology and not suitable 
for Turkish cultural structure. We have to accept that Turkey is a Muslim country.397  
While Ozal respected secularism, he opposed the Kemalist interpretation of it. He 
favored the Anglo-Saxon secular understanding and a Turkish interpretation of Islam. 
Laciner argues; “He searched for a middle-way between Islamism and Turkism, his aim 
being to formulate a religious understanding which was suitable for democracy, 
liberalism and capitalism.” 398 
-Ozal’s view of Islam can be summarized in his word: 
-“The Turk is aware that faith in itself does not affect secularism, does not 
prevent him from being rational. In everyday life, there is no difference in this respect 
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between a European Christian and a Turkish Muslim. A synthesis has been realized 
between the West and Islam. The synthesis has ended the identity crisis of the Turk. I am 
a believer and open to all kinds of innovations. Not having a problem of identity, I feel no 
need to defend my own culture, nor attach myself to an ideology or extremist 
nationalism.”399 
5.4.2 Özalist Nationalism 
One of Ozal’s worldviews constituted Turkism. However, Ozal’s understanding 
of Turkism differed from that of Enver Pasha, who was an irredentist and that of M. 
Kemal, who was an isolationist. The Ottoman Turkists aspired to establish an all-
inclusive Turkish empire, which would include the Turks of Russia, Iran and China. On 
the contrary, M. Kemal avoided such adventurist policies and restricted his ideology with 
the Turks of the new republic he founded. Therefore, Ataturk had no interest in affairs of 
the Turks outside Anatolia. Laciner states that an example of this is when M. Kemal 
refrained from giving support to the Azeris in the South Caucasus when the Soviets 
annexed it in 1920s.400 Ozal believed that the relations with the kin states were important 
but not in irredentist terms but economically, culturally and politically. 
Laciner argues that Ozalist Turkist understanding, unlike that of M. Kemal, was 
not a reaction to the domestic developments of Turkey. M. Kemal’s nationalism was 
shaped by the secessionist movements of the minorities that created a lot of trouble in the 
last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the first years of Turkey, therefore aimed at 
establishing and securing the country as well as from Western aggression and Ottoman 
Islamism. Ozal’s Turkism, on the other hand, embraced the diversity, Islam and it was 
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not against the West. Laciner states that Ozal’s Turkism can be identical to that of 
Americanism in the United States.401  
Bilal Simsir argues that the Kurdish problem Turkey is facing today is due in 
great part to the Kemalist ethno nationalism. He quotes Ismet Inonu’s speech in this 
regard.  Inonu said in 1925; “We are frankly nationalists… and nationalism is our only 
factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of 
influence. We must Turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price.”402 
According to Simsir, what made things worse for the Kurdish problem was that 
Islam, which held the Turks and Kurds together for centuries, was abandoned by the new 
regime. 403 The Turkish modernization movement and its nationalism and secularism was 
met with resistance in the early years not only among certain Muslims but also the Kurds, 
who staged a series of uprisings against the new republic. 404 The Kurdish problem 
resurfaced in the 1970s as the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was formed and 
adopted an armed struggle against Turkey.  
During his presidency, Ozal managed to challenge the Kemalist 
consensus/military option and introduced new ideas and opened new realms of inquiry 
and thinking. He did this almost single handedly, and often with members of his own 
party opposing him. During his tenure, Ozal opposed the Kemalist policies and military 
option towards the solution of the Kurdish problem single handedly. 405 
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For the first time in the history of the Kurdish question, Ozal stated that the 
solution would not be through military means. Ozal said: “The solution to the problem in 
the South East is in freedom of speech, expression and dialogue… Not through force. 
Mutual consensus, not the unilateralism, is very important if we want to solve the 
problem. We need to strengthen democracy in Turkey… The key for development is 
freedom. Free societies become those of productive, which eventually brings 
prosperity.406  
He also believed that it was thanks to these values that the U.S became a 
superpower.407 His pluralist understanding went beyond the borders of Turkey as he 
embraced the Kurds of Iraq when they had to flee from Saddam’s oppression during the 
first Gulf War. For example he argued that Turkey would protect the Kurds as much as 
the Turkomans in Iraq. He went as far as to imply a federation between the Kurds in Iraq 
and Turkey.408 This certainly implied a revisionist foreign policy understanding of Ozal 
when it came to the immediate neighborhood of Turkey, which for the first time brought 
about the concept of “neo-Ottomanism” in Turkish foreign policy. 
Özal underlined his plans for the outside Kurds in his speech in Diyarbakir, a 
predominantly Kurdish region:  `The people in the south east region are our brothers. 
The people in the Northern Iraq are their brothers and should to be our brothers too. 
Turkey just neglected the events happening in Northern Iraq in the past. For example, the 
Halabje incident. We said "that's outside our frontiers; it's nothing to do with us.” This 
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policy must be changed. Turkey's new policy should be as: if Baghdad commits another 
barbarity there, it will find us opposing it.' 409 
It is important to note that for the first time in the history of republic, a high 
ranking official would openly criticize the pillars of Kemalist republic by denouncing its 
perception of nationalism, and secularism. The neo-Ottomanist tone in Ozal’s policies 
can be found in his speech in 1993. Ozal stated that the Turkish Republic must reconcile 
with its Ottoman past. While debasing the CUP, thanks to which Ataturk was able to 
establish his place against the Istanbul administration, Ozal highly praised the Sultan 
Abdulhamid II. In the same speech, he also reiterated the important of freedom of speech 
regarding the Islamic and Kurdish identity.410 This speech clearly underscores the huge 
differences between the traditional pacific policies and Özal's activist Kurdish policy. 
He emphasized that Turkey’s Ottoman past is its most precious asset. He argues 
that only by embracing its Ottoman past can the Turkish republic overcome its domestic 
problems and those issues that rage across its borders.411  Therefore, he criticized the 
traditional National Pact “Misak-i Milli” which stressed protecting the existing borders 
without giving any room for expansionist movements. Moreover, he criticized Turkey’s 
highly centralized governance style arguing Turkey can best be governed with the state 
system (eyelet system) where local authorities would have more administrative power. 
He also proposed a presidential system, like the one in America. 412 This was very much 
against the centralist Kemalist understanding of territorial integrity.   
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He even argued that the Ottoman heritage granted Turkey great power to control 
the region.413 To Ozal, “the Misak-I Milli borders that Turkey has now sooner or later is 
going to change. If Turkey remains status quo oriented, the change will be against the 
Turkish interests. Therefore Turkey has to pursue a pro-active foreign policy.”414 
 He further implied that the only solution to the Kurdish problem and other matters 
in the Middle East was a federation between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, which was 
considered as the resurgence of the Ottoman Empire by the leftist groups in Turkey. For 
Özal, Ottoman political and cultural systems could be a perfect model for 20th century 
Turkey. For example, his eyalet sistemi (state system), the localization of the 
administration, and the presidential system suggestions were all inspired by the Ottoman 
past. 
While Ozal viewed the West an important part of modern world he believed 
Turks did not need to be ashamed of their civilization, because Turkish/Islamic 
civilization was not a lower civilization, but one of the many advanced civilizations in the 
world: “The Turks living in this territory for a thousand years, have inherited some part 
of culture of every civilization which flourished here since prehistory. They have evolved 
a synthesis derived from the cultural legacy of Anatolia, from the culture they brought 
with them from Central Asia, and from the Muslim religion. Their talent for synthesis and 
their ecumenical character has enabled them to blend these three strands together. ' 415 
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5.4.3 The Socio-Demographic Impact of Ozal  
Upon taking office on December 13, 1983, Ozal promptly began implementing 
his economic policies that combined economic liberalization with fiscal and monetary 
austerity. His stated intention was to reduce inflation, promote economic growth through 
exports, attract sorely needed foreign investment and shrink the state’s large role in the 
economy.  He eased some of the restraints on importing and exporting.  This helped 
loosen restrictions on the economy by fortifying Turkey’s stability payments.  There were 
new standards for imports as well as motivations for exporting.  Regulations for 
importing were re-defined and unless specified on a list of prohibited imports were free to 
enter.   This helped make the duty lower or removed completely. Exports were further 
encouraged by making licensing easier and less bureaucracy involvement.  Exporters 
earnings increased by 15% and additional incentives were given for companies exporting 
over $30 million.  Acceptance of foreign currency at commercial banks and freedom for 
the Turkish people to carry and travel with foreign currency was established.  Daily 
exchange rate adjustments helped keep exports competitive. Ozal recognized the need for 
change in the economic structure hindered by the omnipresent role of the government.416 
Thanks to Ozal’s liberalization policies, the Turkish economy began to change for 
the better. The GNP increased by 5.4% in the 1980-89 period compared to 3.3% in 1975-
80. As of 1990, the relative involvement in trade was better than those of Greece and 
Spain and not so far behind that of Italy. 417  
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The Turkish exports rose from $2.9 billion in 1980 to more than 20 billion dollars 
in 1990, which corresponds to a whopping 350% increase in a decade. 418 The share of 
export in GNP was about 20% in 1987, which was a triple increase in export share in 
eight years. Also, the average annual rate of growth export earnings increased by 18.9 in 
1980-88 period. 419 Imports rose from $ 7,909 million in 1980 to $ 22.5 billion in 1990, 
which was a 182% increase. The tourism industry boomed in this period.  While the 
tourism revenues were $212 million in 1980, in 1990, it corresponded to more than 3 
billion dollars. 420  
At this point, it is essential to note the impact of Ozal’s economic liberalism and 
its ensuing effect on the Turkish society due to the fact that this impact would in later 
decades shape the domestic political outlook, giving rise of the conservative periphery, 
which challenged the Kemalist elite and status quo. 
5.4.4 The Socio-Demographic Earthquake and its Impact on the Turkish Politics 
The economic and political reforms carried out under Prime Minister Turgut Ozal 
in the mid-1980’s also contributed to strengthening the role of Islamic groups.  The 
Ozalist reforms loosened the state control over economy, giving rise to the predominantly 
non-Kemalist masses in such cities in Anatolia as Denizli, Gaziantep and Kayseri.  The 
new economic environment created a new middle class called “Anatolian bourgeoisie” 
who has a strong sense of Islamic identity.  The new group supported liberal economic 
policies, limited state intervention in economy and social spheres such as greater religious 
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freedom.  Thanks to theis emerging group, the Welfare Party and eventually the AKP 
came to power, changing the domestic and foreign political atmosphere in Turkey 
radically. 421 
The conservative religious businessmen and their companies, also called the 
Anatolian Tigers, were inspired from the notion that Islam and its prophet emphasized the 
importance of commerce in blessed gain (helal kazanc). This movement of the rising 
Anatolian elite is also called “Islamic Calvinism”. 422 The supporters of this movement 
adopt the Protestant ethics of religious merit of work and the importance of saving and 
education. The new rising elite contributed greatly to the changing nature of the Turkish 
politics. It is important to note that the ideology of the new elite is considerably differed 
from classical Kemalist ideology that prevailed in the 20th century Turkey. The 
divergence stemmed from the fact that the new elite, unlike the Kemalists, harbored the 
Ottoman imperial nostalgia, supported laissez faire economics, non-intervention of the 
state and importance of small business. All these were combined with the conservative 
values. 423 
Another important result of the Ozalist policies was that the Arab capital began to 
flow into Turkey. Moreover, Ozal, by nature, advocated religious freedom and allowed 
for the opening of religious schools. During his time the conservative Turks gained 
greater access to higher education, economy, media and politics.424 Probably the most 
impacting change in the Turkish society was the influx of conservative Turks into big 
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cities like Istanbul and Ankara and rapid urbanization,425 all of which was due in great 
part to the Ozalist liberal policies. Naturally, the rural to urban influx meant the 
ideological change of the cities, as they brought with them their habits, beliefs and 
customs. The Kemalist elite and the Anatolian migrants began to live side by side, which 
began to create social tensions, especially in application of secularism.426 
Hakan Yavuz concludes that the AKP’s success in early 2000s was due in great 
part to the rise of the new conservative elite, especially during the Ozal era, in which the 
social mobility became available. The symbiotic relationship between the Kemalist state 
and the large Istanbul-based capitalists had been based on a secular agreement and the 
Kemalist ideology. The new rising elite constituted a challenge and an alternative to it. 427  
Having scrutinized the conditions and events that preceded the Ozal era as well 
Ozal’s rise to power and his ideology, I proceed with the implication of these on the 
foreign policy of Turkey during the Ozal period. 
5.5 Ozalism in Foreign Policy 
The most important international event that took place during Ozal’s tenure was 
undoubtedly the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The end of the Cold War and ensuing 
developments in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Central Asia as well as the Middle 
East, as Hasan Kosebalaban puts, “forced Turkey to face its historical, cultural and 
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religious legacy in its surrounding regions”428 This was in contrast with the Kemalist 
ideology. The newly emerging Turkic states, the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the 
Caucasus that impacted the Muslims and the Turks living there prompted the need for a 
more pro-active foreign policy. Kosebalaban concludes "no matter how hard Turkey tried 
to escape from its imperial legacy, it has always come back to haunt it.” 429  
As Graham Fuller reminds us, geopolitical change in post-Cold War era has made 
physiological and cultural dynamics among the nations much more important and 
aroused sentiments, perceptions and aspirations regarding group identity. Fuller notes; 
“Without history and psychology... the Balkans is meaningless. It is language and myth, 
not rivers, mountains, or raw materials that link the Turkish shores of the Mediterranean 
to the shores of Lake Baikal over the rivers of Western China -- in the real political 
sense.” 430 
As has been seen throughout this dissertation, despite some differences, the path 
all Turkish governments have chosen was integration with the West. The locus of the 
Kemalist foreign policy was always pro-Western. For the Kemalists, integration with the 
Western world was a matter of life and death. It was not only base of Turkish security 
and foreign policy but also a security for the secular regime. Therefore the end of the 
Cold War made most Turks panic. The simplest explanation was that: `Now, the West 
does not need us. Hereafter they will not give any financial, political and military aid. 
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Similarly, the EEC, which had implied cultural biases in its Turkey policy, will close 
down its doors to Turkey. Turkey separated from the `civilized world' (the West), will be 
alone with the traditional enemy, Russia, and the regional conflicts, poverty, instability. 
Regional instability will undermine Turkish economy and integrity and all the foreign 
powers will work to disunite Turkey. Kemalists, who believed that the end of the Cold 
War threatened the Turkish economy, security and democracy, suggested returning to the 
early Republican policy of isolation. They further argued that after the Cold War, the 
West's aim was to disintegrate Turkey as witnessed in Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. For 
the Kemalists and other isolationists, the Kurdish problem and the European refusal of 
the Turkish application for the European Union were clear signs for the Western 
intention. Kemalists argued that separatist Kurds were encouraged by the EU countries.  
The geopolitical realignment in the post-Cold War era had the Kemalist worried. 
According to this belief, Turkey, which played a vital important role during the cold war 
against the Soviet threat, was losing its importance for the west, which would mean that 
the West might abandon Turkey, which would be detrimental for Turkey’s westward 
ideology and democracy. The new geopolitical environment in Turkey’s neighborhood 
would throw Turkey in the pit of newly emerging conflicts, which in turn would wreak 
havoc on Turkey financially and politically. One of the biggest concerns was that the 
Kurdish insurgency would result in the Kurdish secession thus break up of Turkey; such 
was the case in Yugoslavia. The solution that the Kemalist elite proposed was 
isolationism.431 However, Ozal adopted a proactive approach in foreign policy.  
A new sense of awareness and sympathy among several groups (those Turks who 
share their culture and language in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Muslim 
                                                 




Balkan people) have been brought to light via strong political friendships.  These people 
considered Turkey as a great source of support, both morally and materially, as they 
transition to life after Communism. This led the leaders of those republics in Central Asia 
that speak Turkic and Azerbaijan in the east plus Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania to 
visit Ankara in 1991 and 1992 in order to utilize the power of the new political alliances 
for their political and economic needs.432 
Conflicts within the region such as Karabagh and the Bosnia crisis were the 
reason for the mutual awareness leading these countries to look for support from Turkey. 
Because there was no competition between communists and capitalists, superpowers 
were not lending their support. In order for these nations to receive military and political 
support, cultural and ethnic similarities were important. Fuller claims that “neo-
geopolitics” mobilized psychological and cultural dynamics among the countries. 433 Due 
to this, the group identity created by relationships between countries and cultures became 
crucial to international relations. Because of the areas’ multi-cultural structures, this was 
even more important in the Balkans and Caucasia. If this theory is true, then it was 
unavoidable for cultural polarization leading to the area around Turkey being the most 
dangerous in the world. The approaches used may be correct or not, but this question is 
beyond the extension of this study, yet obviously Turkey has become attractive for the 
Turks, Muslims, and those considering themselves to be of the former Ottoman Empire. 
We saw an example of this when Turkey served as an ally for the Muslim peoples of the 
country formerly known as Yugoslavia while Greece and Russia supported the Serbs. We 
also saw this when the Azerbaijanis requested support from their “Muslim, Turkish 
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brothers” while Russia lent their support to the Armenians. In addition Ankara was the 
meeting point in the midst of the Cold War for the leaders of the Turkic world, Bosnia, 
Albania, and Macedonia to seek out help for their countries’ economic and political 
problems. 434 
One of the positive outcomes of the fall of the Soviet bloc for Turkey was the 
emergence of new regimes. Once hostile to Turkey due to treatment to its Turkish 
minority, Bulgaria as well as Romania and Albania revised their attitudes towards 
Turkey. Not to mention the Turkic republics of former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan decided to take Turkey as their role model in their transition. 
Therefore, political and economic relations between these republics and Turkey increased 
dramatically.435  
5.5.1 Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) 
One of the most striking examples of Ozal's pro-active and ambitious foreign 
policy was the establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) in 1992, 
which aimed to establish institutionalized relationship between the former communist 
bloc countries.436 The BSEC was established with the Turkish leadership and was Ozal’s 
idea. The objective was to stabilize the region by utilizing economic incentives while 
opening new trade routes for the Turkish entrepreneurs.437 The BSEC marks an important 
policy endeavor of Ozal because it symbolizes the novice pro-active foreign policy. 
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On June 25, 1992, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine signed the declaration of Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) citing the importance of multilateral cooperation and the 
principles of market economy. Taking advantage of their geographical proximity, the 
signatory parties pledged to establish constructive and peaceful relations promoting 
democratic and human rights values.438 Furthermore, fight against violence, terrorism is 
among other goals of the organization. 439 
For Ozal, cultural dimension was also important. During his trips to respective 
BSEC countries, he signed cultural protocols, which aimed at increasing cooperation in 
education, language and science. Turkey further gave aid to much poorer countries such 
as Georgia and Macedonia. Laciner argues that some countries used the agreement as 
leverage to their adversaries. For example, Turkey became a source of credit for Albania 
and a balancing power against Greece.440 
Valinakis draws an interesting point to Turkey’s initiative. He argues that one of 
Ozal’s goals was to increase Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the European Union and increase 
its influence in the Black sea basin and the Transcaucasia. He states that Turkey wanted 
to establish an alternative project to the European Union.441 However, those who oppose 
this proposition argue that by endeavoring in such an ambitious project, Turkey hoped to 
strengthen its prospects of full EU membership. This too was confirmed by the Turkish 
under-secretary, who argued that it was not an alternative but catalysis for Turkey’s EU 
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membership. 442Membership of Greece, who has traditionally vetoed Turkey’s EU 
membership, to the BSEC can be seen in this context. 443  
 Laciner argues that BSEC is the epitome of Turkey’s pro-active foreign policy 
understanding. Unlike Ataturk and Inonu’s security oriented, cautious and to certain 
degree isolationist foreign policies, which later came to be known as traditional Turkish 
foreign policy, Ozal always attempted to be proactive, taking advantage of the new 
geopolitical atmosphere. 444 
5.5.2 The Balkans and Turkey: The Resurgence of the Ottoman Empire?  
For Ozal, the Balkans was as much important as the Black Sea basin as once was 
part of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Kosova, Macedonia, Bosnia and Albania have 
significant Muslim populations, which was an incentive for Ozal to establish close 
relations with these republics. Laciner states that Albania and Macedonia turned their 
faces to Turkey in their transition as well as in terms of their conflictual relations with 
Serbia and Greece. Furthermore, Ozal aimed to establish telecommunication and 
transport systems to connect the Balkan states with Turkey, making the latter a regional 
hub. 445  
The crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s showed that the Turkish foreign policy 
under Ozal was different from the Kemalist one in that the former was proactive. 446 
Being one of the staunchest supporters of the Bosnian side, Turkey established a pro-
Bosnian group in the 1992 ECSC summit by gathering Azerbaijan and the Turkic 
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republic of Central Asia. In the summit, Ozal negotiated with the leaders of the Western 
European countries447 and lobbied for NATO intervention in Yugoslavia to protect 
Bosnians.448 Turkey sent $22 million in official aid to Bosnia and lobbied in the UN as 
well.449 He pursued active policy in the Organization of Islamic Countries for Bosnia. 
Furthermore, in his Balkan tour February 15-22, 1993, he tried to unite the Croats and the 
Bosniaks against the Serbian forces and negotiated with Bulgaria, Albania, and 
Macedonia to open their air space for the Turkish warplanes.450 
It can be said that on the contrary to the Kemalist understanding, Ozal’s Balkan 
policy especially that of Bosnia was based on religious and cultural reasons. Ozal aspired 
to make Turkey a pivot country in the Balkans. Ozal once stated; “Turkey is responsible 
for looking after the well-being of the Muslims in the Balkans” 451  This assertion of 
Ozal’s clearly runs counter to Kemalist understanding, which does not establish foreign 
policy on religious or cultural basis. This marks that Özal attempted to change another 
column of traditional Turkish foreign policy. Finally, all Turkish initiatives in the region 
of Turkey had been defensive. 452 
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5.5.3 From the Adriatic to the ‘Chinese Wall’: Turkey as a Development Model for the 
‘Turkic World’  
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and emergence of Turkic states as 
independent entities paved the way for Turkey to establish relations with them. Turkey 
under Ozal pursued to become a role model for those republics. 453  
One of the strongest incentives for Ozal’s Central Asian policy was pan-Turkist 
aspirations. To Landau, Turkey’s grand project was to institutionalize its relations with 
the “Turkic Brethren.”454 According to this, Turkey initiated Economic Co-Operation 
Organization (ECO).  
In his speech at the Izmir Economic Fair of 1992, Ozal said: “Turkey has gifted 
geopolitics. In ten years we will have a big enough population that will help us to be a 
great power. This will make us the second biggest country in Europe. The next ten years 
is very important for Turkey. Those Muslim and Turkic countries that stretch from the 
Balkans to the Central Asia and us ought to advance our capabilities to become stronger 
and more prosperous. If we could use this opportunity well enough and advance 
cooperation, we and our brothers will become stronger. These opportunities have been 
granted to us by Allah. We need to realize our potential and realize our goals to become 
stronger.”455 
As opposed to the Kemalist isolationism, Ozal proposed that Turkey had 
indispensable interests in such regions as the Balkans, Middle East, The Caucasus, the 
Central Asia even as far as western China, where Uighurs, who are of Turkic origin, live. 
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Turkey’s engagement with the new Turkic states marked a radical departure from its 
traditional foreign policy and eased its perception of isolated position in foreign affairs. 
What is more important about the new active foreign policy was that it helped Turkey to 
overcome its cultural isolation and identity dilemma. Turkey for the first time felt that the 
Western culture is not the only one it can turn to. For the first time, Turkey adopted 
“Turkist” foreign policy, which to Kemalists was not a priority. This ‘Turkic’ opening 
was surely of Ozal’s initiative but one has to take into consideration that the relations 
with Central Asia only became possible after the withdrawal of the Soviet hegemony in 
early 1990s.456   
As Eric Rouleau put it `Mustafa Kemal distanced Turkey from Turkish-speaking 
populations, abroad, arguing that Ankara should not meddle in the internal affairs of 
foreign states, just as he had dissociated the young republic from the Islamic world. It 
was his way of tying the young republic more closely to the West’457  
Furthermore, M. Kemal completely distanced Turkey from any type of pan-
Turkic aspirations which he deemed adventurist. He believed such policies are ‘illusions’ 
and ‘vague sentiments about some nebulous Turkic homeland.’ 458 
This in mind, whereas Ozal was pursuing ambitious and proactive foreign policy 
taking advantage of reorientation of the geopolitical structure of the new world, the 
traditional Kemalist elite were still suspicious of this type of engagement.459 When, for 
example, Ozal was making such statements as ‘the 21st century will be a Turkish 
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century,”460 which emphasizes the prospect of the rise of Turkish leadership, the then 
prime minister Suleyman Demirel, who himself can be considered as Kemalist, stated the 
following:  “It would be a great mistake to evaluate Turkey’s assistance as the pursuit of 
a policy of pan-Turkism or a bid to extend regional influence… Turkey is not seeking a 
monopolistic hegemony over relations with these states. On the contrary, its aim is to 
increase their ties with the outside world. In short, Turkey believes that it can help these 
republics in their long overdue attempt to integrate with the world and at the same time 
help them stand on their own feet….”461 
Turkism, Islamism, liberalism and American type democracy were important to 
Ozal and he believed the Kemalist worldview was not compatible with these. One of the 
most prominent journalists in Turkey, Cengiz Candar argues that Ozal represented 
society’s discontent with certain Kemalist principles as secularism, nationalism and 
etatism. While M. Kemal aspired to completely Turkify the population and keep the 
religion under strict control of the state, Ozal wanted a Muslim, democratic, liberal, 
capitalist society in which different ethnicities and religions are tolerated. 462 Candar 
further said: `He [Ozal] opposed to almost all the principles of the existing regime 
dominating the state. While he was the President he opposed the state, and when he died 
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he was buried not in a state cemetery. He now lies near by those who were hanged by the 
state, like Menderes''.463 
In October 1992, Turkey invited the presidents of Azerbaijan (Ebulfez Elchibey), 
Kazakhstan (Nursultan Nazarbayev), Kyrgzistan (Askar Akayev), Uzbekistan (Islam 
Karimov), and Turkmenistan (Safarmurad Niyazov) to Ankara for celebrations on the 
anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Ozal emphasized the notion 
of the co-operation by saying: “This cooperation of ours is beneficial for our people and 
region. Therefore, it is a contribution to regional and global peace and stability. No one 
should have undue worries or qualms. Let no one misunderstand us… Our policy, our co-
operation is not detrimental to anyone, and will not be so in the future either. We are 
only concerned about the welfare of our peoples and the region. We believe that the 
closer we get to that goal the more will we have served regional and world peace. In our 
opinion this is a mission in the name of humanity and as such should be applauded.”464 
One of the most ambitious endeavors Ozal had undertaken was the establishment 
of the Turkish International Co-operation Agency (TIKA) in early 1992, which aimed at 
improving relations among the Turkic republics by promoting democratic values, 
economic reforms, improving telecommunication and transportation, privatizing public 
enterprises and establishing companies as well providing education. 465 
Another venue for cooperation was the Turkic States and Turkic People’s 
Friendship and Cooperation Group, which was established in Antalya in March 1993. Its 
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motto was, 'Dilde, fikirde, iste birlik” (Unity in language, ideology and action), which 
attracted criticism from Moscow for its having pan-Turkic overtones. 466  
During his numerous visits to the central Asian republics, Ozal had signed 
bilateral agreements from education to health. Moreover, Turkey gave credit to newly 
independent Turkic states and accepted some ten thousands students to universities in 
Turkey. 467 
The Turkish state radio and television organization, TRT, started its broadcast to 
regions under the Avrasya (Euroasia) program. The flag carrier Turkish Airlines 
immediately established flights to Baku, Alma-Ati, Tashkent, Ashkhabad and Bishkek. 
Turkish Exim bank and other Turkish banks gave about $7 billion in credits to 
Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Krgyzstan.468 Being a liberal, 
Ozal encouraged bilateral private investment, particularly in the education, media, and 
telecommunication and textile sectors. 469 This was a turning point in Turkey's sceptic 
world perception and underlined the effects of the new Turkist policies. 
5.6 The Gulf War: Return of Activism and Özalism vs. Kemalist Bureaucracy 
Probably the second most important development in international arena after the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall was the US invasion of Iraq in 1991, which had substantial 
implication in Turkish foreign policy. Not only did the invasion prove that Turkey still 
played an important geostrategic role in the region, it also created a rift between the 
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Kemalist policy makers and Ozal. Therefore, this section will examine the Gulf War of 
1991 and its implications in the Turkish foreign policy. 
As was discussed earlier, the way the Turkish state machine approached the 
Muslim world in general and the Middle East in particular was indicative of the Kemalist 
foreign policy approach, which had been to stay away from the affairs of the Middle East 
as much as possible. However, Ozal’s approach to the region was completely off line 
with Kemalism. Even before 1991, Ozal emphasized the importance of improving with 
the Arab and the Muslim world. 
He personally played an important role in vitalizing the Turkish investments in 
the region as well in attracting the petro-dollars in Turkey. 470 The Gulf War displayed 
Ozal’s pro-American foreign policy. As Faroz Ahmad puts it; ‘Ozal took matters into his 
own hands and placed the country squarely behind President George W. Bush's 
policy’.471 He believed that it was Turkey’s moral obligation to support the coalition. 
Besides legal considerations, Ozal wanted to show the world that Turkey still was a 
strategic western ally in the post-Cold War era. What is really controversial about Ozal’s 
foreign policy during the Gulf War from the Kemalist perspective was that he did not shy 
away from making revisionist remarks about the future of Iraq. He believed; ‘The Middle 
East was in the midst of irreversible change and it was, therefore vital for Turkey to be in 
a position to take full benefit from future opportunities.’ 472 He further said in an 
interview on Sept. 5, 1990 that; 'The Middle East and the Gulf region will definitely not 
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be the same after this crisis...I also mean geographic borders... If there is a better place 
for us in this changing world then we must take this.'473 
Oktay Eski, a prominent journalist, stated; "(Ozal) had two objectives. The first 
was to include Kirkuk and Mosul within Turkey's borders and the second was to establish 
a federation between Turkey and the northern Iraqi Kurds. He had convinced himself of 
this so much that he had said `I will not be reluctant to send soldiers and warships to the 
Gulf if necessary.'474 
Although, Ozal was determined to pursue such a foreign policy, the traditional 
policymakers and foreign ministry bureaucrats in Ankara were reluctant about his 
policies and perceived adventurist and risking Turkey’s national security by dragging the 
country into the war. He bypassed them in his communication with the White House. 475  
Erdal İnönü, Ismet Inonu’s son, a staunch Kemalist, who served as the deputy 
prime minister between 1991 and 1993, accused Ozal for being a revisionist and 
criticized Ozal’s desire for a cross-border intervention into North Iraq. He said in the 
parliamentary session on August 12, 1990 that: “We are against such actions no matter 
what. We cannot launch a military action against another country unless attacked. The 
entire foreign policy concept of the Republic of Turkey is based on this principle. I see 
that Ozal aims to change this. He slipped it out of his mouth. The fundamental issue when 
the republic was established was the preservation of the existing borders and it was the 
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right thing to do. Ozal hints that the War of Independence is long over, it was then, it is 
now. This notion is wrong.”476  
Inonu’s following remarks bear the classic status quo preserving nature of the 
Kemalist foreign policy. He goes on saying: “Don’t you remember how the WWI brought 
calamity to our nation? We entered the war hastily. A few people dragged the nation to a 
catastrophe without the consent of the parliament of that time. Those few may have done 
it out of good intention and their intention may have been to ‘regain the losses’. But, the 
result was evident. What is happening now is not much different from what happened 
then. Hoping to make gains and elevate Turkey’s position in the west, Mr. Ozal wants to 
make Turkey part of the invading coalition, which I believe is an action that will bring no 
good to our nation.”477 
The remarks of Suleyman Demirel, who was the member of the parliament and 
later the prime minister and the president of Turkey, reflect a more cautious, traditional 
foreign policy making. Like Inonu, he criticized Ozal for being adventurist and 
lampooned his desire to regain Mosul and Kirkuk. “The world will not reconcile Mosul 
and Kirkuk in Turkey’s favor when the rest of the world is trying to save Kuwait from 
Saddam. The oil in this area is worth 20 billion dollars. Do you think they would let 
Turkey sit on this wealth? Let’s not be duped by this. Such changes occur in much larger 
system changes (conjuncture changes) and the world is not ready for this… I would not 
ask the parliament for a motion for a cross border military operation.”478 
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The member of the Kemalist Republican Party (PRP), Kemal Anadol’s statement 
is also an important reflection of the Kemalist foreign policy. He said: “The founder of 
this parliament Mustafa Kemal Ataturk says ‘the decision to go to war must be made out 
of grave necessity. Otherwise it is akin to suicide.’ And, he established the republic’s 
foreign policy on this premise. If the motion for the cross border action is to be accepted, 
it means we are leaving this traditional Ataturkcu (Kemalist) policy. Turkey will then be 
remembered as the invader. The very members of parliament, which was established by 
Ataturk don’t have the right to violate his policies, we cannot commit this crime. Our 
peace-seeking foreign policy would be the thing of the past.”479 
What really was the straw that broke the camel’s back among the Kemalist circle 
in Ankara was Ozal’s executive order to cut off the oil pipelines that carried oil from the 
north Iraq to Turkey’s Mediterranean shore in Adana. Upon this decision, then foreign 
minister Ali Bozer resigned on October 12, 1990,480 which was followed by the Defense 
Minister Sefa Giray’s on December 18.481 The actions of these individuals demonstrated 
the friction between the two ideologies in Ankara and that although Ozal occupied the 
executive office, the bureaucracy largely remained loyal to the Kemalist principles.   
While the civilians opposed Ozal, so did the Kemalist military. Ozal did 
something unprecedented at the National Security Council (NSC) of August 3, 1990, in 
which the Gulf crisis was the main agenda. He openly went against and criticized the 
Kemalist leading politicians and the military officials and blamed them for being too 
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cautious. He believed that Turkey had to send boots on the ground in Iraq along with the 
United States. The following statement of Ozal can be considered as his overt criticism to 
overly cautious and sometimes ‘timid’ Kemalist foreign policy. He said that ‘Many things 
have changed in Turkey…In foreign policy the days of taking a cowardly and timid 
position are over. From now on we’ll pursue an active policy based on circumstances. 
This is a totally apolitical choice.’ 482  
One of the most striking results of Ozal’s defiance to the resisting Kemalist bloc 
in Ankara was the Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay’s resignation on December 3, 1990. 
Torumtay vehemently criticized Ozal for being an adventurist.483 The Turkish public met 
the resignation with a great deal of bewilderment as this kind of occurrence had never 
happened before in the history of the republic.484  A civilian politician for the first time 
trumped over the ‘mighty’ military. According to Özal, the generals were resisting the 
change: `Some generals are not keeping in step and are acting to preserve the status quo. 
While we are taking brave steps forward, they are trying to put the brakes on. '485 
The president Özal declared Turkey's new foreign policy position as follows: 
`Many things have changed in Turkey... In foreign policy the days of taking a cowardly 
and timid position are over. From now we will pursue an active policy based on 
circumstances...486 My conviction is that Turkey should leave its former passive and 
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hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy... The reason I made this call is 
because we are a powerful country in the region. Let me also point out that there are 
conservatives who prefer that no change should be made to these passive policies. The 
reason these circles accuse me of dragging the country into an adventure is because I 
generally prefer to pursue a more dynamic policy for our country.’ 487 
Ozal defended his Gulf policies by saying that “we are going to bet one and get 
three!”488 In spite of Ozal’s eagerness, Turkey did not send troops alongside the US to 
invade Iraq mostly because of the reluctance of the public opinion. However, Turkey 
contributed effectively via the Incirlik Air Force base.489 This in turn can be considered 
as Ozal’s failure to win over the Kemalist bureaucracy and establishment in Ankara. 
Robins noted that Turkey's importance was underlined by the war, and 
particularly the Americans understood that Turkey was a vital country for American 
interests in the Middle East. He said: `The action of President Özal in helping to isolate 
and confront the Iraqi regime greatly endeared him to the US administration and the 
White House. This in turn brought benefits on a wide front - from greater access to 
American markets for Turkish textiles to help in improving the quality of military 
hardware possessed by the armed forces. The US now appears to place greater value on 
the importance of Turkey than before.’490 
Although the Gulf War once again proved that Turkey still continues to be an 
important player in the region,491 it had detrimental effects too. One striking result was 
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the exacerbation of Turkey’s Kurdish problem. Not only one million Iraqi-Kurds, who 
fled from Saddam’s repression, put a burden on Turkey but the no fly zone that was 
imposed north of 36th parallel in North Iraq created a safe haven for the PKK terrorists. 
The PKK began to establish training bases in North Iraq, from which it had orchestrated 
terror attacks within Turkey. The fact that the PKK problem had spilled into another 
country made it very difficult for Turkey to solve the problem, as it became an 
international issue. Furthermore, the PKK issue began to contribute to the securitization 
of Turkish politics.492 Over the next decade, Turkey had conducted numerous cross-
border incursions into Iraq in order to destroy the terror camps only to no avail. 
Furthermore, with the invasion of and the subsequent destabilization of Iraq, Turkey lost 
one of its trade partners in the region, which cost Turkey billions of dollars in trade 
damages. 493 While it can be said that in the aftermath of the Gulf War Turkey had lost 
more than it gained economically and politically, what it showed is that Ozal pursued a 
very unorthodox foreign policy, abandoning traditional Kemalist approach to issues.494 
5.7 Conclusion 
Ozal, besides Menderes, was probably the most unconventional figure in the 
Turkish politics in the 20th century, Ozal pursued policies, both domestic and foreign, that 
ran counter to the traditional Kemalist worldview. His unprecedented activism and 
pragmatist approach to domestic and foreign affairs was one of the most striking features 
of Ozal. He repeatedly criticized the stagnant and reactive nature of the Kemalist 
paradigm. While his personality and worldview played a great role in his active foreign 
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policy understanding, what really facilitated Ozal’s active pursuit of foreign policy was 
the end of the rigid Cold War international system, which he openly deemed an 
unprecedented opportunity for Turkey to wake up from almost a century long 
‘hibernation’ and be active to bring back the ‘glorious days’ of the Ottoman Empire, thus 
the Neo-Ottomanism.  
The collapse of the Communist bloc and the independence of the Turkic republics 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus as well as the developments in the Balkans were 
important defining factors in Ozal’s foreign policy making. He believed that the newly 
independent Turkic republics needed Turkey for guidance in their transformation from 
Communism to Capitalism in social, economic and political life. Clearly, what motivated 
Ozal was the shared history and culture with those states, which is the reminiscence of 
pan-Turkist ideals. This type of policy understanding ran counter to the Kemalist foreign 
policy, which interestingly prompted criticism from the Kemalist establishment, who 
often opposed foreign policy that is based on culture and religion. Whereas the implosion 
of the Soviet Union sent shock waves across the members of the Kemalist establishment 
with the perception that Turkey’s no longer an important entity for the West, it actually 
excited Ozal as he considered it to be a once in a life time opportunity. 
Ozal was not an Islamist but he was a practicing Muslim. His reactions to the 
sufferings of Muslims in Bosnia, Azerbaijan and Chechenia were different from those 
Kemalist bureaucrats and politicians, who were more cautious towards the conflict prone 
zones in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Although never was able to materialize help, he 
did not hesitate to use military rhetoric towards the Bosnian and Azeri-Armenian conflict 




This clearly was not something that the isolationist and cautious Kemalist foreign policy 
makers would entertain. 
Another important aspect of Ozal was his staunch pro-American stance. He 
believed that adoption of American type political and economic liberalism, nationalism 
and American understanding of secularism would solve Turkey’s domestic and foreign 
problems and boost Turkey in the world arena. This once again created friction between 
him and the Kemalists, who by nature are elitist, ethnic nationalists and rigidly secular. 
For example, his solution to the Kurdish problem was the American type multi-
culturalism, which recognizes the cultural differences for peaceful coexistence as 
opposed to the Kemalist nationalism, which rejects cultural pluralism in favor of ethno-
centric Turkish nationalism. 
One of the most striking manifestations of the Ozalian pro-Americanism took 
place during the Gulf War of 1991. It also reflected his view of Turkey in the post bi-
polar international system. According to this, the US was now the sole superpower and 
siding with America in its invasion of Iraq will be in Turkey’s favor. His unconditional 
support for America once again exposed the gap between the Kemalist establishments. 
He overtly stated his intentions to annex Mosul and Kirkuk, which once were Ottoman 
cities, in the wake of the collapse of the central government in Iraq. Although it never 
materialized due to considerable resistance from the Kemalist military and bureaucracy, it 
clearly showed that Ozal would not hesitate to pursue revisionist policies vis-à-vis the 
neighbors, a concept the Kemalists have adamantly avoided. Subsequently, for the first 
time in the history of Turkey, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, Necip 




With his worldview, personality coupled with the new world order in the post-
Cold War, Ozal clearly brought an unprecedented change to foreign policy by reorienting 
Turkey’s priorities, which included incorporation of such new dimensions as liberal 
politics and economy, democracy, Islam, Turkishness.  He was very comfortable with 
Turkey’s Ottoman Islamic and Turkish past and did not hesitate to accept them as 
Turkey’s assets in her pursuit to be a member of the European club. For the first time the 
concept of Neo-Ottomanism was introduced to denote the Turkish foreign policy. He 
introduced a multi-dimensional, proactive, more economy and culture oriented foreign 
policy.  
While Ozal had criticized Kemalism for being inefficient for the needs of the 
country in a new era, he did not take on the institutions and bureaucracy due to the fact 
that there was still a power disparity between him and the Kemalist establishment in 
favor of the latter. For example, he had failed to have the Turkish high ranking officers 
agree with him to enter Iraq. He complained about the clumsiness of the foreign 
bureaucracy. Therefore, although wanted, Ozal could not bring a paradigm shift in 
Turkish foreign policy. 
However, Ozal’s rise to power heralded the impending triumph of the 
conservative/Islamic periphery over the Kemalist ‘core’. However, his premature death in 
1993 resulted in Turkey going back to the status quo. The immediate aftermath of the 
Ozal era was marked by political leadership crisis, corruption and increased PKK 
terrorism. It was this atmosphere that gave rise to Necmeddin Erbakan, a staunch Islamist 




Goals and Priorities of the Ozalist Policies 
• Neo-Ottomanism  
o Aspiration for Turkey to become a leading state of the Muslims in the 
former Ottoman territories such as the Kurds in Iraq, Bosnians in the 
Balkans and the Azeris in the Caucasus. 
o Pro-Ottomanist Rhetoric 
• Pro-Islamic (More emphasize on the Turkic-Muslims in the Balkans, the 
Caucasus and the Central Asia, rather than the Middle East) 
• Revisionist  
o Intention to annex Mosul and Kirkuk 
• Proactive Foreign Policy  
o The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Balkan Policies 
(Especially in Bosnia)  
• Pan-Turkism/nation building  
o The Central Asia and Caucasus 
• Aspiration to make Turkey a regional power 
• Pro-Western (especially America) 
• Pluralist/inclusive  (Proposed solution to Kurdish problem and the approach to the 
Kurds in Iraq) 
• More emphasize on the economy (Liberal domestic, pro-EU policies) 
• Aspiration to implement de-centralization in local governance.  
Instruments of the Ozalist Foreign Policy 
• The Executive Branch (The post-1989 Presidency of Ozal) 
 
In the next chapter I will examine the Erbakan era Turkish foreign policy and its 




CHAPTER 6. THE ERBAKAN ERA (1996-1997) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Necmeddin Erbakan’s (1926-2011) rise in politics in the early 1960s was the rise 
of political Islam in Turkey. While the pro-Islamic and conservative circles in Turkey 
hailed him as the leader of the Muslim world and the leader of the Islamic struggle 
against the Kemalist/secular establishment in Turkey, the Kemalist elite, especially the 
military, demonized him and his supporters as menace to the foundations of the republic. 
Like Ozal, he pursued policies that ran counter to the established Kemalist paradigm. 
During his short lived tenure as the prime minister, Erbakan embarked on an 
unprecedented activism in Turkish foreign policy, although it was generally limited 
towards the Muslim world, which created unsurmountable friction with the secular 
Kemalist establishment. His pro-Islamic/anti-Kemalist rhetoric and policies prompted an 
uproar among the Kemalist elite and subsequently the guardian of the state, the Turkish 
Military ousted him by, what was then called, the post-modern coup as the generals did 
not take over the governance but used the National Security Council and the secular press 
to create pressure on Erbakan, forcing him to resign. The postmodern coup taught some 
of the Erbakan’s followers a lesson that it was impossible to go against the almighty 
Turkish military under the banner of Islamic ideology and they decided to become 




In this chapter, I analyze the implications of Erbakan’s background, his rise to 
prominence in politics and his interaction with the Kemalist bureaucracy, (especially the 
secular Turkish Military), on the Turkish foreign policy.  
6.2 The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey  
The emergence of Erbakan in the Turkish politics took place in the 1960s. Having 
been a prominent professor of engineering who studied in Turkey and in Germany, he 
contributed greatly to the development of German Leopard Tanks.495 He then became 
involved in politics and was elected as an independent member of parliament in 1969 
from the religiously conservative central Anatolian town of Konya, which reflects his 
worldview. The most striking element of his worldview was that he believed that due to 
the western influences, the Turkish society has been in a moral downfall and departing 
from the Islamic values, which should be restored. He was heavily influenced by Sayyid 
Qutb’s ideology, especially his call for the rural Muslim intelligentsia to organize itself 
and eventually take control of government from the urban elite. Thanks to the 
encouragements from Mehmet Zahit Kotku, who was the leader of the Naksibendi order, 
Erbakan established the first Islamic oriented party, the National Order. With Kotku’s 
spiritual leadership, Erbakan became the head of the party. Among Kotku’s adherents are 
Ozal and the most influential figure of the first decade of Turkey, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan.496  
Because the National Order Party was closed by the Constitutional Court in 1971 
on the grounds that it had violated the secular principles of the Turkish constitution, 
Erbakan founded the National Salvation Party the next year. In 1974, his party became a 
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part of the coalition government which was founded by the Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, 
who was known for his social democrat leftist, pro-Ataturk views. For the first time in the 
history of Turkey, a party with an official Islamic agenda became part of the government 
in Ankara. This was important because it marked the rise of political Islam in Turkey. 
Now, Erbakan began to help his party members rise in the government positions and 
institutions of the Turkish secular state.497 
Those Turks who immigrated to Western Europe during and after 1960s, 
especially those in Germany, have always made up the important supporters of Erbakan. 
In 1975, Erbakan declared the National View (Milli Gorus) manifesto calling the 
European Turks to identify themselves as Turkish-Muslims and avoid being assimilated. 
The most important part of the manifesto was the call for a “just order” (Adil Duzen) in 
Turkey and among the European Turks, according to which real justice, development and 
prosperity in society can only be achieved through political and economic teachings of 
Islam. This constituted a stark contrast with the secular foundation of the republic. This 
inevitably created troubles in the coming decades for Erbakan in his relations with the 
Kemalist elite. 498 
Not surprisingly, the NSP was among the abolished parties after the 1980 military 
coup. With the easing of political party laws in 1983, Erbakan founded yet another party 
named Refah (Welfare) Party. The realities of the Cold War prompted the generals to 
come up with the idea of “controlled Islam”, which would counter the rising threat of 
Communism in Turkey. The invasion of Afghanistan and the rise of the Soviet threat 
only exacerbated this concern. Therefore, the junta adopted a policy of “controlled 
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Islam”. It aimed not only to counter the Communist movements in Turkey but to prevent 
radicalization of pious Muslims in Turkey. This concern became serious after the Iranian 
revolution in 1979.499 Part of implementation of this policy, the government restored 
mandatory Sunni religious education at schools, broadcast religious programs from the 
state owned Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), greatly increased the number of Imam 
Hatip schools from 72 in 1970 to 382 in 1988.500 These schools educate clergy personnel 
that are employed in the mosques by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri 
Baskanligi), which is under the government control. Baran argues that the same policy 
could be seen in Pakistan where the President Zia ul-Haq, with the encouragement from 
Washington, resorted to the Islam opening to counter the Soviet and Iranian threat.501  
One other contributing factor to the rise of political Islam in Turkey in the 1980s, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, was the liberal policies of Ozal that paved the way 
for the rise of small scale provincial businesses and industries. As opposed to the 
republican business elite of Istanbul, who benefited greatly from the state subsidies, the 
newly emerging small businesses of Anatolia did not want government intervention in 
favor of economic liberalization. These entities resorted to Islamic values, symbols and 
ethics to garner the support of conservative Anatolian rural Turks. In 1990, they formed 
the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD),502 an 
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association of Muslim capitalists to defend their interests against the Istanbul elite.  
Yavus states that the ideology of the emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie, while socially 
Islamic, was economically liberal.503 
Islam became a symbol of legitimization of business connections and profit. The 
alienated Anatolian periphery felt, for the first time, that they would have a chance to 
become an important player in Kemalist Turkey. In short, the Turkish society began to 
experience social and economic changes, the results of which would be profound for the 
Turkish politics in the coming decades.504 
6.3 Rise of Erbakan: The Islamist Victory of the Mid-1990s 
The unexpected death of Ozal in April 1993 marked the beginning of political 
instability. The weak coalition governments, a number of corruption scandals, endless 
political quarrels only rendered the Turks weary of politics and politicians.505 Erbakan’s 
Welfare Party managed to capitalize on this increasing dissatisfaction of the citizens and 
emerged as the victor in the 1994 local elections. The WP was able to gather the support 
of more than 5 million of 28 million voters. That the mayors of the two biggest cities, 
Istanbul and Ankara, were now WP members made it an even bigger victory for WP. 
Istanbul’s new mayor in 1994 was Tayyip Erdogan. The widespread corruption in 
Turkish politics made it easier for Erbakan to sell his ‘just order’ doctrine to larger 
masses.506  
The Erbakan’s ‘just order’ denounces capitalism and communism alike. The 
former contains “microbes”, which cause diseases in society. These are the interest and 
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the banking system that perpetuates interest, unfair taxes, the mint and the exchange 
system. Capitalism is responsible for hunger, poverty, inflation, corruption, moral decay, 
wars and exploitation. Communism has not brought prosperity and happiness during its 
70 years of rule either. The solution to these problems is the Just Order, which is “an 
order of harmony not discord and in it there is a congruence of interests between workers 
and employers, government administrators and the people, doctors and patients, and 
lawyers and clients.507 
Table 6.1 Population of Turkey from 1950 to 2000 
 
Year Total Population Rural Population Urban Population 
1950 20,947,188 15,702,851 5,244,337 
1960 27,754,820 18,895,089 8,859,731 
1970 35,605,176 21,914,075 13,691,101 
1980 44,736,957 25,091,950 19,645,007 
1990 56,473,035 23,146,684 33,326,351 
2000 67,803,927 23,797,653 44,006,274 
 
To Erbakan, the Just Order will be realized by the cooperation of seven major 
'armies': (1) the devout people; (2) religious authorities and leaders who will be the 
architects of a greater Turkey; (3) scientists and university professors; (4) engineers and 
economists who will prepare the projects to turn natural resources into developed 
industries; (5) businessmen who will implement the projects; (6) guilds; and (7) labor, 
including workers, farmers, and white-collar workers. Thanks to these seven ‘armies’ 
Turkey would attain a powerful position in the world and be a capable leader of the 
Muslim world.508 
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According to Baran, while such promises are nothing new in Turkish politics, 
urban voters found these views more credible because they were uttered by a political 
party whose official identity is Islamic. This came to place as the rural to urban 
immigration became rampant especially in the late 80s and early 90s.509 
The WP played a role in the political socialization of pro-Islamic groups in 
Turkey by, for example, actively organizing voter registration drives and election 
campaigns, providing free transportation to polling stations. These practices were 
overseen by other political parties in Turkey in the 90s. This way WP aimed at 
integrating the marginalized, Islamically oriented “periphery” as well a large segments of 
the Kurdish population510 into the political arena. 511 
The December 1995 general elections marked an important point in the Turkish 
political life. The WP came as the 1st party out of the elections by 21% of the 28 million 
votes cast, grabbing 158 seats in the 550 seated parliamentary. Erbakan formed a 
coalition government on June 28, 1996, with the secular True Path Party (DYP) he 
became the prime minister. This was significant as “for the first time, the secular Turkish 
Republic had a prime minister whose political philosophy was based on Islam” 512 
This sent shock waves to the Kemalist elite. This meant that the control of budget 
expenditures and audits, as well as the recruitments of public civil servants would be 
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determined by the Islamist. Being cautious of any Kemalist repercussion, especially the 
military, Erbakan pledged in his oath of office that he would remain loyal to the 
democratic, secular foundations of the Turkish republic, although he had in many 
occasions lampooned the Kemalist revolution and its outcomes in favor of the Islamic 
values.513 
No doubt, the historic victory boosted the morale of pro-Islamic circles in Turkey 
and consequently led to the rise of political Islam in Turkey. One of the biggest sources 
of friction between the seculars and the pro-Islamic circles was the head scarf issue. By 
this, the secular constitution of Turkey banned the display of religious symbols, here the 
head scarf in public spaces such as universities. The Erbakan era witnessed the rise of 
anti-scarf ban demonstrations. Moreover, perception that Turkey was being Islamized 
grew bigger as alcohol was being phased out from certain public spheres, the brothels and 
prostitutes were being cracked down as well as some statues in public spheres were being 
removed on the grounds that they were indecent. 514 The ideological battle was at its 
height in the state controlled Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), by which the 
secular state would keep Islam under its control. The Kemalists accused the WP of 
staffing the Diyanet by employing some 6000 pro-WP clergy. This was called by certain 
Kemalist circles as the Islamization from above.515  
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6.4 Turkish Foreign Policy during the WP Era 
6.4.1 Neo-Ottomanist Elements 
Erbakan and WP’s foreign policy reflected their worldview as well. He defined 
his foreign policy as “respectable foreign policy” (sahsiyetli dis politika), which aimed at 
elevating Turkey to a respectable position in international affairs. Part of this identity 
laden foreign policy was made up of taking Turkey to the leadership of the Islamic world 
and subsequent attainment of respect in global affairs. This meant the adoption of a pro-
active foreign policy. 516  
The Islamic political identity shaped the WP’s view of and relationship with the 
rest of the world. One of the main aspects of the WP foreign policy making is its neo-
Ottoman characteristic.517   
Oliver Roy states, “the Islamic movement in Turkey is first and foremost a 
nationalistic one. Islam is interlinked with the idea of homeland in Turkey, but this also 
includes the Turkish workers in Europe. The Turkish workers remain Turks and maintain 
their connection with Turkey.” 518 
The history and the Ottoman legacy played a great role in the evolution of the 
Turkish Islamic movement.519 Abdullah Gül, who played a leading role in formulating 
WP’s foreign policy positions, and later became an AKP member and then the president 
of Turkey, said: 
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Turkey is neither Luxembourg nor Bangladesh. History, geography and reality 
require Turkey to carry and fill a mission regardless of our desires. This mission or role 
may be the role of the Ottoman Empire. We therefore cannot remain indifferent to the 
developments in Palestine, Yugoslavia, and Albania due to our national interest. He 
concluded that Turkey is “the cultural center of Islamic civilization in Europe. We 
[Turkey] therefore have to involve ourselves in the developments in the Balkans.” 520 
Hakan Yavuz argues that neo-Ottomanists tend to enthnocize the Ottoman state 
by calling it ‘a glorious achievement of the Muslim Turks’. At the WP’s fifth convention 
in 1997 Erbakan declared the party’s foreign policy goal to be the “creation of the 
Greater Turkey just as the Ottomans did”.521 To Tanil Bora, who is a prominent analyst 
of Turkish foreign policy, Erbakan pursued a foreign policy that was the “continuation of 
Ozalian neo-Ottomanism.” 522 
Although, the WP separated itself from nationalistic parties by emphasizing the 
Islamic identity, its foreign policy practices showed that Turkey was a central element. 
For example, the WP policy makers insisted that the Muslim world can only be united, 
which is the official goal, only under Turkey’s leadership.523 Erbakan justified this by 
asserting that Turkey is the heir state of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey’s geopolitics, 
economy and strength dictate it. 
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It is important to note that Erbakan aimed at eliminating intra-Muslim conflicts by 
all embracing aspect of Islam. Therefore, to him the cure for the ominous Kurdish 
problem was Islam as ‘all Muslims are brothers and sisters.’524 In this regard, Erbakan 
argued at the WP’s fourth congress in 1993 that Turkey’s socioeconomic problems could 
only be resolved by recognizing the Kurdish identity in the context of umma (the nation 
of Islam), establishing the Just Order, and by allowing each community to govern 
themselves by its own laws and norms.525 These ideas were clearly in stark contrast with 
the Kemalist principles. 
As far as nationalism is concerned, the WP’s stance can be summarized as: ‘the 
most important and worthy base of people’s identity in Turkey has been Islam. The 
secular-nationalist Kemalist elite has promoted other sources of identity (e.g. 
Turkishness) as a counter force against Islam; this trend had to be stopped.”  This too 
posed an overt defiance to the established Kemalist ideology of Turkey. 526  
Nazir Ozsos, who was the chief press adviser of Erbakan and who wrote in the 
party’s semiofficial newspaper Milli Gazete stated: 'the people of the Southeast have 
always been considered as a threat by the (Republican) Westernists simply because of 
their strong commitment to their faith (Islam) and their traditions and of their resistance 
to the integration with the West'.527 
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Likewise, the WP deputies criticized the ethno-centric nation building process of  
M. Kemal for he destroyed the prospects of the formation of ummah and depriving the 
Kurds of their identity. They argued “the outcome is the Kurdish nationalism that has 
been created by the Marxist PKK to constitute a reaction to the prevailing racist Turkish 
nationalism.” Therefore, reviving the brotherhood among Muslims, regardless of their 
ethnicity would cure the problem. 528 
Erbakan said in a public meeting in 1994 that; “The people of this soil (Turkey) 
started everything with Besmele (in the name of Allah). What you did was to replace it 
with ‘I am Turk, I am righteous, I am hard working.’529 This gave our Kurdish brothers 
the right to say; I am Kurd and I am more hardworking, more righteous than a Turk. This 
way, you alienated people against each other.”530  
The WP stressed that; Turkey has not been very successful in “the race of 
civilization” due to the Kemalist revolution. According to this; “The real reason of 
foundation of the WP is to end [...] the backward position of Turkey in the contemporary 
race of civilization. It is saddening for all of our people who love their homeland and 
nation that while world nations quickly progress in the technology and civilization race, 
we are still very far behind of them in economic social and political terms.”531 
The following section will examine Erbakan’s foreign policy practices. 
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6.4.2 The EU, UN and NATO 
The WP adopted a strong anti-Western, anti-European foreign policy rhetoric in 
favor of willingness to get close to the Muslim world, which naturally concerned the 
Kemalist elite. Erbakan argued that the real reason why Turkey has been excluded from 
the European Union was its Muslim identity. The following statement made by Hasan 
Dikici, a member of the WP, at the Turkish Grand National Assembly on July 6, 1993 
underlines the WP’s philosophy: 
“The EU is an integration model based on a Christian-Western culture; it is a 
political integration; it is an effort to create a European state. It is a Catholic European 
Union established according to a Christian ideology. Turkey is a Muslim country. With 
the aim of increasing [the] material welfare of the Turkish people, to try to have a place 
in the European Union means to abandon our political, social, and cultural values. If 
Turkey joins the EU, our sovereign rights will be transferred to the Catholic EU. The 
decision to be a member in the EU was made against the will of our nation and the 
application should be withdrawn for the future of our nation.532 
Necmettin Erbakan expressed similar views about Turkey’s secular foreign policy 
and indicated the very different future role that he had in mind for Turkey. Erbakan 
argued, “Turkey should cooperate with Muslim countries through which it can realize the 
goal of being a leader, instead of being a servant in the EU”.533 For him, “to become a 
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member in the EU by leaving the community of Muslim countries means to lose the very 
essence of our identity and to accept the Sevres”534  
Erbakan opposed any western based intergovernmental organization. He claimed 
the United Nations was a tool of Western imperialism. For example, when the Bosnian 
conflict was raging in the early 90s, he viewed it as genocide against Muslims and added; 
“the major catastrophic event of the century is taking place at the heart of Europe. The 
double standard of the West became clear. What did they do to stop this carnage? The 
West only observed the massacre! They therefore want this carnage to go on because 
those who are killed and raped are Muslims. I want to know where is the United Nations, 
which was established on the principle of no forceful acquisition of territory? What 
happened to the principles of the United Nations? The UN implements its principles only 
against the Muslims. If Muslims suffer, these principles have no value whatsoever. The 
UN has no moral face any more.535 
Erbakan strongly believed that 1.5 billion strong Muslims of the world had to 
form their own version of the UN and NATO. He argued, if the Muslims of the world had 
been united Serbs could not have massacred Bosnians and Armenians could not have 
won against ‘our Azeri brothers’ in the early 90s. 536  
As one RP official put it in an interview: 
“When compared with the West, the Islamic nations are far behind today in income and 
living standards. But we represent a great potential. A human potential of 1.5 billion 
souls. We can increase current living standards ten times or even one hundred-fold if we 
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can come together and work for our own market. This is not enmity towards the West. 
We don't hate anyone. It's just that that's what we want to do.” 537 
And, according to another party official:  “The same as the West unites to serve its 
interests; the Islamic nation should unite for its own good. This is both logical and the 
reasonable thing to do. This will save us not only in this world, but also in the one to 
come.”538 
As has been discussed, Erbakan believed that the Islamic revival and unity of the 
Muslims would be possible with Turkey’s leadership and thought that the Kemalist 
ideology was an obstacle in this regard. He said; “The Western civilization that prioritizes 
the might ought to be replaced by the new one that cherishes the ‘justice’. It is impossible 
to fulfill Turkey’s mission when the current order in Turkey prevails. It has to be replaced 
with the ‘just order’.”539 Erbakan sought to fly “the WP flag to unify 1.2 billion Muslims 
all over the world.” 540  
6.4.3 Erbakan and Israel 
The epitome of Erbakan’s anti-Western stance was in the form of anti-Zionism 
and he frequently accused America for being Israel’s unconditional supporter. He 
repeatedly stated that while America responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by 
occupying and pounding it with thousands of tons of bombs, it has remained silent to the 
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Israeli invasion of the West Bank and the Gaza. He argued; ‘it should not be surprising to 
see America disintegrate, like the Soviet Union that had acted like a bully.’ 541 
It would not be wrong to say that the degree of Erbakan’s effectiveness in Turkish 
foreign policy during his premiership was tested via the Turkish-Israeli relationship in the 
90s. In other words, the Turkish-Israeli relationships in that decade showed who was 
really in charge of Turkish politics. The 90s marked the rise of strategic relations between 
Turkey and Israel and in Turkey the driving force was the military. The military was 
eager to develop relations for several reasons; to reinforce Turkey’s secular image, to 
counter the rising threat from Syria and Israel, both of whom supported the Kurdish 
separatism and Islamism against Turkey, to win the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington and 
to have access to military technology unrestricted due to human rights concerns. 542 
After the formation of Erbakan’s coalition, the military used Turkish-Israeli 
relations to embarrass the government by exposing its powerlessness to halt an alliance it 
openly had opposed. Not only did the military totally ignore the government in dealings 
with Israel, but also in May 1997, the military engaged in a massive military operation in 
northern Iraq without notifying the civilian government in advance. The friction between 
the Erbakan government and the Kemalist military was evident. During Erbakan’s tenure 
as prime minister, the military adamantly ignored Erbakan’s anti-Israel rhetoric and to 
‘embarrass’ Erbakan, the military deepened the relations with Israel.543  
The Turkish-Israeli relations had become a battle ground between the WP and the 
military. One of the starkest examples of this was ‘the Military Training and 
                                                 
541 Erbakan's speech in the Group Meeting of the Welfare Party in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-zeqDJPsbzM   





Cooperation’ agreement with Israel, which provided mutual military visits and the 
acquisition of military know-how. Although opposed to it, Erbakan bowed down to the 
pressure of the military and had to ratify it.544 What made it unusual was the Deputy 
Chief of Staff Cevik Bir, not a civilian representative from the government, signed the 
agreement while on the Israeli side it was the defense ministry director David Ivry who 
signed it.  Moreover, while all agreements have to be presented to and approved by the 
Parliamentary Committee of foreign relations, this one was signed secretly without the 
knowledge of any government representative. The military later justified its action by 
arguing that it did so due to the security and stability of the state, which showed the 
distrust of the military against the civilian government. Surprisingly, the Turkish side 
publicized the agreement, a move that befuddled Israel.545 
Erbakan would later admit the government had to approve the agreement due to 
the pressure from the Turkish Military. In January 1997, Erbakan expressed his dismay 
on the issue as such; “I wanted to approach to the U.S but the Americans told me to go to 
Israel. Americans dictated the agreement with Israel. I could not oppose the 
establishment of the common air force base in Anatolia because ‘the soldiers’ would 
have made Mesut Yilmaz (the then opposition leader in the parliament) the prime 
minister, establishing a coalition government.”546 
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The then Minister of State Abdullah Gul expresses the situation as; “…Americans 
had forced us to sign the agreement…We had two choices; either we would forget about 
the F-4 renovation project that would cost 600 million dollars or we would have had to 
sign the agreement with Israel. Unfortunately, Israel exploited this situation 
disseminating the idea in the region [the Middle East] that Israel and Turkey are getting 
close…”547 
While the Turco-Israeli military rapprochement was met with resistance in 
Turkey, so was it in Israel. In 1998, the Israeli foreign minister was said to have some 
concerns with regards to the relations with Turkey. He arguably warned that the close and 
intensive relations with Turkey would become detrimental for Israel’s relations with 
Syria, Greece, Cyprus even Russia, which supplied arms to the Greek Cypriots. Others 
have blamed David Ivri, who was considered to be the architect of the rapprochement, for 
jeopardizing Israel’s larger interests in the region. 548 
Finally, Erbakan argued that Turkey’s financial and banking system had been 
taken over by Jews and Israel. He said; of the price of a loaf of bread, one third goes to 
the IMF via interest payments, which in turn goes to Israel and the Israeli banks.549  
He criticized the 1993 Oslo Agreement claiming that it was a result of Zionism’s 
desire to penetrate into the Muslim world, eventually dividing them (citing the friction 
between the PLO and the Hamas). 550 Erbakan also rhetorically asked on one occasion of 
America: “Are you a slave of Israel? You claim to be a superpower. What happened to 
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you! You are a toy in the hands of the Jewish lobby. . . You are a servant of Israel, your 




Figure 6.1 Turkish-Israeli Trade in $ million (1994-2013) 
Source: www.turkstat.gov.tr 
 
As seen in the above chart, despite Erbakan’s staunch opposition, the Turkish-Israeli 
bilateral trade rose during and after his tenure. Finally, the fact that Erbakan was not able 
to retard the Turco-Israeli rapprochement proved that the real driving force behind the 
Turkish foreign policy was the Turkish military and the bureaucratic elite.552 
6.4.4 Third Worldist Foreign Policy 
Another important aspect of Erbakan's foreign policy practice was his "Third 
Worldist" critique of the international system, seeing it dominated by and serving the 
interests of the Western world. The solution to this, to Erbakan, was for the Muslims of 
the world to organize, unite and establish an independent system, rival to the existing 
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Western dominated world. He repeatedly advocated the establishment of an Islamic 
common market with its common currency, the dinar. The first concrete attempt to this 
end came on October 22, 1996, when Erbakan led the formation of the Islamic D-8 
(Developing 8), which clearly imitated the group of 8 developed economies553and an 
association of Muslim countries-the Economic Cooperation Organization, all of which 
were based on pan-Islamic ideology. The D-8 was Erbakan’s most aspiring venture and 
clearly aimed at changing Turkey’s traditional foreign policy direction, which is Western. 
The D-8 included Turkey Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, and 
Pakistan,554 to which he paid numerous visits.555 
Furthermore, Erbakan foreign policy practices upset secular Turks and Turkey’s 
Western allies as they perceived Turkey drifting from the West towards the East.556 The 
new prime minister’s first meeting was with the leader of the Muslim brotherhood, the 
son of the late Hasan al-Banna.557 This created concern in Egypt and Hosni Mubarak 
visited Ankara to express his ‘concerns’ about the perceived intervention in Egypt’s 
internal affairs. This vexed the secular governments in the Middle East, who feared the 
rise of Islam. His visit to Libya’s Qaddafi later turned out to be a political disaster for 
Erbakan for Qaddafi humiliated Erbakan and accused him of being too pro-Western and 
oppressing the Kurds in Turkey.558 Erbakan visited Iran and signed the oft criticized 
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natural gas agreement with Iran in August 1996. Abdullah Bozkurt, a journalist at 
Today’s Zaman of Turkey, sums up the displeasure about this Erbakan’s endeavor; 
“It was Erbakan's unreciprocated love affair with Iran that landed Turkey an 
unfair natural gas deal in August 1996, an agreement that Turkey pledged to purchase 10 
billion cubic meters of gas annually from Iran for a quarter of century. It was his deal 
that made Turkey dependent on Iran for one-fifth of its gas imports, an unnecessary 
leverage that Iranian hawks never fail to bring up every time they talk about Turkey's 
reliance on Iran. Did we get a fair shake from this supposedly lucrative trade deal? I do 
not believe we did, judging from the past hiccups on the volume and quality of Iranian 
gas.”559 
Bozkurt concludes that unlike with Russia, Azerbaijan and Algeria, Turkey has 
continued to experience problems with the Iranian gas delivery due in great part to the 
poor Iranian infrastructure, which caused the gas supply to be interrupted especially in 
severe winter condition, during which Iran simply cuts the supplies and diverts it to its 
domestic consumption.560 
The fact that the deal was signed at the very moment when President Clinton was 
signing into law the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act to impede foreign investment in both 
countries was interpreted by many analysts as a deliberate slap in the face of the U.S. 
administration. However, this act prevented a U.S. company from supplying critical 
compressor units needed for the completion of the Turkish side of the deal. In January 
2000, a crisis erupted when Iran sought financial compensation from Turkey on the basis 
of the 1996 agreement. There is thus a major conflict of interest between Turkey, 
                                                 





desperate for additional supplies of natural gas to meet its growing demand and reduce 
dependence on Russia, and the U.S. strategy. The gas deal with Iran was not only 
economically problematic it also created political tension with Turkey’s western allies. 
The gas deal with Iran came almost exactly at the same time when the President Clinton 
was signing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The timing of the agreement was perceived in 
Washington as a deliberate act of defiance of the Erbakan government towards 
America.561 To make matters worse, because the Turkish side of the gas pipeline could 
not be completed because supply of critical compression units needed to build pump 
stations in Turkey was banned due to the Iranian sanctions, Iran sought for financial 
compensation in January per the 1996 agreement, which created crisis between Turkey 
and Iran.562  Kemal Kirisci concludes that this situation proved that there is a major 
conflict of interest between Turkey, who wanted to diversify its energy sources to reduce 
dependency on Russian gas and America, who wanted to punish Iran.563  
Quoting Richard Perle, a former senior Pentagon official, Tom Friedman wrote in 
the New York Times that Erbakan 'stuck his finger in America's eye,' and '…suddenly 
Turkey's government, a longtime pillar of U. S. policy at the crossroads of Asia and 
Europe, is becoming, under Mr. Erbakan, an unreliable ally at best and a threat to U. S. 
interests at worst.”564 Friedman concluded; ''But it was a result of the fact that the pro-
U.S. faction inside Turkey has been shamed into silence, because of the indifference with 
                                                 
561 Kemal Kirisci, (2001) U.S.-Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership, in Turkey 
in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, ed. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirisci, Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, p. 140 quoted from Alan O. Makovsky, “Turkey” in Robert S. Chase, Emily Hill and Paul 
Kennedy, eds./ The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S Policy in the Developing World, W.W 
Norton, 1999, p. 97. 
562 Kirisci, p. 140, quoted from Radikal, January 6,7, 2000. 
563 Kirisci, p. 140 




which the Clinton Administration has treated Turkey. The Congress has not been helpful 
either, but previous Administrations fought for Turkey's interests in Congress in a way 
this Administration has not. I don't see Dole giving a major foreign policy speech without 
mentioning how Turkey has been mishandled.''565 
As much as Erbakan was courting Iran, he failed to attract Iran’s support in the 
fight against PKK. It is a well-known fact that there are PKK camps in Iran from which 
the PKK launched attacks against targets in Turkey. However, Erbakan admitted his 
failure in this regard. He said; 
“In spite of the D’amato’s Iran-Libya Sanctions Act566, I went to Tehran. I signed 
with them the gas deal of $25 billion for the next twenty years. Yet, the Iranians did not 
cooperate in regards to the PKK issue. If they [Iranians] had agreed to collaborate, I 
would have stood stronger against the soldiers [the Turkish Armed Forces]. I asked 
Rafsancani at the Sadabat Palace to curb Ocalan’s terrorist activities in Iran. He said ‘it 
is not possible. Because there is not one PKK member within Iranian borders. If you 
don’t believe me you can go there with my helicopters and see for yourself.’ The Head of 
Turkish Police Forces, Aladdin Yuksel told the Iranian Deputy Head of State Hassan 
Habibi that ‘we know every PKK camp, facility in Iranian soil. We know the telephone 
numbers and addresses of the Kurdish separatists in your country.’ As you see, Iran is an 
important neighbor but they are not sincere in their relations with Turkey.”567 
Erbakan continues to confess how he was weak against the state bureaucracy. He 
said; “After I became the prime minister, I wanted to go to Syria after my visits to Iran 
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and Libya. I have a good rapport with Hafez Assad [the then president of Syria]. We need 
to solve the PKK problem. Our military is losing 5-10 of its members every day. For the 
sake of solution, I even proposed the abolishment of the Turkish-Syria border. But, the 
Office of Chief of Staff and the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) did not let me to go to 
Syria. Therefore, Assad did nothing.”568  
6.5 The WP’s Islamic, Anti-Kemalist Rhetoric 
Erbakan repeatedly charged against M. Kemal and the Kemalist establishment in 
Turkey. And he did not shy away from implying his desire for a regime change in 
Turkey. On April 13, 1994, Erbakan said; ‘‘…Refah (WP) will come to power and a just 
order [adil duzen] will be established. The question we must ask ourselves is whether this 
change will be violent or peaceful; whether it will entail bloodshed. I would have 
preferred not to have to use those terms, but in the face of all that, in the face of 
terrorism, and so that everyone can see the true situation clearly, I feel obliged to do so. 
Today, Turkey must make a decision. The Welfare Party will establish a just order, which 
is certain. [But] will the transition be peaceful or violent; will it be achieved 
harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens] must make up their minds on 
that point.”569 
In a public speech on March 14, 1993 and a television interview first recorded in 
1992 and rebroadcast on November 24, 1996, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, Refah MP for the 
province of Ankara said; “Our homeland belongs to us, but not the regime, dear 
brothers. The regime and Kemalism belong to others. ... Turkey will be destroyed, 
gentlemen. People say: Could Turkey become like Algeria? Just as, in Algeria, we got 
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81% [of the votes], here too we will reach 81%, we will not remain on 20%. Do not 
waste your energy on us – I am speaking here to you, to those ... of the imperialist West, 
the colonizing West, the wild West, to those who, in order to unite with the rest of the 
world, become the enemies of honor and modesty, those who lower themselves to the 
level of dogs, of puppies, in order to imitate the West, to the extent of putting dogs 
between the legs of Muslim women – it is to you I speak when I say: ‘Do not waste your 
energy on us, you will die at the hands of the people of Kırıkkale.” (a city in central 
Anatolia) 
“... the army says: ‘We can accept it if you’re a supporter of the PKK, but a 
supporter of sharia, never.’ Well you won’t solve the problem with that attitude. If 
you want the solution, it’s sharia.”570 
Yavuz states that the RP sought to distinguish between Westernization and 
modernity. Westernization, in the Turkish context, was a process of alienation from one's 
own cultural values and history and its replacement by an empty shell that only could be 
a pale shadow of the other that it aspires to be. This weakness, in turn, was viewed as 
causing underdevelopment, the lack of political independence, the erosion of moral 
values, and the subjugation of the Turks in their own historical regions. Modernity, by 
contrast, was viewed as a necessity for survival, and its technological, scientific, 
democratic, and industrial elements were not seen as being incompatible with Islam. In 
having this view, the RP ideologues were very close to Ottoman liberals like Namlk 
Kemal, who also thought that a prudent incorporation of Western attributes, such as 
democracy, liberalism, and industrialization, could be accomplished without 
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compromising essential Islamic customs and values. The promotion of a liberal political 
and economic agenda, in fact, was cleverly used by the RP to assail the authoritarian 
aspects of the Kemalist tradition while increasing their popularity and credibility with 
those who were dissatisfied with the present system. 
To sum up, Erbakan believed that westernization does not necessarily mean 
modernization. The Turkish modernity with the Kemalist revolution had alienated 
cultural values and history. What was left was a hollow body. Erbakan was of the opinion 
that due to the nature of the Kemalist modernity, the development of Turkey and the 
Turks were retarded, morality easily eroded and Turkey lost its ties with its historical 
hinterland that was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. While Erbakan viewed modernity as a 
necessary element for political, economical and industrial development, he also believed 
that these could be achieved without sacrificing Islamic values; therefore they are 
compatible with Islam. Yavus states that Erbakan’s view of modernity is identical to that 
of Namik Kemal, an Ottoman liberalist, who believed democracy, liberalism and 
industrialization could be achieved through Islamic values. Yavuz concludes’ “the 
promotion of a liberal political and economic agenda, in fact, was cleverly used by the 
RP to assail the authoritarian aspects of the Kemalist tradition while increasing their 
popularity and credibility with those who were dissatisfied with the present system.” 571 
6.6 The Kemalist State Machine Steps in: The ‘Post-Modern’ Coup 
Erbakan and members of WP’s anti-Kemalist and pro-Islamic rhetoric had already 
disturbed the Turkish military, who perceived the duty of protecting the secular 
foundations and the Kemalist principles of the state, even before the ascent of the party to 
power, the activities of religious groups began to rise and became more public. 
                                                 




The incidents that prepared the unavoidable fall of the WP continued to occur. 
One of them was when the Aczmendis, an Islamic order in Turkey, staged a highly 
publicized ritual in the largest mosque of Turkey, the Kocatepe Mosque, which is only 
several kilometers away from the Turkish Parliament, on October 6, 1996. With TV 
cameras present, the members of the order clamored for Sharia in Turkey.572 On January 
11, 1997 invited the leaders of religious orders in Turkey to a dinner at the official 
residence of the prime minister.573  
Then came the straw that broke the camel’s back. On January 30, 1997, one of 
Erbakan’s aides and the mayor of town of Sincan, which is outside the city of Ankara, 
Bekir Yildiz574 organized an evening rally named ‘the Jerusalem Day’, which was 
proclaimed by the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomenei in Iran in 1980s. The spectators 
filled the arena to capacity chanting for the advent of jihad as small children staged a play 
that depicted the victory of Islam. Moreover, the VIP guest was Mohammed Bagheri, the 
Iranian ambassador to Turkey, for whom the crowd cheered in excitement. While 
clamoring for Sharia, the crowd cursed Israel and Arafat. Furthermore, Bagheri came to 
stage to speak and called for the victory of Sharia in Turkey. He said: “On behalf of 
Muslims all over the world, I say that we can wait no longer! Do not be afraid to call 
yourselves fundamentalists! Fundamentalists are those who follow the words and actions 
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of the Prophet! God has promised them the final victory!”575 The pictures of the 
prominent Shi’a clerics Musa al-Sadr and Abbas al-Mousavi were hanging in the 
background on the wall.576  
The Sincan incident was really unacceptable for the Kemalist establishment as it 
trampled on the major sensitivities of Kemalism. The Jerusalem Night organized by the 
RP mayor of Sincan, Bekir Yıldız, at the end of January 1997 increased the already high 
tensions between secularists and conservatives. The participation of the Iranian 
ambassador and his speech at the event over lapped with one of the grand narratives of 
secularists in Turkey: the “Iranization” of Turkey. 577  A few days later, the tension 
around Sincan reached a crescendo with a procession of tanks on the main street of 
Sincan. Ismail Saglar said: “The tanks were considered a warning to the WP or an early 
sign of a coup d’état, as Turkish people, most of whom had seen at least one military 
intervention during their life, were quite sure of the meaning of tanks on the streets.” 
However, the military officials announced that the procession was a previously organized 
regular training move. 578 
However, the military showed their real intent at the February 28 meeting of the 
National Security Council. The meeting and the subsequent press release was significant 
in that the military threatened the Erbakan government with “sanctions” if it did not take 
immediate action to curb the “religious reactionary movements.579 Erbakan refused to 
sign the council’s decisions and stated "Governments are formed in Parliament not in the 
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National Security Council; laws are made in Parliament." In the end, he had to ratify the 
decisions. 580 
The generals made it clear that they did not want a classical military coup but a 
political solution to the ‘problem’. Therefore, the coalition partner Tansu Ciller was 
pressured to pull her party out of the government.581  
Defections had already begun from Ciller’s True Path Party. The Minister of 
Industry, Yalim Erez and Minister of Health, Yildirim Aktuna582 resigned from their 
positions. However, the military found the process too slow.583 
Meanwhile, the military’s displeasure with the Erbakan government climbed to 
unprecedented heights so much so Osman Ozbek, the Chief of Staff of Gendarme in 
Erzurum Province went so far as to call Erbakan “a pimp” for going to pilgrimage in 
Mecca with his family as the guest of the king of Saudi Arabia.584  Although, Erbakan 
asked the chief of staff of the Turkish Military for the punishment of Ozbek, it never 
happened. 585  
The lack of trust between the military and the government went up so much that 
the military staged one of the largest cross border incursions into Iraq in May 1997 with 
50,000 troops to eliminate the PKK targets without the foreknowledge of the 
government.586 A senior military officer conceded that the government was informed of 
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the incursion twelve hours after its commencement for fear that the classified operation 
might have been leaked to the terrorists.587 
The crisis between the conflicting parties further escalated when on May 11, 
1997, the Erbakan supporters staged a 100,000 strong demonstration in Istanbul against 
the army’s February 28th demands.588 
At the National Security Council meeting of May 1997 Erbakan took extreme 
pressure from the generals to ‘do his bidding at once’.589 Unwilling to concede to the 
military, Erbakan came up with a solution that he would switch positions with Ciller, 
making her the prime minister. He assumed that if his secular coalition partner would 
take over premiership, the military would relax the unrelenting pressure on him. 
However, the generals saw no difference as long as Erbakan remained in government. 
Chief of Staff Hakki Karadayi personally demanded all high ranking officers to remain in 
their posts throughout the summer in case an emergency meeting was needed. 590 
Different from preceding coups, where the military physically took over and ruled 
for a certain period of time, this time the military pursued a different method. The 
generals embarked on giving a series of briefings to officially inform and convince the 
ruling elite of WP’s ‘unconstitutional’ deeds. 591  Despite the opposition from the 
Minister of Justice of WP, the high level Supreme Court and other judges as well as the 
university representatives, labor unions, other NGOs, even teachers, all of whom 
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represented the Kemalist elite, were given briefings at the Turkish General Staff 
headquarters in Ankara for days.592 
Furthermore, the military resorted to any means possible to eradicate the traces of 
Islamism in Turkey, including economic, legal constitutional and political. For example; 
the military officially boycotted the Islamic oriented companies and stopped buying 
merchandise from them. For example, certain food brands and newspapers were banned 
in the military facilities. Also, the NSC continued to expel certain officers from the 
military on the grounds of religious reactionary and anti-secular activities. 593  
The anti-Islamic, pro secular front continued to organize mass demonstrations in 
large cities of Turkey. The large-business association TUSIAD, the then president 
Suleyman Demirel and civil society organizations were among the supporters of these 
demonstrations. 594   
In the face of relentless pressure from all spheres of the Kemalist elite, Erbakan 
made the expected move and on June 17, 1997, he submitted his resignation, marking the 
end of the Welfare Party-True Pathy Party coalition. Subsequently, the president refused 
to give Ciller, who owns the second largest majority in the parliament, the duty of 
establishing the next government as, by law, it is the president who decides about the 
person to form a government. 595  
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Demirel, under pressure from the military, called on the main opposition leader, 
Mesut Yilmaz, who then formed a right-left coalition government. Therefore, the new 
government included no Islamic elements.596 
For the military, the mission was accomplished. Without damaging further the 
country’s image with a traditional military coup, the generals were able to force 
democratically elected Erbakan to step down. A new secular administration was erected, 
which would carry out the decisions made by the soldiers with no reservation.597 
The influence of the military grew even stronger as the government was now in 
compliance with the generals. The West Working Group (Bati Calisma Grubu), a 
clandestine group within the military, which had been established before February 28 to 
report any anti-regime, Islamic activities, continued to check on the media, businesses, 
academia and other parts of the society. 598 The generals were now in full control of 
Turkey’s foreign policy and they indicated that they would continue to do so citing the 
national security. Now, instead of acting alone, they would work with the ministry of 
foreign affairs and its bureaucracy. As an example, when some Nordic countries openly 
declared their support for PKK members in their countries, the military pressed the 
ministry of foreign affairs to ‘take necessary steps’ to stop this. 599 
The 1997 military intervention is known as the “soft coup” because of the way the 
military carried it out. Major business associations, media outlets, academia, judiciary 
and other pro-secular, pro-Kemalist fractions of the society were mobilized with the 
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encouragement of the military, which resulted in the forceful resignation of Erbakan and 
his government.600 
Burak Bilge Ozpek states that what made the coup post-modern was its 
methodology, because the military managed to eliminate the Welfare Party without 
suspending the whole political system. Still in 1999, the military continued to enjoy the 
‘absolute kingmaker’ status, as Ozpek puts it. The leader of PKK was arrested in Kenya 
with a Cypriot passport and the organization declared a ceasefire. Like the case with 
previous coups, those who were affiliated with WP and pro-Islamic ideology were 
banned from politics, the conservative way of life, such as the headscarf in public official 
spaces, was kept under control. 601 
6.7 Conclusion 
Necmeddin Erbakan and his Just Order (Adil Duzen) represent the decade’s long 
disenfranchised conservative and Islamist portion of the periphery thus the epitome of 
political Islam in Turkey. According to this, the adverse effects of Western influence, 
such as European culture, secularism, Western banking system, Zionism etc. have plunge 
the Islamic world into a spiraling decline and these are responsible for the persistent vices 
that have befallen the Muslims. Therefore, the only way to salvage the Islamic world is a 
spiritual, moral, political and economic awakening based on the tenets of Islam. 
Therefore, one of the most important elements of the Erbakanian worldview consists of 
the unity of Muslims all across the world under the banner of ummah. (the Community of 
Muslims) It is important to note that although he advocated the unity of Muslims, he 
believed that it ought to be under the banner of Turkey’s leadership. 
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While the actual rise of Erbakan to prominence came in mid-1990s, the seeds of 
the National Order ideology were sown in late 1960. Several factors contributed to the 
rise of Erbakan. First of all, the adherents of the National View have always been known 
to be devoted to their cause and well organized not only in Turkey but among the Turkish 
diaspora in Europe, especially in Germany. The symbiotic relation between the European 
and the Anatolian wings of the National View would then contribute to the economic 
revival of the latter, which brings us to the second factor. 
The relative liberalization of Turkish economy and general life in Turkey under 
Ozal throughout 1980s helped the birth of what was called the Anatolian Tigers, a term 
coined for the business entrepreneurships outside of the Istanbul establishment. After 
decades of economic, social and educational deprivation, the periphery began to rise 
against the Kemalist establishment. Finally, the death of Ozal in 1993 coupled with the 
rising PKK terrorism, corruption and bribery that plagued almost every level of state 
offered a perfect opportunity for Erbakan and his “Just Order” rhetoric. The election of 
Erbakan to prime minister in 1996 marked a historical point in the history of Turkey in 
that for the first time an individual with overt Islamic rhetoric became the head of the 
government. Whereas this was an unprecedented accomplishment for the political Islam 
in Turkey, it raised concerns among the Kemalist establishment, particularly in the 
Military.  
Having ascended to the top of government, Erbakan began to implement policies 
that ran entirely counter to the traditional Kemalist understanding. His aspiration to create 
a Muslim version of European Union with the membership of mostly Muslim developing 




Turkey’s relations with Israel under Erbakan, who was anti-Israeli, became a 
battleground between him and the military, which saw Israel the only viable option in the 
region to counter both the rise of political Islam and the Kurdish terrorism. Unlike 
Kemalists, Erbakan was a steadfast anti-westernist, who repeatedly denounced almost 
every aspect of Western world. This in turn strained Turkey’s relations with the US and 
EU. 
With his worldview and policy implementations, Erbakan clearly attempted to 
challenge the Kemalist establishment, desiring to create a complete paradigm shift in 
Turkish foreign policy. However, the Kemalist establishment with its strong military, 
bureaucracy, higher education, legislation and secular socio-economic circles, prevented 
it from happening with an unprecedented “postmodern coup”, where the military 
removed the government without physically taking over the governance. Erbakan and his 
government simply did not have means and power to subdue the Kemalist establishment 
primarily because they were part of a coalition government, which kept Erbakan from 
fully materializing his ideals, molding the state machinery with its military and 
bureaucracy into his own worldview. Erbakan neither withdrew Turkey from the 
“Christian club” European Union and NATO nor was he able to sever the relations with 
Israel. In fact, perhaps it was Erbakan’s stubborn anti-Western attitude that deprived him 
of the most viable partner against the military dominance; the European Union, which has 
long urged Turkey to implement civilianization reforms that would render the military 
less influential in state affairs.  
The monumental collapse of the Erbakan government in 1997 once again proved 




political Islamic movements in Turkey. It is this perception that set the stage for the 
creation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The founding members of AKP, 
who had decided to distance themselves from Erbakan’s establishment, conceded that a 
serious reform in their ideology was required if they wanted to be successful in Turkey’s 
political atmosphere.  
Goals and Priorities of the Erbakanist Foreign Policy 
 
• Pan-Islamic (Desire to build the Muslim unity in the world; Ummah) 
• Third Worldist (the D-8 project, unification of the Muslims) 
• Neo-Ottomanist (Aspiration to make Turkey a regional power and the  
leader of the Islamic world) 
• Anti-West (Opposition to the European Union based on identity) 
• Anti-Zionist/Israel 
• Pro-Iran 
• Pluralist/inclusive (Recognizing the Kurdish identity based on the  
Ummah concept) 
• The Just Order (in regards to the Turks in Europe) 
 
Instruments of the Erbakanist Foreign Policy 
 
• The Office of the Prime Minister 
 
 
The 18 Directives of NSC of February 28, 1997602 
According to NSC decision no. 406, the Erkaban government was instructed to 
implement the following 18 directives: 
1. The principle of secularism should be strictly enforced and laws should be modified for 
that purpose, if necessary. 
2. Private dormitories, foundations, and schools affiliated with Sufi religious orders must 
be put under the control of relevant state authorities and eventually transferred to the 
Ministry of National Education (MNE)  
3. An eight-year uninterrupted education system must be implemented across the country 
and necessary administrative and legal adjustments should be made so that Qur’anic 
courses, which children with basic education may attend with parental consent, operate 
only under the responsibility and control of the MNE. 
4. National education institutes charged with raising enlightened clergy loyal to the 
republican regime and Kemal Atatürk’s principles and reforms must conform to the 
essence of the Law on Unified Education 
                                                 




5. Religious facilities built in various parts of the country must not be used for political 
exploitation and such facilities must be built in coordination with local governments and 
relevant authorities. 
6. Activities of religious orders banned by law no. 677, as well as all entities prohibited 
by said law, must be ended. 
7. Media groups that oppose the military and depict its members as inimical to religion 
should be brought under control. 
8. Personnel expelled from military service because of fundamentalist activities, 
disciplinary problems, or connections with illegal organizations must not be employed by 
other public agencies and institutions or otherwise encouraged. 
9. The measures taken within the framework of existing regulations to prevent infiltration 
of the military by the extremist religious sector should also be applied in other public 
institutions and establishments particularly in universities and other educational 
institutions, at every level of the bureaucracy, and in judicial establishments. 
10. Iran’s efforts to destabilize Turkey’s regime should be closely watched and policies to 
prevent Iran from meddling in Turkey’s internal affairs should be adopted. 
11. Legal and administrative means must be used to prevent the dangerous activities of 
the extremist religious sector that seeks to create polarization in society by fanning 
sectarian differences. 
12. Legal and administrative proceedings against those responsible for incidents that 
contravene the constitution and laws of the Turkish Republic should be concluded in a 
short period of time and firm measures should be taken at all levels not to allow 
repetition of such incidents. 
13. Practices that violate the attire law and that may give Turkey a backward image must 
be prevented. 
14. Licensing procedures for short- and long-barrel weapons, which have been issued for 
various reasons, must be reorganized on the basis of police and gendarmerie districts. 
15. The collection of (animal) sacrifice hides by anti-regime and “uncontrolled” 
(unregulated) organizations and establishments for the purpose of securing financial 
resources should be prevented. 
16. Legal proceedings against private bodyguards dressed in special uniforms and those 
responsible for them should be concluded speedily and all such should be disbanded. 
17. Initiatives that aim at solving Turkey’s problems on the basis of the concept of 
“ummet” [religious worldview] rather than the concept “nation” [or a secular 
worldview] and that encourage the separatist terrorist organization [meaning the PKK] 
by approaching it on the same basis [means the Islamization of Kurdish nationalism] 
should be prevented by legal and administrative means. 
18. The law (no. 5816) defining crimes against Atatürk, including acts of disrespect, must 
be fully implemented. 
 




CHAPTER 7. THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY ERA 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The first part of this chapter will analyze the social, economic and political origins 
of the ascension of the Justice and Development Part (AKP) to power, the party’s 
struggle with the Kemalist state institutions to remain in power. The second part will 
scrutinize the foreign policy ideology of the party (neo-Ottomanism) and explain the 
implications of the victory of the AKP over the Kemalist bureaucracy as well as the 
party’s neo-Ottomanist approach on the Turkish foreign policy.  Turkey’s relations with 
other state and non-state actors under the AKP will also be analyzed in the context of 
neo-Ottomanist foreign policy understanding. 
7.2 The Rising of the Alternative Elite: “Islamist Calvinists” 
As discussed in the previous chapters, increasing political and economic 
liberalization in Turkey gave way to the upward mobilization of the “other Turkey”, 
which also was called “the periphery”. This section of Turkish society grew into 
prominence in financial and economic sector especially late 90s also called the 




successful, conservative businessmen, who are inspired by the Qur’an and the Prophet 
Muhammed, who encouraged commerce and development.603  
This concept of entrepreneurship was then named as “the Islamic Calvinism”. 604 
Those who follow this ideology value the importance of merit of work and savings and 
advanced education. As a result of increasing awareness in education and urbanization, 
the new elite began to greatly impact the Turkish politics and its discourse. It is important 
to note that the values and ideology of the new rising elite showed considerable 
differences from the Kemalist ideology, which is represented by the Ankara 
establishment. The new conservative elite stress the importance of small business, 
laissez-faire economics, and reduction of state intervention. 605  
For example, in the 1990s, Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association (MUSIAD) created a guideline in which it encouraged the idea of profit 
maximizing individual, which is not necessarily in contrast with his/her moral or 
religious values. It created its own version of homo economicus; homo Islamicus. This 
ideology was legitimized by resorting to the life of Prophet Muhammed, who was a 
merchant during his lifetime. Therefore, homo Islamicus is characterized by having 
appropriate morals and minimal state intervention. In other words, it is the ideal Muslim 
business type similar to homo economicus with respect to capitalist economies. The 
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difference between homo Islamicus and homo economicus is that the former’s adoption 
of ‘moral capitalist economy’.606 For example, according to this; “God-fearing pious 
employers would take care of their employees, and in turn, the employee would work with 
great enthusiasm knowing that they serve God as they do work, and their work is part of 
their devotion. Both employer and employee would know that they work with the same 
objective of serving Islam.”607 
Prominent religious figures have stated that the search for profit for Muslims is 
considered to be equal with prayer and fasting. Esad Cosan, former leader of one of the 
largest wings of the Nakshibendi order, strongly encouraged his followers to study and 
learn foreign languages, engage in computers and travel abroad to increase their 
knowledge.608 
One of the prominent examples of the “Islamic Calvinists” that played a great role 
in the success of the AKP government is the Gulen community, also known as the 
Cemaat (Community in Turkish). The movement is led by the cleric Fethullah Gulen, 
who currently lives in Pennsylvania, USA and is distinct from other such religious 
leaders in terms of its geopolitical and imperial aspirations. The community’s most 
striking indication is their educational institutions in the thousands, ranging from primary 
education institutions to private universities that are located not only in Turkey but in 
more than 110 countries around the world. Especially before 2014 in which time the 
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relations between the AKP government and the Cemaat hit rock bottom, the Cemaat’s 
influence in Turkish politics and economy was substantial. 609 
Fethullah Gulen has objected to the Kemalist-secular system that excluded Islam 
from the public sphere. Gulen argued that the Kemalist modernization confined 
spirituality to a private space. In one of his sermons he stated: 
 “Now it is a painful spring that we live in. A nation is being born again. A nation 
of millions [is] being born one that will live for long centuries, God willing...It is being 
born with its own culture, its own civilization. If giving birth to one person is so painful, 
the birth of millions cannot be pain-free. Naturally we will suffer pain. It won’t be easy 
for a nation that has accepted atheism, has accepted materialism, a nation accustomed to 
running away from itself, to come back riding on its horse.”610 
Gulen glorified the Ottoman past and it’s all-inclusive ‘millet system’ in 
opposition to the Kemalist nationalism which is exclusionist. 611  
The community has supported the Turkish membership of the EU. As opposed to 
Erbakan, whose focus was the Middle East and the Islamic world, Gulen has focused 
more on Central Asia and the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union. He believed 
Turkey’s rise to global power also goes through establishing hegemony over the brethren 
of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Through education communities and institutions 
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throughout the world and especially in Central Asia, Gulen has aspired to engage in PR 
of Turkey and Islam.612 This evidently is in contrast with the Kemalist worldview. 
7.3 The Islamic Calvinism and Turkish Politics 
As studied in the previous chapter, the rise of the ‘periphery’ played a great role 
in the success of the Welfare Party. The support came basically for two reasons. The first, 
of course, the same world view, the second is to counter the pressure they were getting 
from the Kemalist establishment. The WP offered the new rising conservative sphere an 
alternative by which they would lead their life as they wish. 613 
The disappointment and pessimism set in on the conservative ‘other Turkey’ with 
the removal of the Erbakan government by the military after the February 28 process. 
The process caused a fundamental shift in the Turkish political Islam, which eventually 
resulted in the formation of AKP.614 As Cizre and Cinar argue; “[t]his process has 
profoundly altered the formulation of public policy and the relationship between state 
and society. No major element of Turkish politics at present can be understood without 
reference to the February 28 process.”615  
The inability of Erbakan to counter the military in the mid 90s and his eventual 
forceful resignation subsequent to the 28th process led some members of the Welfare 
Party to come to the conclusion that it was almost impossible to win over the military 
with the existing structure of the party and the long advocated worldview that had 
attracted the wrath of the Kemalist bureaucracy and the military. The crack between the 
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conservative and those members of the National Outlook, who advocate the change, 
could not be hidden from the public in the newly established Felicity Party, the successor 
to then abolished WP, Congress, where Abdullah Gul, one of the prominent reformists 
ran for the chairmanship of the party against the traditionalist candidate Recai Kutan. 
Though the race ended with Kutan’s victory, it became evident that the reformists were 
now made up of a considerable percentage of the movement. 616   
Those who split from the Felicity Party officially formed the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) on August 14, 2001 and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had 
become a prominent figure in Turkish politics in the early 1990s as the successful mayor 
of the largest city in Turkey, Istanbul,617 was elected as the chairman of the party. One of 
the most important aspects of the AKP was that it not only was formed by those who 
seceded from the Erbakanist movement but also those who represented different 
ideologies of the political spectrum of Turkey. For example, among the founding 
members were Cemil Cicek and Abdulkadir Aksu, who were the members of Ozal’s 
Motherland Party, Cemil Cicek and Koksal Toptan, who were members of the 
Democratic Party. Kursad Tuzmen was a member of the Nationalists Movement. The left 
ideology was represented in the founding by Ertugrul Gunay. The wide array of 
ideological make-up of the founding members of the AKP shows that it was founded 
aiming to embrace large segments of Turkish society as opposed to limiting it to the 
conservative-Islamists. 
The AKP was founded with conservative values in mind but at the same time it 
accepted the existing regime’s secular principles. According to this, although Islamic 
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values made up an important aspect of the foundation, the goal was not to politicize Islam 
or Islamization.618 It was evident that the February 28 process was a big lesson for the 
advocates of political Islam in Turkey, which was that overhauling the existing status quo 
regime in Turkey and replacing it with an Islamic one was not an option, given the 
tremendous strength and influence of the Turkish military and Kemalist bureaucracy. 
Therefore, navagating through the system, the reformists accepted the Kemalists 
principles of the state while retaining their conservative background. Therefore, AKP was 
founded to be a part of the system, not against it.619 However, as will be discussed 
shortly, as soon as the AKP came to power with a super majority it began to charge 
against the Kemalist institutions and mechanism of the state, using the European Union 
reforms as leverage. 
While the scholars conceded that the new party was established on the basis of 
moderation and change, the point of contention was about the nature and the level of the 
change. For example, Hale and Ozbudun argue that the AKP could not be called Islamic 
due to the fact that the founding members overtly rejected their allegiance with the 
National Outlook movement and should be accepted as center-right party. 620 The AKP 
defines itself as a “conservative democratic party”.621 Ziya Onis defines the AKP as 
“Islamic Liberal” while its predecessor Welfare Party was “moderate fundamentalist”.622 
Hakan Yavuz states that AKP’s rejection of the National Outlook was part of a 
worldwide moderation trend among the Islamic movements. Yavuz calls AKP “Islamic 
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Liberal”. To Yildiz Atasoy, the AKP represents a successful “marriage” of Islam and 
neoliberalism. 623 
Ihsan Dagı summarizes all these assessments with the following quote;  
 “The transformation of the national view movement from the early 1970s to the 
late 1990s has given to a new political party (the AKP) with a liberal, democratic and 
pro-Western orientation and political agenda. A movement that embraces modern 
political values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, which advocates 
integration with the EU, and manages to get votes from all segments of society, can 
hardly be called Islamist. It is a case demonstrating that a discursive shift may be 
followed by an identity change under certain circumstances. The Islamists’ recent 
departure from their traditional anti-West and anti-Westernization position seems to have 
transformed the Islamic self in Turkey, opening up new possibilities for the coexistence of 
Islam and the West.624 
7.4 Prelude to AKP’s Electoral Success  
About one year after it was established, the AKP won the November 2002 
elections with an exceptional victory, gaining 34.3% of the votes. The Republican 
People’s Party got 19.4%. Because of the ten per cent threshold, the remaining parties 
were not represented in the parliament, making the AKP a single party government, 
gaining 363 of the 550 seats, and the PRP the opposition party. Erbakan’s FP received 2.5 
percent of the votes, which is considered to be a heavy defeat.625  
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It is important to note here that the success of the AKP could not solely be 
attributed to its adoption of new values and declared change in ideology. It is widely 
agreed that among the contributing factors to the AKP’s historic win were the financial 
and economic crisis of 2001, which was one of the biggest. The financial crisis was 
preceded by the massive earthquake of 1999 that rocked the Marmara Region, the most 
populated area of Turkey. The failing banking system in Turkey and the gloomy reports 
of the IMF about the Turkish economy as well as the massive corruption and nepotism 
allegations that involved the aforementioned banks and the politicians only exacerbated 
the economic and social devastation of the 1999 earthquake. 626   
The flimsy coalition government of the DSP (Democratic Leftist Party), MHP 
(Nationalist Movement Party) and ANAP (Motherland Party) led by Bulent Ecevit failed 
to meet the demands of the IMF and the crisis in the banking sector combined drew the 
Turkish economy to the brink of collapse. The 2001 growth rate was a mere minus 7.5%. 
The Turkish Lira lost more than 110% of its value against the dollar, more than fifty 
thousand small and medium size businesses had filed for bankruptcy. The unemployment 
rate climbed up to 10%. The gravity of the economic and political situation prompted the 
General Staff to warn that it might lead to a social explosion. 627  
There is no doubt that the AKP’s success in the 2002 elections was due in great 
part to the Turkish people’s dissatisfaction with the existing coalition government and its 
utter failure in socio economic affairs. The 2002 election proved this. The total 
percentage of votes that the coalition parties gained fell from 53% in the previous 
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elections to 14% in 2002. One third of the entire constituents voted for AKP. Among the 
supporters of the AKP in 2002 were the residents of the shanty towns of Ankara and 
Istanbul (Gecekondular), the new rising “Anatolian elite” and the Kurds. 628 
Finally, Erdogan’s charismatic persona and the perception that he was unfairly 
barred from politics and jailed by the State Security Court of Diyarbakir on April 22, 
1998 because of a poem with religious tones he recited played a role in the success of the 
AKP in 2002 elections. Therefore, not only his Islamic past but also the financial crisis 
and the desperation of the citizens for a fresh start as well as his personality brought the 
AKP to power with it forming a single party government,629 which had not happened 
since Ozal’s 45th (1983-1987) and 46th (1987-1989) governments.  
7.5 The Path to Consolidation of Power 
Fuat Keyman and Sebnem Gumuscu state that the AKP was able to successfully 
exert its dominance in Turkish politics by pursuing democratization, modernization, 
globalization and Europeanization at the same time taking on the complications that 
originated from the reactions from different powerhouses that countered the AKP 
policies. Keyman and Gumuscu argue that the AKP’s strategy for success and 
consolidation of power was established on four principles:630  
The first one is proactive, market-oriented and reform based conservative 
democracy, which is also ‘caring’ and acquiring a supervision role in its relation with 
economy. Therefore, AKP implemented policies in its governance such that they would 
result in a change in the existing structure of politics and economy, which had alienated 
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the society, neglecting their needs and demands. This, to AKP, had created an 
undemocratic system rule. 
The second principle is growth oriented ‘philanthropic and regulated liberalism’. 
According to this the AKP government adopted free market economy, which created 
sustainable growth and contributed to further industrialization of Turkish economy. 
These ensured consolidation of financial stability and robust economy. 
The third principle is service based politics, which was established based on 
distribution of wealth and welfare services whereas the social elements in Turkey were 
not discriminated against for their cultural identity. With this principle, the AKP 
government focused on the poverty and aimed to reach to different parts of the society, 
who were in need of help. This helped AKP in its successive elections. 
The fourth principle is proactive foreign policy, which indicated that the AKP 
would pursue multidimensional and constructive politics abroad. This would emphasize 
Turkey’s soft power capabilities. 631 
The initial success of the AKP in economics was greatly attributed to the policies 
set by Kemal Dervis, who was a prominent economist at the World Bank and had been 
invited by the Ecevit coalition government to save the crumbling Turkish economy and 
financial sector. Added to this was the expansion of exports markets to which Turkish 
businessmen would do business and attracting foreign investment in great proportions as 
well as pursuing aggressive privatization, which totaled a whopping 34 billion dollars. 
All these policies resulted in sustainable growth in and consolidation of the economy. 
Turkey became the seventeenth largest economy in the world. The economic success 
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resulted in increased volume and diversification of exports goods ranging from 
automotive to household durables and textiles to food. During the AKP government 
tenure, the per capita income passed the ten thousand dollars threshold. The consolidation 
of market economy propelled the AKP to focus on modernization of bureaucracy, 
infrastructure, education, health and housing, which required intense investment in the 
technological infrastructure of public sector, expanding highway, railroad and airport  
networks. 632 
In the same initial stage of its rule, the AKP widened and consolidated its 
domestic and foreign legitimacy. One of the most important instruments that the AKP 
used for this purpose was aggressive pursuit of European Union reforms, which led to 
more civilianization of Turkish bureaucracy and politics. The transformation of 
bureaucracy, economy and politics under the AKP government, which demonstrated that 
modernity was possible with conservative/religious values and the fact that the AKP 
represented the ‘other Turkey’ or ‘periphery’ with its distinct economic, political and 
social worldview, and that it rose to power of great proportions, began to disturb the 
Kemalist state machinery and secular elite or ‘the traditional center’. 633  
In the following section, I will focus on the AKP’s interaction with the Kemalist 
state machinery, which is comprised primarily of bureaucracy, military, judiciary, 
legislation and higher education. 
The extent of the AKP’s adoption of democracy was generally measured by its 
policies to civilianize/democratize the government in the form of removing the military 
tutelage and the Kemalist monopoly over the Turkish politics and democracy. Ertugrul 
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Tombus states that AKP was evaluated “within the binary opposition” of military versus 
civilian politics as well as center versus the periphery, authoritarian versus democratic, 
appointed versus elected.634 
 Tombus analyzes AKP’s path to power consolidation in two phases. The first 
phase is the polemical phase (2003-2007) and the second is the ruling phase (2007- 
today). In the first phase, the AKP was perceived as a political entity that endeavored to 
counterbalance the establishment and the status quo. The degree of AKP’s 
democratization was generally measured by its policies and rhetoric to disapprove and 
challenge the authoritarian military. Therefore the AKP was considered to be the opposite 
of the Kemalist establishment, which was defined as possessing “exclusionary politics, 
monolithic national identity, and assimilation of differences, authoritative or assertive 
secularism, and extra-political control over democratic politics”.635It is this stance that 
AKP had that granted it legitimacy both at home and abroad, especially in Europe. This 
also widened the support base of AKP. 636 
The AKP’s populist rhetoric in this stage was that “the Kemalist establishment 
and its minority and privileged elite alienated the real owners of the republic”. This way 
AKP found a reliable connection with a wider popular base. As a result, the Turkish 
politics under the AKP’s initial rule became reduced to a “binary opposition” such as 
supporting AKP versus the military.637 
In the polemical phase the AKP rulers expressed their commitment to and need 
for democracy but it was solely established on the premises to combat with the Kemalist 
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establishment, especially with the military. In this phase, the election of Abdullah Gul, a 
very prominent figure in the AKP, as the president of Turkey in 2007 marked an 
important point. Beginning his election, the AKP captured all institutions and 
mechanisms that the Kemalist paradigm put in place to establish its supremacy over the 
masses and to control the governance of the country. With this stage, the polemical phase 
came to an end.638  
The end of the polemical phase, which began with the ascension of Abdullah Gul, 
one of the founders of AKP, to presidency in August 2007 ushered in an era where the 
AKP acquired its unchallenged power status. By this, the AKP became no longer bound 
by the Kemalist establishment and further consolidated its power.639 
7.5.1 The Initial Reform Period: 2002-2007 
Having won a historical victory in 2002, the AKP became a single party 
government for the first time in more than twenty years. This undoubtedly gave AKP 
considerable power and leverage compared to flimsy and often uncompromising coalition 
governments. This did not mean, however, that although the AKP was able to ascend to 
be government it did not really mean it had the full control of the state. Historically, the 
governments, especially those that had agenda outside of the Kemalist realm were 
contained by the Kemalist state apparatus, which was made up essentially of the military 
and then the Kemalist bureaucracy, i.e. the higher courts, higher education, and foreign 
ministry bureaucracy. The single party AKP government was no exception. Having 
learned a hard lesson from its predecessor, Welfare Party, not to challenge the Kemalist 
establishment with the delusional feeling of substantial electoral victory, the AKP 
                                                 





adopted a different means to tackle the Kemalist establishment; it was to play the game 
with its rules!640 
Therefore, the initial AKP period was marked with Turkey’s aggressive and 
unprecedented pursuit of the European Union membership. Therefore, the pro-EU 
discourse helped AKP in two ways; first thanks to the EU reforms the AKP was able to 
garner the support of a wide array of the Turkish public, which also further legitimized 
the government. The second, the EU reform process was used as a legitimate tool to 
‘civilianize’ the governance and reduce and later completely remove the supremacy of 
the Turkish military. 
In the following section, I will examine the process through which the AKP 
developed its strategy to tackle the secular, Kemalist establishment. Therefore, I will 
examine the civilian-military relations as well as the AKP’s relations with the most 
important guardians of the Kemalist establishment of the state, namely, Higher Education 
Council (YOK), the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) and the 
Presidency. 
7.5.1.1 The EU Reforms Aimed at the Military Tutelage and the Kemalist Bureaucracy  
 Ismail Akca and Evren Balta-Peker argue that the transformation of civil–military 
relations in Turkey in the first decade of the twenty-first century is related to three 
factors: the presence of international conditionality, a decrease in the level of internal 
threats, and the emergence of a domestic political actor with the capacity and will to 
challenge the military establishment. Regarding international conditionality, civil–
military relations have been transformed, not only in Turkey but also globally, since the 
                                                 




end of the Cold War. This trend has affected Turkey directly through the EU accession 
process. The European Council granted Turkey candidacy in 1999 in Helsinki and stated 
that ‘Turkey is a candidate country destined to join the EU’ (Presidency Conclusions, 
Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999). However; the EU clearly stated that 
accession negotiations could only begin if Turkey is resolved to fully satisfy 
certain political conditions. According to the Commission:  
 “The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of 
fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively 
addressed... The independence of the judiciary, the powers of State Security Courts and 
military courts and compliance with rulings of the European Court of Human Rights 
remain matters of concern.641 The extent to which the constitutional amendment will 
enhance de facto civilian control over the military will need to be monitored.642 Hence, 
the EU requirement that the role of the military be reduced in civilian politics was the 
initial trigger for reform in civil–military relations. However, international conditionality 
would not have created a similar effect if Turkey had continued to experience a 
significant level of internal threat as it had in the 1990s.643  
It is this point of the EU negotiations that the AKP government took earnestly in 
order to challenge the supremacy of the military. The AKP was willing to win the game 
by playing it by the rules! Added to the advantage of the AKP was, as mentioned 
previously, the lessened threat from abroad in 2000s, which rendered the military less 
relevant in Turkish politics. 
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The Copenhagen Criteria of 1993 were important factor for the AKP to push 
through the EU accession reforms to curb the military. Accordingly, the AKP passed the 
seventh harmonization package on August 7, 2003644 [Law No. 4963], which brought 
significant changes in the composition, role and functions of the National Security 
Council (NSC) and the Secretariat General. As previously discussed, the NSC was the 
main driving body for the military hegemony over the civilian rule. By the new law, the 
NSC was reduced from being an executive body to a mere advisory board. Furthermore, 
substantial changes were made in the formation of the members of the NSC. 
Accordingly, the majority of the members were to be civilians rather than high ranking 
officers. The secretariat general was to be a civilian, for the first time in the history of the 
council, and was to be appointed by the president out of the list proposed by the prime 
minister.645 Subsequently, Mehmet Yigit Alpogan, a career diplomat who had served as 
the ambassador to Greece, was appointed to be the first civilian secretary general of the 
NSC.646 
One of the signs that the military was out of reach of the civilian control was the 
military expenditures that were not transparent and not audited by the Court of Accounts 
a Turkish body similar to the U.S. General Accounting Office. The package amended the 
1967 Law on the national audit bureau, which drew criticism from the military. Therefore 
the Court of Audit was to act ‘on behalf of the Turkish Grand Assembly and its inspection 
committees’ – to scrutinize the revenues, expenditures and property of all public sector 
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institutions ‘without any exception and without exempting any institute from being 
accountable’. The Court was also held responsible to report to the relevant parliamentary 
committees. 647 
In another attempt to reduce the military influence on the civilians, the NSC was 
to meet once every two months, as opposed to every month. The NSC had had the 
authority to nominate military personnel to the boards of the Establishment of, and 
Broadcasting by, Radio and Television Corporations, Wireless Communication, and the 
Protection of Minors from Harmful Publications. This was annulled.  The authority of the 
General Staff to appoint a representative to the board of the Higher Education Council 
was also revoked. Finally, the state of emergency that had been in effect in the thirteen 
south eastern provinces since 1987, due to the PKK terror, was also abolished. This was 
due in great part to the new policy approach to the Kurdish problem, which has aimed to 
resolve it.648 
From 2003 until 2005, the AKP pushed through some reforms related to the 
Kurdish problem, including abolition of the death penalty and a clampdown on the police 
use of torture, the release of political prisoners, greater freedom of expression and 
protection for the media, and some cultural, educational, and language rights albeit very 
limited for the Kurds. An amendment to Articles 4 of the Law on the Establishment of 
Radio and Television Enterprises lifted the restrictions on broadcasting in the different 
languages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives, such as 
Kurdish. Although, the AKP was not able to create a Kurdish policy of substance during 
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this period, it sought to find a pragmatic solution to the Kurdish problem. This solution 
would not include military confrontation, which would have given the army the 
opportunity to reassert itself further in Turkish politics. 
The AKP government took bold steps for the solution of the Kurdish issue. These 
included greater freedom of expression and the freedom of press. Although limited, 
important steps were taken to restore the cultural, linguistic and educational rights of the 
Kurds.649 Therefore, the Article 4 of the Law on the Establishment of Radio and 
Television Institution (RTUK) was amended and the restriction to broadcast in different 
languages other than Turkish was abolished.650 These steps showed that the AKP 
approach to the Kurdish issue was pragmatic. 651    
7.5.1.2 The Reaction of the Turkish Armed Forces 
It was evident that the AKP government targeted the military hegemony in Turkey by 
pursuing pro-EU policies. However, a beacon of western values and westernization, it 
would not have been expected that the military oppose and react to the 
Europeanization/civilianization/ democratization attempts by the AKP government. It 
soon was revealed that the military hardliners had been trying to undermine the AKP 
government due to the reforms that aimed at weakening the power projection of the 
Turkish military. As was the case in the second half of the 20th century, the military had 
been planning to overthrow the government. 
On March 29-April 4, 2007, the weekly political news magazine Nokta published 
a sensational issue that was titled “We were saved from two military coups in 2004; the 
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Golden Coin and Moonlight! Stunning details!” The following excerpts from the 
magazine are remarkable; 
“January 20, 2004 – I attended the force commanders meeting at the Air Force 
Headquarters. Since the National Security Council's pre-meeting was rescheduled from 
Thursday to tomorrow, a new coordination was needed. … During the conversations, 
Gendarmerie Commander Gen. Şener Eruygur was talking with desire for a coup and 
asking ‘Let's do it as soon as possible.' Today, he repeated it many times…” 
“February 6 2004- I directly headed to the Gendarmerie headquarters in the 
morning; three of us got together there. We evaluated the situation one more time. The 
Gendarmerie commander was insisting ‘Let's make a coup”… We convened in the 
morning to review the options in the Cyprus issue. However, we pushed this aside and 
engaged in whether or not we will make a coup. It is really difficult to convince 
Gendarmerie Commander Gen. Şener Eruygur. Although I knew that it would be 
pointless, I tried to convince him. But I cannot say that I was successful…”A bunch of 
previous notes: There is another one dated December 6, 2003. It reads: “... We have 
decided to prepare an action plan.652 
It was revealed that the head of the land, naval and air forces of the Turkish 
military had attempted to intervene in civilian government four times, which later called 
Ayışığı (Moonlight), Yakamoz (Bioluminescence), Sarıkız (Blondie), and Eldiven 
(Glove). Those officers who supported the coup attempts considered the AKP 
                                                 






government as a threat to the foundations of the republic and were threatened by the rapid 
and decisive EU reforms that apparently targeted the military. 653 
These coup attempts were unsuccessful for several reasons. First of all, hardliners 
in the military relied on the possibility of ratification of the Annan Plan in Cyprus as the 
most forceful justification for a coup. Thus, the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek 
Cypriot part of the island deprived them of necessary public support. While Gen. Özkök 
resisted the coup from the start, it could not be realized due to the subsequent emergence 
of divergent opinions between the four commanders (Navy, Land, Air and 
Gendarmerie).While explaining in his diary the coup plans, Örnek also describes 
outgoing President Ahmet Necdet Sezer as a man supporting the commanders' views in 
their efforts to do something against the AK Party, Nokta magazine said. Former Land 
Forces Commander retired Gen. Aytaç Yalman has also accused Gen. Özkök of being 
timid and someone incapable of doing anything. Örnek briefly mentions the second coup 
attempt, codenamed Ayığışı. This coup attempt, or memorandum, was later planned by 
now retired Gen. Eruygur alone when all the other top commanders had withdrawn from 
the plan. Due to its limited character, Ayışığı also failed to be staged. 
Akca and Balta-Peker argue that the coup attempts failed to come to fruition for 
several reasons. One of them was that the military was hoping the Annan Plan of 2004 to 
be put into effect in Cyprus, which would have created a legitimate pretext for the 
military to step in arguing that the territorial unity of Turkey was compromised. Because 
the plan was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots, it was not put into practice, 
                                                 




which ceased the hopes of the military. 654 Diaries of the then Naval Admiral Ozden 
Ornek, revealed that although the then president Ahmet Sezer, a staunch Kemalist, 
supported the views of the land, navy and air force generals, the opposition of then chief 
of staff  Hilmi Ozkok (2002-2006) was one of the biggest reasons for the coups to fail. 655  
Furthermore, the coups failed because unlike the previous military interventions, 
the generals were not able to gather the support of the big businesses and media tycoons, 
who were sensitive to political and financial instability in Turkey. Also, Turkey was 
enjoying a great deal of recognition in the west due to democratization reforms. The 
generals, therefore, lacked external support too. To sum up, the political and economic 
reforms that the AKP undertook in the first years of governance resulted in the 
diminishing support of the general public for the military. 656  
The very fact that the AKP government was not strong enough to penetrate into 
state institutions had the members take a low profile vis-à-vis the military. This stance as 
well as deceleration of the EU reforms and remilitarization of the PKK problem paved 
the way for the generals to strike back against the AKP government.657 The Turkish 
military was relentless in its quest to prevent the AKP from fully controlling the state. 
The following section focuses on the civilian-military relations and their implications 
leading to the presidential elections of 2007, which marked the final battle between the 
military and AKP, which resulted in the AKP’s consolidation of power against the 
foundations of the Kemalist status quo. 
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7.5.1.3 The Military Strikes Back 
Upon the rejection of the EU constitution in France (May 29, 2005) and the 
Netherlands (June 1, 2005) and the increasing tendency among the European Union 
representatives for a “privileged membership for Turkey” rather than a full membership, 
as well as the overt opposition of the Christian Democratic Union, the Christian Social 
Union, and the Left parties against Turkey’s membership began to create “Eurofatigue” 
in Turkey.658 
The diminishing Euro-excitement among the Turks and unfavorable atmosphere 
of the EU-Turkish relations meant that the AKP’s most important weapon against the 
military tutelage was getting weaker. On April 20, 2005, the chief of staff Hilmi Ozkok 
spoke at the War Academy in Istanbul drawing attention to the increasing PKK violence 
and the European Union. He blamed the EU for the PKK activities as the terror 
organization has found safe haven in different countries in Europe. He added that “it will 
not be the end of the world if Turkey stays out of EU. 659  
The remilitarization of the PKK problem in southeastern Turkey began to increase 
especially in late 2005 and early 2006. The bomb attack at a local book store in Semdinli 
showed that the perpetrators were members of the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Fight 
against Terrorism (JİTEM), while the other was a PKK informant.660 In a bold move, the 
chief prosecutor of the Van Province Ferhat Sarikaya drafted an indictment for those 
members of the Turkish Armed Forces involved in the attack. 
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However, the general chief of staff Hilmi Ozkok reportedly asked the then prime 
minister Erdogan to take measures to prevent this indictment attempt from  
materializing. 661  
The disappearing pro-European sentiment allowed the military to press the 
government in regards to the PKK problem. According to this, the AKP government 
amended the Law on the Fight against Terrorism (Act No. 3713), which had previously 
been created in 1991. The amendment broadened the definition of terror related crimes 
and toughened the penalties.662 Inadvertently, the freedom of expression, the press and 
the media was affected negatively in this process. 663  
Between 2002 and 2005 the TAF gave concessions to the AKP government but 
the setbacks in the EU process had the military charge back. This opened up more space 
for the military to maneuver against the government. 664 
Umit Cizre states that the military strategy that started on the February 28 process 
deepened in 2005. According to this, the military’s strategy shifted from a “state-centered 
strategy to establish hegemony to a more de-centered, individual-based and informal 
practice of power in society.” 665  That is to say, the failed coup attempts of the 2002-
2005 era was replaced by a more informal means of pressuring the government. This 
included public pronouncements by the TAF representatives, public commutations at 
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universities or graduations of military academies. These venues were used by the military 
representatives to give message to the government and incite the public against it. 666  
The appointment of a secular hardliner Yasar Buyukanit to the general chief of 
staff in August 2006 reinforced the military’s role to be ‘the guardian of secular state’. As 
reminiscent of the process that led to the February 28 process, the headscarf issue began 
to be a hot topic in Turkey. Part of the new strategy, under the TAF leadership, a secular 
public front was established. This front included the representatives of the Kemalish 
establishment, namely CHP, certain NGOs, presidents and deans of the higher education 
institutions, and print and visual press. According to Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, this 
coalition presented “the Islamic headscarf as a sign of the hidden agenda of the AKP. The 
implication here is that the AKP will eventually replace the secular republican regime 
with an Islamic one.”667 
The friction between the government and the military reached its peak before the 
presidential elections in 2007. The military perceived the AKP’s presidential candidate 
Abdullah Gul, one of the prominent founders of AKP and then minister of foreign affairs, 
to be a threat to the secular/Kemalist state and embarked on blocking him. The then chief 
of staff Buyukanit at a press conference on April 12, 2007 warned that the presidential 
elections and the nature of the president was extremely important as the president is the 
commander in chief of the Turkish Armed Forces.668 He said: “I hope someone who is 
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genuinely dedicated to the fundamental values of the Republic, and the unitary structure 
of the state and democratic/secular aspect of state is going to be the next president.”669  
In what turned out to be one of the largest displays of public opinion in Turkey, 
the secular front under the leadership of Ataturkist (Kemalist) Ideology Association 
(Ataturkcu Dusunce Dernegi) and retired general Sener Eruygur staged demonstrations in 
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other cities of Turkey in defiance to the AKP government 
and its candidate Abdullah Gul. The main message that the hundreds of thousands of 
demonstrators wanted to give was “Turkey is secular and will remain so!” As the 
demonstrations were raging, the chief of staff of the Turkish Military posted on April 27, 
2007, a statement on the military’s website, which then was known to be the “e-coup” 
attempt. 670 
The General Chief of Staff statement was as follows: 
Press Release 
It has been observed that there is a part of society that is in an ongoing struggle 
to undermine the basic values of the Turkish Republic, secularism being at the forefront, 
and those activities have increased in the recent period. The following ongoing activities 
have been submitted to the relevant authorities under suitable conditions: the desire to 
redefine basic values, and a wide range of activities, which extend as far as to arrange 
alternative celebrations of our national holiday, which is a symbol of our nation’s 
coherence, the independence of our state and our nation’s unity. 
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Those that attempt to carry out these activities exploit the sacred religious 
emotions of our people without shame, transformed into an open challenge to the 
government in the guise of religion, in an attempt to conceal their actual purpose. By 
bringing activities that draw attention to women and children, these actions resemble 
those that attempt to destroy the unity and integrity of our country.  
 In this context;  
In Ankara, a Koran reading contest was scheduled on the same day as the April 
23 National Sovereignty and Children’s Day celebrations, but the contest was cancelled 
due to a sensitive media and public pressure. 
On April 22, 2007 in Şanlıurfa with the participation of groups from the districts 
of Mardin, Gaziantep and Diyarbakır, a choir was created and young girls were forced 
to sing religious refrains at a time when they should have been in bed and in old-
fashioned costumes not suitable for their age. Additionally, the attempts to remove 
pictures of Atatürk and the Turkish flag in the middle of the night revealed the true intent 
and purpose of the organization of such activities. 
Furthermore, all school principals in the district of Altındağ in Ankara were 
ordered to participate in the “Holy Birth Celebration”; at an event organized by the 
District Mufti of Denizli with the cooperation of a political party, elementary students 
sang religious refrains with their heads covered; in spite of having four mosques in the 
town of Nikfer, in the county of Tavas ijcrb.webs.com in Denizli, Atatürk Elementary 
School women were forced to listen to presentations about preaching and religion, and 




The National Ministry of Education has determined the events that will be 
celebrated in schools. However, it has been established that such celebrations were 
realized upon instructions that were not regulated in directives. Also, it has been 
observed that although the General Staff had informed the authorized institutions, no 
preventive measure had been taken. The fact that an important part of the related 
activities had been realized with the authorization and within the knowledge of civilian 
authorities, which should intervene to such events and prevent them makes the matter 
even graver. It is possible to further demonstrate more examples.  
Those that are anti-Republican, with no other purpose than to erode the basic 
characteristics of the state with this retrogressive approach, have expanded the scope of 
their activities over the past few days with the developments and discourse of the last few 
days with courage.  
The developments in our region reveal many examples, which might result from 
playing with religion and abusing beliefs for a political rhetoric and purpose from which 
lessons should be drawn. 
It is possible to observe in our country as well as in other countries that a 
political rhetoric or ideology, which is tried to be built on a sacred belief, suppresses the 
belief and turns out to something else. It can be argued that the event, which occurred in 
Malatya, is a stunning example of this. There is no doubt that the only condition for the 
State of the Republic of Turkey to live in peace and stability, as a modern democracy is to 
protect the essential characteristics of the State determined in our Constitution.  
As a matter of fact, such behaviors and implementations are totally in 




words but in deeds and reflecting this with acts” stated by the General Chief of Staff in a 
press conference held on the 12th of April, 2007 and they do violate the basic 
qualifications and provisions of the Constitution. 
In recent days, the outstanding problem in the Presidential elections has been the 
discussion of secularism. This situation is observed with concern by the Turkish Armed 
Forces. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces is not neutral in these 
discussions and is the absolute defender of secularism. Furthermore, the Turkish Armed 
Forces is definitely against the ongoing discussions and negative comments and would 
reveal its attitudes and behaviors clearly and transparently when necessary. No one 
should ever doubt about it.  
Briefly, whoever is against the philosophy of the Great Leader Atatürk ”How 
happy is he who says I am a Turk” is the enemy of the Republic of Turkey and so will he 
stay. The Turkish Armed Forces still maintains its firm determination to fully carry out its 
clear duties assigned to it with laws in order to protect these qualifications and its 
commitment and faith in this determination are absolute”. Announced with respect to the 
public.” (General Chief of Staff, April 27, 2007)671 
The defiant proclamation of the military was met with an even harsher statement 
by the government, which was swift in doing so. The next day on April 28, the AKP 
government released the following: 
"Yesterday a declaration expressing the opinions of the General Staff on various 
subjects has been served to media organs at midnight and has been published in the 
website of the General Staff. This declaration has been perceived as a clear attitude 
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against the Government. There is no doubt that in a democratic environment, even 
thinking about this is unaccustomed. We would like to express that, the fact that the 
General Staff which is an institution associated to the Prime Minister uses an expression 
against the Government in any subject is unthinkable in a democratic State of law. The 
General Staff is an institution under the command of the Government, the functions of 
which are determined with the Constitution and the related laws. According to our 
Constitution, the General Chief of Staff is accountable to the Prime Minister regarding 
its duties and authorities. The fact that this text has been served to media organs and its 
timing in the website are meaningful. First of all, it is extremely remarkable that such a 
text comes out in the process of the presidential election of the 11th president which is the 
supreme authority of our State and, moreover, in the middle of the night. That this fact 
happens in this fragile period when discussions are ongoing on the Constitutional Court 
would be perceived as an attempt aimed at influencing the supreme justice. It should be 
clear to everyone that our Government is more supporting and fragile than anyone else 
in what concerns the principal and indispensable common values indicated in articles 1, 
2 and 3 of the Constitution, the unity and integrity of our country, the notability of our 
nation and the qualifications of Turkey as a secular, democratic and social State of law. 
Turkey’s national unity and integrity and the welfare of the Turkish Nation is possible 
with the protection of those values.  
It is not possible to approve any behaviors and acts that are revealed from time to 
time by real and legal persons against the basic qualifications of our Republic, the 
Constitution as well as the laws. Anyway, in such situations, starting from the public 




investigations without taking any permit from anyone. Doing the necessary in these 
matters is their duty. 
Furthermore, it is out of question that our government and the associated units 
remain insensitive to the implementations that are declared by media organs or are 
expressed in various environments and are in contradiction with the basic values of our 
State. 
Therefore, it has been very regrettable that certain statements regarding the 
relations between the Government and the General Staff which are very inaccurate took 
place in the related text. 
For the healthy functioning of the process aimed at strengthening Turkey, 
modernizing it and increasing its democratic standards, it is compulsory that all the basic 
institutions of our State be more prudent and attentive on these subjects Otherwise 
unrecoverable damages would have been given to the strengthening of our State, the 
peace and wealth of our country. The primary duty regarding the protection of the basic 
values of the State belongs to the Government. Since the Government is 
uncompromisingly a supporter of this subject, the fact that all the institutions associated 
to the Government be also supporting in this direction is after all natural.  
Each problem of Turkey would be resolved within the rules of law and 
democracy. An adverse thought and attitude shall on no account be accepted. The 
mission that everybody and each institution shall fulfill is to ease the functioning of this 
process. The damage given to our country and our nation by being in other searches has 




Our government is firmly committed to further strengthen our Republic, which is 
a democratic, secular and social State of law and to prevent our democracy from being 
damaged. Our Republic and democracy is an irrevocable, unalienable acquisition. Today 
we should struggle to find out how we can walk stronger to the future in harmony and 
cooperation to protect the basic qualifications of our State.  
Instead of consuming our energy with internal discussions, we should struggle in 
order to further strengthen our country in global competition and increase the wealth 
and happiness of our nation. In this context, we should defeat the efforts of some 
malicious persons to put the Turkish Armed Forces against our Government.  
All the persons having a sense of responsibility should avoid behaviors that 
damage the respectability of Turkey in the international community, harm our position in 
the modern world, threat the stability of the Turkish economy, are against democracy and 
inflict a deep wound in the Turkish conscience. Those who harm trust and stability should 
know that they would carry the responsibility of the negative results this would generate 
for our country and our nation.”672 
7.5.2 The Attempts to Close down AKP 
Having felt defeated but still relentless, the Kemalist state machine continued to 
resort to every bit of remaining means to contain the AKP. Like its predecessor the WP, it 
was going to be the “anti-secular” argument that was going to be put forth against 
Erdogan and his teammates in an attempt to remove the party from the government. That 
the new president appointed conservative leaning, pro-AKP Professor Yusuf Ziya Ozcan 
as the head of the Higher Education Board, one of the fundamental institutions that the 
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pro-seculars deem important, created uproar among the Kemalists. What really triggered 
the Supreme Court to initiate the process to close down the AKP was the headscarf issue. 
On February 9, 2007, the motion that AKP proposed to amend the head scarf ban 
in public spaces, including universities was overwhelmingly (411 yes - 149 no) passed in 
the Parliament. The president Gul ratified the amendments immediately. In February 
2008, the opposition parties CHP and DSP filed suit in the Constitutional Court to block 
the headscarf law. On March 14, the chief prosecutor of the Court of Appeals asked that 
the Constitutional Court ban the AKP and 71 members, including Erdogan and Gul, be 
banned from practicing politics. The pretext was that the party had become “focal point 
of anti-secular activities.”673 AKP argued that the move was to expand freedom and 
democratization in society. 
The prosecutor did not seek indictment for the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), 
which had joined with the AKP to form a supermajority to pass the headscarf legislation. 
The seven of eleven votes of the Constitutional Court was needed to impose the 
maximum penalty on AKP. On July 30, the AKP literally escaped from being closed 
narrowly when six members of the Constitutional Court voted to ban the party. Still, the 
AKP was given financial penalties, which was better than facing the same fate as the 
Welfare Party. No AKP members were banned. 674 
Carol Migdalovitz argues that the reason why the members of the Constitutional 
Court refrained from closing the party altogether was that there was a great concern in the 
political and financial circles that the shutdown would create instability worse than the 
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2001 crisis. Furthermore, it would mean a blow to Turkey’s struggle to become an EU 
member. 675 
AKP reaffirmed its commitment to EU membership even stronger after the legal 
battle was over. President Gul asked for more empathy and common sense saying “in 
looking at our own errors, we at the same time have to place ourselves in the position of 
those opposed to us and try to understand the thinking and feelings of those 
 against us” 676 
In the following section, I will examine those institutions and mechanisms of 
tutelage, which were put in place by the Kemalist establishment and the interaction of the 
AKP with them. They are; the Higher Education Council (YOK) and the president’s 
authority to appoint university presidents, the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors 
(HSYK), the General Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Analyzing AKP’s 
interaction with these institutions is important because the nature of relation will 
determine to what extent the AKP wanted to change the current Kemalist paradigm in 
Turkey. These intuitions are the “engines” and the protectors of the Kemalist ideology. 
7.6 AKP Takes on the Kemalist Bureaucracy 
While it was perceived that the Turkish military constituted the biggest obstacle in 
realizing its agenda, the other Kemalist institutions also became the target of the AKP as 
the state functioned as a whole, supporting each other, to protect and perpetuate the 
Kemalist tutelage and principles. The following will be an in depth examination of how 
the AKP gradually eliminated the dominance of Kemalism from the Higher Education 
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Council (YOK) and The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), the two 
important institutions that steer the higher education and the legal matters.   
7.6.1 Higher Education Council (YOK) and the Education System in Turkey 
The YOK has drawn much criticism since it was established by the military in 
1981 on the grounds that it prevents the academic freedom. It was devised to centralize 
and to hold the universities and higher education intuitions under the state control. It has 
the authority to appoint, promote academic administrative staff in higher education. 
Therefore, the YOK was one of the most important tools of the establishment to dictate 
its ideology.677 
The AKP opposed the YOK on the grounds that the institution had ultra-secular 
tendencies imposing the headscarf ban citing the freedom of religion. The AKP also 
criticizes the pro-Kemalist president Ahmet Nejdet Sezer for appointing like-minded 
rectors to universities. 678 
The first battleground between the secular establishment and the government was 
the YOK Legislation Proposal (YOK Tasarisi). The AKP justified this proposal citing the 
EU reforms. According to this the EU argued that: “… under YOK’s control the 
universities lack academic, administrative and financial autonomy. YOK has been 
accused over the years of being an authoritarian institution that has satisfied Turkish 
thought and interfered excessively in university life. Acknowledging such criticism, Isa 
Esme, deputy head of the YOK, said the institution today wanted to hand more autonomy 
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back to the universities, adding that an over-centralized structure was hampering 
initiative and change.”679   
Although the AKP had criticized the YOK establishment and its policies in higher 
education, it never attempted to completely abolish it and grant universities considerable 
academic freedom. One criticism that has been directed to AKP is that it is doing exactly 
what the Kemalist establishment did; using YOK in favor of the respective ideology. 680 
The election of Abdulah Gul as the president in 2007 virtually ensured the AKP 
control over YOK. During his tenure he sometimes chose not to appoint those 
academicians who were elected by their universities as the president of their respective 
institutions, the practice that the AKP had criticized when Ahmet Sezer was the President 
of Turkey. The AKP continued to erase the traces of the military tutelage in the education 
system by removing the mandatory national security classes from high schools. The 
national security classes used to be given by military officials. The classes were offered 
between 1926 and 2012. 681  
Furthermore, one of the iconic elements of the military tutelage, the massive 
stadium-commemorative rituals and ceremonies of important dates such as May 19- the 
Youth and Ataturk Holiday, were ended by the government decree. These rituals were 
criticized for being reminiscent of their former communist counterparts. Then Minister of 
Education Omer Dincer claimed that the reason behind the abolishing these rituals and 
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ceremonies was the financial burden although it was evident that it was one more step to 
civilianize the society. 682 
The head of the Union of United Educators of Bursa Province Numan Seker 
stated that the decision to end the ceremonies was a right decision since it would take 
more than a month for the students to prepare for it and it would be detrimental to the 
academic success of those students who participate in it. 683  The CHP and secular circles 
criticized the decision and blamed the AKP for eradicating the heroic sentiments from the 
Turkish people. 684  
7.6.2 The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) 
The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) is one of the most 
important institutions that contributed to the perpetuation of the Kemalist status quo by 
imposing and protecting Kemalist principles via the judicial system. Mustafa Akyol 
states; “the high judiciary was designed to work in a system of “co-option,” where jurists 
with similar views appointed each other to powerful seats.” 685  
Given the history of the Kemalist judiciary engaging in pro-Islamist parties, and 
the narrow escape of AKP of being closed down in 2008, the AKP began to restructure 
HSKY in 2010. The key moment for the AKP came when the constitutional amendments 
were put to referendum in October 2010. Before the referendum, the structure of HSKY 
had been determined by a regular system of appointees from other judicial bodies, such 
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as the Council of State or the High Court of Appeals. Not to mention, the members of 
these influential judicial bodies were predominantly of Kemalist worldview. The 
referendum was accepted by the Turkish people by 58%.686 
As a result of the referendum, HSKY was made to be more representative, 
increasing the number of members from seven to twenty two. Four of them are now 
appointed by the president, six chosen by other judicial bodies and ten are elected by 
some 12000 judges and prosecutors from all provinces of Turkey. The Justice Ministry 
fills the remaining two seats. 687 
While the Kemalist autocracy over the judiciary had been criticized for preventing 
fundamental freedoms, Senem Aydin Duzgit contends, what was about to happen is the 
“the replacement of one form of ideological favoritism with simply another that rests on 
the power of the executive.”688 
Like it was with YOK, the AKP was criticized for not making the HSYK an 
independent and executive body by retaining the Ministry of Justice in the board. This is 
a clear indication that AKP intended to control the judicial body by appointing the board 
members from likeminded judges and prosecutors.689 To sum up, the AKP has now the 
control of the highest judicial bodies in great part due to Erdogan’s “inclination to think 
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that a party enjoying a parliamentary majority should reign unconstrained other 
institutions.” 690 
7.7 The 2007 Onward: The AKP Consolidates Its Power; the Ruling Phase 
The main issues that dominated the 2007 general elections were secularism, the 
military-civilian relations, and the presidential elections. The result was the decisive AKP 
victory. The AKP secured 62% of the seats in the parliamentary. The party came stronger 
out of the elections. With this confidence, the AKP re-nominated Abdullah Gul as the 
presidential candidate. 691 The election of Abdullah Gul as the president meant that the 
last prominent Kemalist institutions, the executive body, was now occupied by someone 
from the AKP and finalized the party’s attempt to eliminate the Kemalist dominance. 
Akca and Balta-Peker summarize this process as following: “The success of the 
AKP in parliamentary and presidential elections signified a turning point, firstly in civil-
military relations by eroding the power and credibility of the Turkish military, and 
secondly on the Kurdish question. Between 2002 and 2007, the AKP government had 
been able to penetrate—albeit limitedly—the judiciary and begin to exert a more 
extensive influence over the police. During the new period, this increasing control over 
the police and judiciary would become crucial as the AKP began to launch an offensive 
against the military based on the evidence of military-inspired plots to overthrow the 
government.”692  
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7.7.1 The Ergenekon Trials 
The electoral victory and the election of Gul as the president gave impetus to 
AKP to stage the final blow on the military, which came in a series of trials that were 
then called “Ergenekon”. In these, numerous military figures were put in jail, which 
marked the victory of AKP over the military. 
The uncovering of certain arms and documents in Istanbul set the stage for the 
Ergenekon Trials which became the biggest legal onslaught against the Kemalist 
establishment. On October 20, 2008, the trial began and continued with the arrest of high 
ranking retired military officers, journalists, lawyers and businessmen. They were 
charged with “membership of an armed terrorist group, aiding and abet-ting an armed 
terrorist organization, attempting to destroy the government of the Republic of Turkey or 
to block it from performing its duties, inciting people to rebel against the Republic of 
Turkey, being in possession of explosives, using them, and inciting others to commit 
these crimes, acquiring secret documents on national security.” 693 
The charges against the defendants covered the alleged illegal military actions 
during the PKK conflict in 1990s, the February 28 process and finally the 2003-2003 
coup attempts against the AKP. 
The Ergenekon process yielded in the emergence of such coup plots as 
the Kafes Eylem Planı (Cage Action Plan)694 (March 2009), İrtica ile Mücadele Eylem 
Planı (Action Plan to Fight Religious Fundamentalism) (dated April 2009), and claims 
about an assassination plan against a leading figure of the AKP, Bülent Arınç. 695 Twenty 
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military officers including the retired heads of land, navy and air force were formally 
charged with creating a chaos atmosphere and eventually overthrowing the government 
in what is called the Sledgehammer (Balyoz) coup plot.696  
This process surely created tension between the military and the government, 
which peaked at the August 2010 session of the Supreme Military Council meeting, the 
government vetoed the promotions of eleven generals on the grounds that they were part 
of the alleged military coup attempts. This was a first in the history of Turkey not only 
for the first time a civilian government intervened in the military promotions, which 
traditionally were handled by the military upper echelon only, but also it was a bold 
defiant move from a civilian government to attempt the alter the organizational structure 
of the Turkish military.697 
For example, the 1st Army Commander Hasan Igsiz, who would have been 
promoted to the land forces commander, was declined by the Prime Minister Erdogan and 
President Gul. Therefore, on the contrary to the normal process, the YAS did not 
announce the promotions on the fourth day of meeting. Gul and Erdogan retained their 
approval of the chief of staff until the commander to the land forces was determined. 
Atilla Isik, who was the head of the Gendarmerie Forces Atilla Isik was slated to be the 
chief of the land forces, who by tradition becomes the chief of staff of the armed forces. 
The government declined his appointment to which he reacted by resigning. Necded 
Ozel, who is known to be in good terms with the government, then became the next chief 
of staff of the armed forces. 698 
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Migdalovitz asserts that the Ergenekon trials and prosecutions intimidated the 
military and thus the military reluctantly accepted the civilian dominance. Furthermore, 
increasing popular disapproval for a military intervention virtually removed the hopes of 
certain circles for the overthrow of government by the TAF.699   
The last phase of the civilian dominance and the waning of the military influence 
was the abolishment of the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order 
(EMASYA), a February 28 Process byproduct, which granted the military the right to 
intervene unilaterally in domestic events. This was the end of the February 28 process.700 
7.8 The Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP 
The next part examines the foreign policy understanding of the AKP as well as 
the implementation of it referring to cases. The fundamentals of the Turkish foreign 
policy under the AKP predominantly were determined by Ahmet Davutoglu, who is an 
academician as well as served as the minister of foreign affairs and now is the prime 
minister of Turkey.  
7.8.1 Neo-Ottomanism Revisited: The Davutoglu Factor and Strategic Depth 
As discussed early in this chapter, a new reality and new elites emerged in Turkey 
in the last decade. The public participation in governance and foreign policy has resulted 
in the advent of a new stream of ideas in Turkish politics. Perhaps the most important 
embodiment of this new reality in foreign policy is Ahmet Davutoglu, the architect of the 
Turkish foreign policy under the AKP.701 Therefore, it is vital to analyze the 
fundamentals of the new Turkish foreign policy and Davutoglu. 
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The “strategic depth” concept, also the title of his influential book, is one of the 
most important aspects of the Davutoglu Doctrine. He posits that the strategic depth 
possesses geographical and historical characteristics. The historical aspect of it is 
characterized by the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, spanned for six hundred years, and 
the areas to which the Ottoman influence was extended (the Balkans, the Middle East and 
North Africa and the Caucasus) makes up of the geographical aspect of the doctrine. 
Davutoglu argues that Turkey, being the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, has the 
opportunity to harness this unique position through diplomacy and trade. He also 
suggests that Turkey’s historical and cultural commonalities grants it a geo-economic 
influence. Therefore, Turkey is a “central country” historically, politically and 
economically702 and has geographical and historical dept. 
Davutoğlu states; “In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a 
large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central 
country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. 
Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or 
culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition 
lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it 
controls an area of influence in its immediate environs.” 703 
The strategic depth that Turkey possesses has granted Turkey with excellent 
opportunities not only regionally but globally and this is possible if Turkey is willing to 
pursue a more proactive foreign policy. 704  
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Due to Turkey’s geo-cultural central position, according to Davutoglu, the 
country cannot afford to pursue a passive, defensive foreign policy. Thus, Turkey must be 
proactive in shaping its neighborhood in order to ensure security and prosperity at home 
and in the region. 705 Davutoğlu’s creation, to Graham Fuller, was “the most systematic, 
substantial, and comprehensive vision of Turkey’s strategic position yet written. It is 
based on a sophisticated and complex reading of history, political cultures, geography, 
geopolitics, global balances and national interests.” 706 
Finally, Omer Taspinar states that there are basically three factors that define the 
neo-Ottoman tendencies of the AKP. The first is the willingness to come to terms with 
Turkey’s Ottoman heritage at home and abroad. Neo-Ottomanism does not seek to re-
create the Ottoman Empire with territorial ambitions in the Middle East and beyond. It 
favors a more activist policy in foreign affairs, particularly in terms of a willingness to 
mediate conflicts. In this neo-Ottoman paradigm, Ankara exerts more “soft power” (i.e. 
political, economic, diplomatic and cultural influence) in former Ottoman territories and 
in other regions where Turkey has strategic interests. This broad vision for Turkish 
foreign policy requires an embrace of Ottoman multicultural legacy.707 
It is important to note that neo-Ottomanism denotes a change in the mindset of 
traditional Turkish policy making. Since the Ottoman Empire pursued a more tolerant 
policy towards ethnic and religious minorities, neo-Ottomanism promotes 
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multiculturalism and plurality. The starkest implementation of this idea can be seen in the 
way the AKP government has handled the Kurdish issue. As long as the Kurds remain 
loyal to the existence of the republic, they have been granted their cultural, political 
rights. Unlike the Kemalist approach, which has aimed to assimilate Kurds into Turkish 
identity, neo-Ottomanism, both under Ozal and AKP government, has accommodated 
Turkey’s Kurds.708 
The second characteristic of the neo-Ottomanist approach is the sense of self 
confidence and grandeur, which is derived from the Ottoman past. As opposed to the 
Kemalist isolation, passivity and paranoia of being surrounded by enemies, neo-
Ottomanism sees Turkey as capable and self-confident regional power. Turkey is a 
pivotal and central state that has to play an important political, economic and cultural role 
in the world. This ambitious undertaking requires Turkey to be at peace with its past. 709   
He repeats that Turkey ought not to remain a bridge country but rather a central 
one. He defines self-confidence by “not being ashamed of its Eastern identity while 
embracing the high standards of the West. The source of Turkey’s self-confidence is 
derived from its centuries’ long relationship with both the west and the east. 710 He states 
that Turkey no longer should wastes its energy by the view that the state sees its own 
people as danger. Turkey has become self-confident enough, to Davutoglu, that 
fundamental freedoms are no longer the source of paranoia and fear. This will strengthen 
Turkey in its region and in the world. 711  
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The third is that the neo-Ottomanism accepts the West as much as it does the 
Islamic world. According to this, per its history, Turkey belongs to both worlds. Like the 
imperial capital Istanbul, it spans on both Europe and Asia and is “Janus-faced”.712 
The official AKP foreign policy in the party program reflects the aspects of the 
Davutoglu doctrine. According to this;713 
-The geopolitical situation of Turkey has the potential to create an attraction zone 
for many cooperation projects. The ability to convert this potential into a regional and 
global effectiveness depends on the logical use of the geopolitics in international 
political, economic and security relations. 
-On the other hand, the dynamic circumstances brought about by the post-cold 
war period have created a suitable environment for developing a foreign policy with 
several alternatives. The particularity of military alliances and blocks to become the 
determinant elements of international relations has been greatly reduced, and 
cooperation projects have become a common tool of relations between States. In this new 
environment Turkey must also rearrange and create its relations with centers of power 
with alternatives, flexibly and with many axis. 
-Our Party shall follow a realistic foreign policy befitting the history and 
geographical position of Turkey, free from prejudices and obsessions, based on mutuality 
of interests. Turkey, which is respectful of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
other countries, deems it its right for other nations and international agencies to respect 
its territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
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-Against changing regional and global realities, our Party believes that Turkey 
must redefine its foreign policy priorities and create a balance between these realities 
and its national interests. 
This can be seen Turkey’s staunch commitment to the EU membership under the 
AKP administration. Turkey has continued to take active part in NATO, attributing 
importance to its relations with the United States. 
The AKP party program reflects the multi-dimensional foreign policy. It is stated 
that: In addition to the traditional Atlantic and European dimensions of the Turkish 
foreign policy, efforts shall be maintained to develop a policy with a Eurasian axis 
should also be. In this sense efforts will be made to reinforce the cooperation in the 
framework of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). In this regards, the 
importance of relations with Russia and China are also emphasized.714 
The strategic depth places a great deal of emphasize on the ummah, Muslim 
solidarity in the world although there is a sense of national pride that Turkish Muslims 
are destined to be the leader of the Muslim world and lead them to the high standard of 
living and modernity. 
This ambition can be seen in the “vision of 2023”715 centennial year of the 
Republic by which time the AKP officers aspires Turkey to be one of the top ten most 
important countries politically and economically.  Davutoglu said: “Turkey could become 
a union of nations just like Britain’s union with its former colonies,” he reported the 
foreign minister as saying. “Britain has a commonwealth with its former colonies, he 
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reminded me. Why shouldn’t Turkey rebuild its leadership in former Ottoman lands in the 
Balkans, Middle East and Central Asia?”716 
Davutoglu has criticized the nation-state concept in Turkey, which he believes is 
one of the main reasons for it to fail to reach its full potential. He criticizes the Kemalist 
detachment from the Ottoman past, Islam and the Middle East. He believes that "a major 
reason for Turkey's relative isolation from its neighborhood had to do with the 
framework that dominated the mindset of Turkish foreign-policy elites for decades -- a 
mindset that erected obstacles between Turkey and its neighbors physically, mentally, 
and politically." He goes on saying; “Turkey's reintegration to its environment is 
essential and this requires a substantial abandonment of the old foreign policy culture 
(the Kemalist).”717 
7.8.2 Davutoglu’s Policy Principles: A New Vision for Turkey  
In tandem with the Strategic Depth concept, Davutoglu puts forward three 
methodological and five operational and principles of foreign policy that he envisioned 
for Turkey. The methodological principles are; 
• “Visionary" approach to the issues instead of the "crisis-oriented". 
• To base Turkish foreign policy on a "consistent and systematic" framework 
around the world. 
• The adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, which has resulted in the 
spread of Turkish soft power in the region. 
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The operational principles are;  
• The balance between security and democracy.  
• Zero problems towards neighbors. 
• Proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy.  
• Multi-dimensional foreign policy. 
• Rhythmic diplomacy. 718 
In addition to these principles, Davutoglu mentions about Turkey’s need for self-
confident foreign policy as well as devising policies autonomously, about which he said; 
“We do not receive instructions from any other powers, nor are we part of others’ grand 
schemes. In particular, our policies towards neighbors are devised with careful 
consideration of our own evaluation of the situation. As has been the case so far, we will 
continue to coordinate our policies with those of our Western partners as we see fit, but 
will never let such partnership negatively affect our relations with neighbors.”719 
In the following part, I will try to explain these principles referring to actual 
foreign policy implementations under the AKP government. 
7.8.2.1 Balance between Security and Democracy 
First, in a post September 11 environment, he asserts, it is important to establish a 
fine balance between security and freedom for the sake of democracy. He emphasizes 
that Turkey was one of the few countries that had established this balance. Davutoglu 
states; 
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“In pursuit of our global objectives, we will endeavor to listen to the 
consciousness and common sense of humanity, and become a firm defender of universal 
values. While embracing these universal principles, we will enmesh them with local 
values; and advocate, in particular, human rights and such norms as democracy, good 
governance, transparency and rule of law. We will extend our assistance to the people 
who rise up to demand such values because given our belief in the principles of justice 
and equality, we are convinced that they also deserve to have the same rights and 
privileges enjoyed by our own people. As its region experiences democratization, Turkey 
will continue its quest to maintain a balance between promoting democratic values and 
defending national interests.”720 
Despite severe criticism from the Kemalist circles, the AKP initiated what is 
called the “Kurdish Opening”, which aims to resolve the PKK problem. One of the 
historical moments in this regard came in Diyarbakir in August 2005. He emphasized that 
common religious bonds and democratic values are the key in the solution of the 
problem.721  Prime Minister Erdogan stated: “The sun heats everybody and the rain is 
God’s grace for everybody. Thus I address those asking, ‘What will happen to the 
Kurdish problem?’ The Kurdish problem is my problem…. We will solve all problems 
through democracy.”722  
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Furthermore, emphasizing the importance of establishing a balance between 
security and freedom Erdogan said “no stepping back from the Copenhagen criteria in 
the fight against terror”723   
7.8.3 Zero Problem with Neighbors 
One of Davutoglu’s most important theoretical foreign policy approaches is the 
“Zero Problem with Neighbors” concept. According to this, Turkey must abolish the 
paranoia that it is surrounded by enemies and end subsequent security oriented 
policies.724 Davutoglu posits that it is important for Turkey to reintegrate with its 
neighbors in order to achieve a regional power status. He goes; “While Turkey goes 
through a domestic transformation and reform processes, Turkey also has embarked on 
the parallel undertaking of moving to consolidate ties to its region. One strength of our 
foreign policy, thus, is the ongoing process of reconnecting with the people in our region 
with whom we shared a common history and are poised to have a common destiny.”725  
This idea denotes a historical change in Ankara’s threat perception. Davutoglu 
notes that decades old chronic problems with once “problematic” neighbors such as 
Armenia and Cyprus began to be solved726 The AKP party manifesto included “While 
our country’s foreign policy used to be run on the basis of the assumption that Turkey is 
surrounded by enemies, we turned this imagination and psychology into the policy of 
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Zero Problems with the Neighbors. We are solving problems that were thought to be 
insoluble, formed friendships people thought could not be formed.”727 
In the following section, I will examine how the zero problem policy has been 
implemented by the AKP government. 
7.8.3.1 Normalization Efforts with Armenia 
Although Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the Republic of 
Armenia in 1991, the bilateral relations have been frozen when Armenian forces 
occupied the Nagarno Karabakh, which is recognized by the United Nations as Azeri soil. 
This incident also resulted in the closure of the Turkey-Armenia border. The worldwide 
political campaign of the Yerevan and the Armenian Diaspora for the events of 1915 to 
be recognized as “genocide” further strained the relations. The normalization efforts 
came by the signing of the Turkish-Armenian Protocols728 by Ahmet Davutoglu and 
Edward Nalbandian, on Oct. 11, 2009, in Zurich in the presence of US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and EU foreign affairs and 
security official Javier Solana.729 The protocols have been suspended due to the 
Constitutional Court of Armenia’s objection730 and the intense opposition of Armenian 
Diaspora as well as Ankara’a insistence that the normalization could only be possible 
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pending the solution to the Nagarno-Karabakh problem. Despite this setback, it is a 
historical step for the reconciliation between the two countries. 
7.8.3.2 Syria 
The Turco-Syrian rapprochement is another example to the Zero Problem policy. 
The relations with Syria hit bottom rock in 1998 when Ankara issued an ultimatum to 
Damascus to expel the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Damascus eventually expelled him 
in the same year.731 Although the relations began to normalize after 1998, they enjoyed 
their peak on December 22-23, 2009 when the Turkish-Syrian High Level Strategic 
Cooperation Council, or HSCC, was held in Damascus. According to this Turkey and 
Syria were to increase their cooperation in economic, political and security fields.732 As a 
result of the HSCC the trade volume between the two countries increased considerably. 
In September 2010, the two countries agreed to abolish visa requirements, enabling free 
roaming.733 In 2010, 750,000 Syrians entered Turkey while the number of Turks visiting 
Syria reached 1.35 million people.734 
7.8.3.3 The Cyprus Issue 
The Cyprus issue has been a very contentious issue in Turkish foreign policy. 
Turkey’s intervention in the civil strife to save the Turks from massacre by the EOKA 
militants resulted in the division of the island into north being Turkish south being Greek. 
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The Cyprus problem has been an obstacle for Turkey’s EU membership negotiations 
partially because of the Greek and Cypriot vetoes. The previous Turkish governments 
tended to pursue a statuesque preserving policy vis-à-vis Cyprus. The most serious 
attempts to solve the problem came with the AKP government. Due to the EU aspect of 
the issue, the AKP pursued an ambitious foreign policy in this regard. The impending 
accession of the Cyprus Republic in the EU in 2004 accelerated the Turkish efforts to 
facilitate a solution. The change began with abolition of the old aged rhetoric that 
“Turkey’s defense starts from Cyprus.” 735  
The AKP government started to support the unification of the island under a fair 
federal system as opposed to the previous governments in Ankara that promoted the two 
state solution.736 This deviation was clearly against the Kemalist policymakers’ 
perception of a solution to the Cyprus problem. 
One of the results of this abrupt policy change was that the Turkish Cypriot 
veteran politician Rauf Denktas, who always supported the independence and vehemently 
rejected any other solution and was considered to be the father of the self-proclaimed the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was “brushed aside” by the AKP 
government. 737  The AKP government perceived him outdated. In a bold move Erdogan 
declared on January 2, 2003 “I am not in favor of the continuation of the policy that has 
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been maintained in Cyprus over the past 30-40 years. We must produce solutions not 
obstacles. We will do whatever is required of us. This is not Denktas’ private matter.”738 
Among those who condemned Erdogan’s policies to alienate Denktas were the then 
president Ahmet Nejdet Sezer and the members of the People’s Republican Party, all of 
whom represent the Kemalist elite. 
Then came the peace plan prepared by the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
(also named as the Annan Plan). 739 The plan, which was supported by the AKP 
government, aimed at unifying the island on equal terms that both parties would be 
represented in government. To the dismay of the European Union, in the referendum the 
Greek Cypriots overwhelmingly rejected it by 75%, while the Turkish Cypriots supported 
it by 65%. 
Celenk states that the AKP’s support and willingness for the unification and the 
Annan Plan constituted a great contrast to the policies of the previous Turkish 
governments, who would have considered the move betrayal to the Turkish interests in 
the region. It is one of the many signs that the AKP has denounced the Kemalist foreign 
policy. 740 
7.8.3.4 Iran 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, Iran had been considered by the Kemalist 
state to be a great danger due to Tehran’s overt attempts to export its theocratic regime to 
Turkey. This threat perception was coupled with Iran’s nuclear program and its Shahab-3 
medium range ballistic missiles that would pose threat to Turkey’s populated areas. Until 
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2010, Iran was among the threats that were mentioned in the military’s Red Book. In that 
year Iran was removed from the perceived threats and even was praised for its 
cooperation against the PKK. 741 
In August 2007, Turkey and Iran signed an important energy agreement despite 
the sanctions on the latter. According to this, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) 
is now allowed to explore for oil and gas in the South Pars fields of Iran and deliver 
Iranian as well as Turkmen gas to Europe via Turkey, but also supply the Turkish 
market.742 
In January 2014, Turkey and Iran signed a comprehensive trade agreement, which 
aims the bilateral trade to reach to 30$ billion dollars by the end of 2015.743  
Finally, as part of the “zero problem with neighbors” policy, Greece, Iran and 
Russia were removed from the “Red Book”, which defines the threat perception. 
Whereas, in the 2005 Red Book, Greece's intention to extend its territorial waters from 
six to twelve miles was considered a casus belli. In the 2010 Red Book, a war with 
Greece in the Aegean region is deemed unlikely and the twelve-mile issue is no longer 
considered a casus belli. The new document also emphasizes the need for cooperation 
with Greece. Additionally, the rapprochement with Greece included high level of visits. 
Then Prime Minister Erdogan visited Greece on May 6, 2004, which was the first in 16 
years and the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis visited Turkey on January 23, 2008, 
which was first of its kind in 49 years.  
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Finally, Davutoglu’s zero problem policy has manifested itself in relations with 
Greece. Greece had been in the Red Book of threat perceptions until 2005 because of its 
intention to extend the territorial waters in the Aegean Sea to twelve miles from six, 
which was considered by Turkey casus belli. 744  The new foreign policy understanding 
under AKP places more emphasize on the mutual cooperation with Greece.745 The 
rapprochement with Turkey and Greece yielded high level visits. Then Prime Minister 
Erdogan visited Greece on May 6, 2004, first of its kind in 16 years and the Greek Prime 
Minister Karamanlis visited Turkey on January 23, 2008, which was first of its kind in 49 
years.746  
Jashua W. Walker argues that a spurned Turkey guided by its policy of “strategic 
depth” will not follow the typical Kemalist prescription of isolation, but could just as 
easily reach out to other important regional actors such as Iran and Russia to form a loose 
alignment.747 
7.8.4 Multi-Dimensional Foreign Policy  
Davutoglu’s third principle of foreign policy is multi-dimensional foreign policy. This, to 
Davutoglu, means that Turkey should pursue a foreign policy that is complementary, not 
competition. For example, according to this foreign policy principle, Turkey’s EU bid, its 
relations with Russia and strategic relations with the United States are all complimentary 
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and synchronized. That is to say, the relations with Russia cannot be considered as an 
alternative to the US. 748 
Talip Kucukcan and Mujge Kucukkeles argue that due to its geo strategic position 
in the Afro-Eurasian landmass, Turkey’s identity mandates that it synthesizes multiple 
civilizations. For example, as opposed to the Islamists worldview, such as that of 
Erbakan, Turkey cannot see the Islamic world as an alternative to the west, therefore 
cannot be anti-Western. Likewise, unlike the Kemalist worldview, the East cannot solely 
be an alternative to the West. 749 According to Davutoglu’s view of policy, Turkey’s 
distinctive identity is based on the blend of West and East, which means one cannot be 
forgone for the sake of the other. This requires a multi-dimensional foreign policy.750 
However, the rhetoric of some Turkish foreign policy makers occasionally 
reflected the opposite of this notion that created an “axis shift” argument. For example 
Erdogan said at a press conference with Vladimir Putin; 
“EU wants to forget us but it can’t. It is reluctant. We will be more comfortable if 
it says so. Instead of stalling us, let it say so and we will go our own way. … Of course, 
when this [EU] affair is not proceeding well, as the prime minister of 75 million you start 
looking around for alternatives. This is what I told Mr. Putin the other day, ‘Take us into 
Shanghai Five and we will forget the EU.’ Take us into Shanghai Five and we will say 
                                                 
748 Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s Zero-Problem Policy 
749 Talip Kucukcan and Mujge Kucukkeles, Understanding Turkish Foreign Policy, The New Turkey, May 
17, 2012 http://www.thenewturkey.org/understanding-turkish-foreign-policy/new-turkey/82  
750 Talip Kucukcan and Muge Kucukkeles, European Perception of Turkish Foreign Policy, SETA Policy 
Report, April 2012, Report No:10, p. 18, quoted from Bülent Aras, ‘‘Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign 






goodbye to EU and leave. What is the point of this stalling?... Shanghai Five is better, 
stronger.”751 
In fact, Turkey took concrete steps and applied to become a guest member of 
Shanghai Cooperation Organizaiton (SCO) in 2007, 2009 and 2010 only to be rejected.  
For example, the first application came in 2007 after EU suspended negotiations in 
December 2007 on the grounds that Turkey did not fulfill the requisites of the additional 
Protocol and the Greek and Cypriot vetoes.  On March 23, 2011, Turkey officially bid its 
“Dialogue Partnership Status” for the SCO.752  
At the annual summit in Beijing on June 7, 2012, the communiqué stated; “The 
member states note with satisfaction an increasing interest of the interational community 
in establishing contacts with the SCO and welcome the participation of the Republic of 
Turkey in the cooperation within the SCO framework as a dialogue partner.” 753 
However, the SCO members, especially Russia and China, have certain 
reservations regarding a NATO member’s observer status and future membership.754 
Last but not least, one of the most striking examples of Turkey’s active/multi-
dimensional foreign policy making can be seen in its relations with Latin American 
countries. While occasional visits were made to Latin America during the governments 
before AKP, it is during the AKP administration that real dynamism in relations could be 
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seen.  According to this, political consultation mechanisms have been established with 14 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, and Venezuela). An “Action Plan for Strategic 
Partnership” was signed with Brazil during the of-ficial visit of Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan to Brazil between May 25 and 29, 2010.755 
Inter-Parliamentary Friendship Groups for 12 Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Jamaican, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela) was founded in the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly, to enhance parliamentary relations with the countries of the region.756 
This dynamism vis-à-vis Latin America resulted in a considerable rise in the 
number of diplomatic representations.  Accordingly, Turkish Embassies in Bogota, 
Columbia nd Lima, Peru became oepraitonal in February 2010 and March 2010, 
increasing the number of the Turkish Embassies in the region to eight.  The Turkish 
Consulate General in Sao Paulo-Brazil was opened in November 2009.  Turkish Embassy 
in Quito, Ecuador was opened in 2012.  In turn, LAC counries have reciprocated by 
increasing their representations in Turkey. With the establishment of the Ecuadorian, 
Peruvian and Colombian Embassies in Ankara, the number of LAC resident Embassies in 
Turkey has reached nine. 757  Economic and Trade Cooperaiton agreements have been 
signed with Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Jamaica, Colombia, Cuba, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Chile, and Uruguay.  In addition to the Turkey-Brazil Business 
Council established in 2006, founding agreement of Turkey-Mexico Business Council 
                                                 







was signed on December 11, 2008.  The national oil company of Turkey TPAO/TPIC has 
become active in oil producing countries like Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.  
Furthermore, Brazilian oil companies PetroBras and TPAO/TPIC jointly carried out oil 
exploration projects in the Black Sea in 2010 and 2011. 758 
Brazil is especially important for Turkey and its most important partner in Latin 
America.  Prime Minister Erdogan attended the Third Forum of the alliance of 
Civilizations in May 2010, around the time when tripartite agreement between Iran-Brazil 
and Turkey on nuclear swap was signed. 759 
During that visit, the heads of governments signed the “Action Plan for Strategic 
Association” based on eight cooperation points: bilateral and multilateral political 
dialogue, commerce and investment, energy, biodiversity and environment, defense, 
security, science and technology and lastly education and culture.760 During his visit in 
May 2009, which was the first of its kind,761 President Lula da Silva attended multiple 
events, including the “Turkish Brazilian Economic Forum” and the opening of the 
“Centre of Latin American Studies” at Ankara University.762  Finally, Brazilian President 
Dilma Rousseff visited Turkey in October 2011 and “Strategic Perspective of a Dynamic 
Association Turkey-Brazil” joint declaration and bilateral cooperation agreements were 
signed.763 
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7.8.5 Proactive/Preemptive Peace Diplomacy 
By this, Davutoglu rejects Turkey’s long established “static” and “one-
dimensional” understanding of foreign policy given the dynamic environment in global 
affairs. The most important aspect of the proactive/ multi-dimensional foreign policy is 
Turkey’s active participation in preemption, prevention and resolution of conflicts, 
especially in its immediate surroundings. Davutoglu justifies this approach by citing the 
increasing divide between Transatlantic, Eurasian, Middle Eastern, North and South. 764 
In the AK Party era, proactive diplomacy has been accompanied by the concept of 
pre-emptive diplomacy. This type of diplomacy requires diplomatic, rather than military 
approach to problems. The most striking examples of this policy approach can be seen in 
                                                 




Turkey’s active involvement in the conflict resolution in the Palestine-Israel765, Syria-
Israel766, Iranian-Western and Bosnian-Serbian conflicts. This policy approach 
acknowledges the importance of nation states as well as non-state actors. 767 
To Davutoglu, Turkey must pursue and is pursuing "a multidimensional, 
proactive, constructive and forward looking foreign policy initiative aimed at 
complementarity rather than competition." It is Turkey’s "strategic location, economic 
performance ranking as the 17th largest global economy, historical background, 
geographical and cultural ties, stature as a reliable and trusted partner, insight to the 
issues and accumulated experience that give Turkey leverage to conduct such foreign 
policy." 768 
In line with the pre-emptive peace diplomacy the AKP government has also tried 
to play a mediator role, especially in the Middle East. Turkey tried to mediate between 
Israel and the Hamas. This policy is a new phase in Turkish foreign policy, considering 
Turkey had isolated itself from the region in previous eras. Clearly, Turkey’s mediator 
role deepened its good relations with the parties, however after 2006, the situation started 
to change after Hamas won the Palestinian election and the Israeli-Lebanon/Hezbollah 
war broke out. The biggest blow to Turkish mediation came during and after the 
Operation Cast Lead of 2008-2009. This ambitious policy approach is certainly a new 
concept. However, it was not free of unsuccessful attempts and drawbacks. For example, 
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the biggest blow to Turkey’s negotiator position came during and after the Operation 
Cast Lead in the winter of 2008-2009. The following section will examine Turkey’s 
peace diplomacy in the context of the Iranian’s nuclear program.  
Before 2002, Turkey’s official policy in this regards was wait and see, which is 
very typical of Kemalist approach. Although, the security elite in Turkey had at times 
voiced their concerns over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, they nevertheless, did not take a 
concrete step towards it. The advent of AKP in 2002 marked a noticeable difference in 
Turkey’s approach to the issue in that it displayed willingness not to be an observer to the 
issue but rather a facilitator and then a mediator.769 
In 2005, the Iranian issue became so tense that the talks of a joint American-
Israeli strike to Iran’s nuclear sites became louder. American journalist Seymon Hersh 
said about this immediate issue that; “What we are dealing with is a joint US-Israeli 
military operation to bomb Iran, which has been in the active planning stage for more 
than a year. The Neocons in the Defense Department, under Douglas Feith, have been 
working assiduously with their Israeli military and intelligence counterparts, carefully 
identifying targets inside Iran.”770 
Turkey’s main concern stemmed from the assumption that a military strike on 
Iran and its retaliation would greatly destabilize the region. 771 It is this point that Turkey 
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began to assert itself as a negotiator between Iran and the West. This would also help 
Turkey to relive the pressure that it had to choose either side. 772 
The Turkish mediation between the US and Iran began after Erdogan’s visit to 
Washington in December 2009.773 Turkey’s mediator position was accepted by U.S 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who welcomed it. Mohamed El-Baradei, then the 
IAEA director general, also asked for Turkey’s diplomatic support to convince Iran to 
restart the negotiations. Soon, Ankara began the shuttle diplomacy between Tehran and 
related capitals.774 However, the Turkish officials admitted having a difficult time in 
convincing their Iranian counterparts to participate in the negotiations. Namik Tan, then 
Turkish ambassador to the United States, said; “We went to Iran—and don't forget, it was 
the Persians who invented the game of chess—it took two 18-hour days to get their 
cooperation”775  
Consequently, in October 2009, the notion of a uranium fuel-swap agreement 
between the 5+1 countries (the Security Council plus Germany) and Iran was discussed 
in Vienna. El-Baradei’s proposed solution was to place Iran’s low enriched uranium 
(LEU) in Turkey’s custody in return for the Vienna Group’s supplying Iran with LEU for 
the production of electricity.776 The proposal was welcomed by Turkey, Russia and US. 
In May 2010, Iran too agreed to send its uranium to be enriched in Turkey. Turkey and 
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Brazil, then non-permanent members of the Security Council, negotiated the deal with 
Iran at the same time the Security Council was voting over the sanctions.777 
Afterward, on June 9, 2010, the Resolution 1929, which “determined to give 
effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with 
resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) and with the 
requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive 
technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programs, until such time as the 
Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met.”,778 
was adopted by the UN Security Council. Disappointed by the adoption of the resolution, 
Turkey and Brazil considered new sanctions as detriment to diplomatic negotiations and 
voted against them, but 12 members of the Security Council were concerned enough 
about the proliferation risks posed by Iran and its non-cooperation with the IAEA to vote 
for the sanctions.779 To sum, Turkey wanted to integrate Iran into the international 
system as the most constructive endeavor in achieving global peace.780 
The Balkans policy of Turkey under Davutoglu reflects proactive/preemptive 
policy understanding. According to this policy understanding, Turkey under AKP has 
pursued foreign policy vis-à-vis the Balkans based on three goals; 1) to strengthen 
Turkey’s good relations with traditional Balkan partners; 2) to make openings toward 
countries with which Turkey has had problematic relations; and 3) to undertake the role 
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of a mediator and lead multilateral initiatives, which is aimed to improve regional 
stability.781  
One of the most striking examples of this mediator role in the Balkans is the 
initiative that Davutoglu launched in 2009 to mend the Bosnia-Serbia relations, which 
had been frozen since the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. Turkey initiated trilateral 
consultations, which eventually resulted in success. Thanks to the shuttle diplomacy, the 
Serbian Government passed the resolution to apologize for the Genocide of Srebrenica in 
July 1995782, although the Serbian officials stopped short of calling the killings 
‘genocide’783 Bosnia and Herzegovina later appointed an ambassador to Belgrade, which 
had been vacant before. 
Davutoglu has referred to the Ottoman presence in the Balkans occasionally, 
which reinforces the notion of the neo-Ottoman foreign policy making under AKP. In the 
conference “The Ottoman Legacy and the Balkan Muslim Communities Today” in 
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 16-18, 2009, Davutoglu devotes a great deal 
of his speech on the Ottoman past of the Balkans. Davutoglu said; 
“… the Ottoman history is a history of Balkan region’ it is a history on the central 
character of the Balkan region in world politics. Not only in the political sense, because 
the main trade routes of the time were passing through the Balkans. Thessaloniki, which 
was a small town before, became the center of economic activities in the region. During 
the Ottoman era, Thessaloniki became one of the main centers of international trade 
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activities…Similarly, Belgrade was like a village or a small town in the 14th century. But, 
during the Ottoman period, Belgrade became the central city, pivotal city of Danube and 
Central Europe in the economic and cultural sense. Hundreds of mosques and churches 
were built with lively cultural activities. Sarajevo should be seen as a miracle, like a 
miniature if this heritage. If you understand Sarajevo you can understand the Ottoman 
history…Sarajevo is a prototype of the Ottoman civilization. Sarajevo has been the 
prototype of the Balkan region, and the global rise of the Balkans.”784 
Furthermore, Davutoglu’s frequent visits to the Muslim populated areas of the 
Balkans and certain practices during these visits generated a new foreign policy term; 
‘mosque diplomacy’. During his visit to Kosovo, Davutoglu performed terawih prayer in 
Pristina and Prizren, as well as in the Bosnian city of Mostar, with the local people. In 
Constanta, Romania, he performed a noon prayer at the historic Hunkar Mosque, where 
he also exchanged best wishes for Eid al-Fitr, a Muslim religious holiday, with residents 
of the city. 785 
The mosque diplomacy also involved in the restoration of historical mosques in 
the Balkans. Turkey’s Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet Vakfı) and the Turkish 
Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) performed the restorations. The Fatih 
Sultan Mosque in Pristina, the Sinan Paşa Mosque in Prizren and the Hünkar Mosque in 
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Constanta, Romania, all Ottoman-era mosques, are among the structures restored by 
Turkey. 786  
It is important to note here that the restoration of mosques by the Turkish 
government as a foreign policy practice is not limited to the Balkans. According to the 
Diyanet, Turkey has or is currently involved in mosque projects in the United States, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, 
Palestine, Belorussia, Somalia 787 and Haiti.788 This is definitely something the secular 
Kemalist foreign policy would not have focus on. 
7.8.6 Rhythmic Diplomacy  
 Another aspect of the Davutoglu doctrine is rhythmic diplomacy, which envisages 
using diplomacy “simultaneously and harmoniously” in different fields. This aims at a 
more active role for Turkey through Turkey’s active involvement in all international 
institutions and virtually all global issues.789  
Yesiltas and Balci state that Davutoglu’s rhythmic diplomacy concept harbors 
mobility and harmony. According to this logic, mobility without harmony may lead to 
chaos. Likewise, rhythm without mobility is equally bad for foreign policy as there would 
not be progress.790 
 Davutoglu says; “If we look at the international meetings and organizations it has 
hosted since 2003. The NATO Summit and the OIC Summit are just two examples: clearly 
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Turkey has gained more influence in international organizations. Interesting 
developments in this regard took place in 2007. For instance, Turkey now has an 
observer status in the African Union, a natural result of Turkey’s opening to Africa in 
2005. Turkey has been invited to the Arab League twice, both at the level of foreign 
minister and prime minister. Turkey signed a special agreement with the Arab countries 
during a meeting of Iraq’s neighbors held in Istanbul on November 2, 2007.”791 
One result of the rhythmic diplomacy was that for the first time since 1961, 
Turkey was elected to be a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2009-
2010. Erdogan said; “This is a reflection of our increasing weight in international 
politics and the confidence that the international community has in us (Turkey)” 792  
Furthermore, Turkey assumed the chairmanship-in-office of the South-East 
European Cooperation Process for 2009 and 2010.793 Turkey is a G20 member794, and 
acquired an observer status in the African Union in 2005795, and has a strategic dialogue 
mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council (214) and actively takes part in the Arab 
League. 796 The opening of 15 new embassies and diplomatic representatives in Africa 
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and Latin America was another result of the active diplomacy the AKP government has 
pursued.797 
7.8.7 Soft Power 
One of the most important changes in Turkish foreign policy was the emphasis on 
soft power in international relations by resorting to diplomacy, culture, dialogue, 
cooperation and historical understanding. There is a visible difference between the 
current AKP government, which used democratic tradition, institutions and free market 
economy, and the previous discourse in which military might was heavily used in 
conducting foreign policy.798  
In this regard, the soft power in Turkish politics means that it should take measures 
that do not involve coercion in foreign policy making. William Hale states that the zero 
problem policy with neighbors is a good example of implementation of soft power as it 
means that Turkey abandon the “surrounded by enemies” feeling and was willing to establish 
peaceful relations with the neighbors where it had used military threat in the past.799  Hale 
also states that in this regard, Turkey’s foreign policy resembled that of the EU.800 
In regards to soft power, Davutoglu states; ‘”…the adoption of a new discourse 
and diplomatic style has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region.  
Althought Turkey maintains a powerful military due to its insecure neighborhood, we do 
not make threats.  Instead, Turkish diplomats and politicians have adopted a new 
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language in the regional and international politics that prioritizes Turkey’s civil-economic 
power”. 801 
Tarik Oguzlu mentions about the facilitating factors (internal and external) behind 
the rise of Turkey’s soft power. One of them is the changing nature of the 
civilian/military relations in favor of the former, which removed the pressure of the latter 
in civilian politics. This situation also impacted the PKK problem. The AKP government 
clearly distinguished between the PKK and the Kurds in Turkey facilitated the 
desecuritization process. 802 
The examples of soft power approach in Turkish Foreign Policy are many. One 
striking example is Turkey’s “Africa opening”. In this context Somalia is important. 
Erdogan’s visit to Mogadishu in 2011 was the first of its kind in 20 years where a world 
leader outside Africa visited the country. It was also symbolic that the visit took place in 
the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and Turkey delivered humanitarian aid in excess of 
$200 million worth. Pinar Tank argues that this visit elevated the war torn country to a 
world agenda.803 
Most of the state aids are dispersed through the Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency (TIKA), established in 1992. In 2011 the office also donated $93.4 
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in humanitarian relief to Somalia. Somalia became the largest receiver of Turkish foreign 
aid in Africa. 804 
According to Mahmut Ozhan, Turkey’s involvement in Africa and especially in 
Somalia is a “novelty” and one of the “firsts” in foreign policy. For the first time, Turkey 
initiated a strategy of state building805 in a continent where it had not had experience in 
such an area.  Another “first” was that the Turkish governemtn cooperated with Turkish 
NGOs in the Somalian state building.  Ozkan also argues that Turkey’s active 
engagement in Somalia is a reflection of its great interest in the future of Somalia, in 
particular, and in that of the continent, generally. 806 
The TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), has undertaken 
extensive agricultural and infrastructure projects in Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda 
and Uganda. The Improving Quality Potato Production project in Comoros Islands and 
the national agricultural master plan for Djibouti are examples of such projects.807 TIKA 
has currently 11 offices in Africa. (Egypt, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, 
Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia)808  
Turkey was the first country to successfully finish the promised housing projects 
in the hard hit Aceh, Indonesia in which about 1050 houses, three schools and a hospital 
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were built.809 Turkey extended help to flood stricken parts of Pakistan where it engaged 
in house and school projects.810  Turkey evacuated its citizens from Libya in 2011 using 
the navy, which according to Oya Akgonenc, was an example to using hard power means 
to achieve soft power goals.811 The most striking example of using hard power means to 
achieve soft power goals was when the Turkish Navy set out on a three-month, 28 
country circumnavigation of Africa, which was the first in 148 years that Turkish ships 
rounded the Cape of Good Hope.812 On its tour, for example, the Turkish Navy task force 
handed 4500 tons of food in Namibia for distribution to drought affected areas, 80 
wheelchairs for children as well 300 school bags with stationery.813All of these represent 
the humanitarian and constructive outreach aspects of Ankara’s soft-power diplomacy. 
7.9 Conclusion 
The advent of the Justice and Development Party to power and its three 
successive electoral victories that have kept the party at the top of governance has had 
important social and political implications for the country. First of all, it became evident 
that the social fabric of Turkey has changed such that it allowed for a party with pro-
Islamic and conservative backgrounds to stay in power this long and grow effective in the 
country’s administration. Another important aspect of the AKP rule is its profound 
impact on the civilian-military relations. With the overwhelming parliamentary 
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dominance and the popular support coupled with the zealous pursuit of the European 
Union reforms and using it as an instrument, the AKP was able to ward off the 
dominance of the secular military. The Kurdish opening also resulted in the de-
securitization of the PKK conflict. The AKP is now able to effectively control the state 
bureaucracy as well as the institutions, including the higher education and judiciary that 
once were the bastions of the Kemalist ideology.  
Also a contributing factor was the purge of high ranking officers through a series 
of court trials, which intimidated and deterred any kind of future anti-government move 
from the higher echelon of the military. 
The removal of the Kemalist tutelage manifested itself in certain ways. One 
remarkable example is “the Kurdish Opening”, a democratic initiative that was 
introduced by Erdogan in 2005, to end the PKK violence and restore the state authority in 
south east Turkey by improving the rights of the Kurds of Turkey. The government has 
moved so far as to hold secret negotiations with the PKK in Oslo in order to find a non-
military solution to the problem. Such a move would not have been possible with the 
Turkish military, which advocated a full armed solution to the problem, still in power. 
The reforms that the AKP undertook literally aimed at erasing the militant aspect 
of Kemalism from all aspects of life in Turkey. The national security classes that 
promoted the supremacy of the military and that once were mandatory in high schools 
were abolished. The military parades and student procession that are reminiscence of 
former Communist countries are now anostalgia. These would have been unthinkable for 




The waning influence of the Kemalist bureaucracy and the military has had 
implications on the foreign policy. The Davutoglu Doctrine that stipulated an ambitious 
pro-active, multi-dimensional and identity based foreign policy would not have been 
easily implemented with the Kemalist bureaucracy and the military tutelage still in effect. 
For example, the thawing relations with Armenia, rapprochement with Greece and the 
political steps towards the solution of the Cyprus problem. Rather than insisting on the 
existing status quo, attempts to nurture close relations with Muslim world, especially with 
Iran, Syria, the Gulf countries and the Hamas Government would not have been possible 
if the Kemalist military, which had always advocated a security oriented and secular 
foreign policy, was still in charge of foreign affairs. When, for example, Erbakan wanted 
to severe ties with Israel, he was met with strong opposition from the generals so much so 
that he felt compelled to accept the prescription for Turkish-Israeli relations determined 
by the military. However, Erdogan did not hesitate to fry the Turkish-Israeli relations in 
2009 after Israel’s Gaza operation. This showed that the civilian government now is in 
full charge of foreign affairs.  
I should note that my analysis of foreign policy practices is limited up to 2011. 
After that date the Arab Spring and the subsequent uprisings has dealt a blow on 
Davutoglu’s zero-problem policy as well as the overall neo-Ottomanist approach to the 
Middle East.  
Goals and priorities of the AKP Foreign Policy 
• Making Turkey a regional as well as a global power (Neo-Ottomanism) 
• Pro-active/preemptive  
• Complimentary foreign policy (Multidimensional/Pro-Western, Euroasianist as 
well as Third Worldist) 
• The zero problem policy with neighbors 
• Soft Power 




Instruments of the AKP Foreign Policy 
• The Executive Branch (The Presidency) 
• Head of Government (The Prime minister) 
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 


































CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 
“Is Turkey leaving its traditional westward foreign policy direction in favor of the 
east under the AKP government, creating a paradigm shift?” The answer is Turkey is not 
leaving the west but the country has experienced an ideological paradigm shift under the 
AKP administration; the Kemalist paradigm being replaced by the neo-Ottomanist one.  
In order to explain the paradigm shift phenomena in Turkey, this dissertation 
compared between the ideological content, institutionalization, the elite formation of the 
two competing paradigms; Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism, applying the policy 
paradigms theory. 
The in-depth examination of the Kemalist ideology yielded that Mustafa Kemal 
was inadvertently influenced by the political realities of the time. According to this, the 
every trace of the Ottoman was to be completely removed from the public sphere as well 
as the state for a clean slate in an attempt to form of the new republic. This made the new 
republic a complete anti-thesis of the Ottoman Empire, which was Islamic and multi-
cultural. This prompted the adoption and strict top-down implementation of secularism 
and mono-ethnic nationalism, which alienated most Kurds and pious Muslims, creating 
resentment towards the Kemalist state. This would later result in the onset of movements, 
such as Erbakan’s pro-Islamic National View and the PKK Kurdish violence against the 
state.  
The foreign policy, too, was an extension of domestic affairs. The flimsy creation 




building prompted M. Kemal to adopt a more cautious, reactive, stagnant foreign policy, 
which became a norm for the foreign policy makers after his death. Additionally, the 
legacy of the war of independence, which was fought against multiple invading forces, 
created a trauma in the minds of the Kemalist elite. The Sevres Syndrome and the 
“surrounded-by-enemies” feeling led to the introvert, suspicious as well as security 
oriented nature of the Kemalist foreign policy understanding.  
The creation and institutionalization of the new Kemalist elite was in conjunction 
with the domestic and foreign state of the time. The hard earned territories could only be 
held in hand via top-down, autocratic regime that dictates its citizens the novice elements 
of the Kemalist revolution. The Kemalist elite (the core) took full control of the 
institutions and bureaucracy of the state, pursuing an exclusionist policy towards those 
citizens who think outside the Kemalist ideology. According to this, those Kurds and 
pious Muslims as well as rural Anatolia (the periphery) were excluded from participation 
in state affairs, their upward social mobilization was prevented and if necessary they were 
punished.  The first blow to this elitism came when Adnan Menderes, who identified 
himself as pro-Islam and his Democrat Party, won the 1950 elections with a landslide.  It 
is this point that the representative of the Kemalist elite, People’s Republican Party (PRP) 
was proven to be ineffective to stop the rise of the periphery through democratic means 
and their sharing of the authority, to which PRP felt fully entitled. This brought the 
forceful means to the scene, thus the Turkish military. The tutelage of the Turkish Armed 
Forces officially began with the 1960 coup, in which the generals forcefully removed the 
elected representatives and executed Menderes. The elite reinforced its grip on the state 




ministry bureaucracy as well as the military made sure the Kemalists principles were 
adamantly pursued abroad. 
The rising treat of Communism in 1970s and ensuing political and social turmoil 
compelled the Turkish military to step in and seized the power in an attempt to restore the 
Kemalist principles of the state that had “eroded” in the last decade. The military decided 
to counter the threat of Communism by loosening the secular principles. This opened up 
the way to the rise of Ozal, who was known to be a devout Muslim. Ozal represented the 
periphery. His liberal political and economic reforms, which irked the Kemalist circles, 
paved the way for the periphery to gradually rise to prominence. Now, the periphery was 
closer to the core, even intermingled in certain aspects of life, which increased the 
friction between the two camps. For example, as more and more head scarf wearing girls 
wanted to have university education, the more the Kemalist status quo asserted the 
secular principles through the Higher Education Council, which had banned the headscarf 
on campuses. 
Ozal’s foreign policy understanding was such that he openly criticized the 
existing status quo, bureaucracy and institutions of Kemalism for being too timid, 
cautious. Certainly, the end of Cold War helped him to decide to maneuver liberally in 
the near abroad and he succeeded to some extend by, for example, initiating the Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation and an active diplomacy. However, he was constrained by the 
Kemalist institutions, namely military and the foreign policy bureaucracy, which he 
criticized for being timid and passive. Between 1983 and 1993, Ozal, especially in his 
presidency (1989-1993) brought an unprecedented activism to the Turkish foreign policy 
but his unexpected death in 1993 threw Turkey back to its stagnant position, as the flimsy 




the changing international system due to the waning Soviet influence and subsequent 
collapse of the Berlin Wall greatly enabled Ozal to implement ambitious foreign policy 
goals especially towards the Central Asia and the Caucasus.  
1990s also witnessed the rise of the influence of the military. With the Cold War 
is over and the separatist PKK terrorism raging, the military asserted itself more than 
ever. The epitome of the core vs. the periphery confrontation came when Erbakan, who 
was an overt Islamist, anti-Western and anti-Zionist, became the prime minister in 1996. 
He was the first ever prime minister, who openly supported the advent of Islamic rule in 
Turkey. To some, this marked the triumph of political Islam. However, pro-Islamic 
agenda Erbakan pursued at home and abroad had the Turkish military flex its muscles 
and Erbakan was forced to resign. The inability of the political Islam to win over the 
strong Kemalist military taught some members of Erbakan’s Welfare Party, who later 
founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP), that conformity with the system was 
the only viable way to success.  
The 2002 elections granted the AKP an opportunity to form a single party 
government, which meant an outstanding legislative power in the Turkish parliament. In 
order to eliminate the clout of the Kemalist institutions and bureaucracy, especially the 
military, the AKP implemented policy of de-militarization in governance by aggressively 
adopting the EU reforms. While the military and the Kemalists attempt to undermine the 
AKP government through covert means and coup attempts they were never materialized. 
As a result of a series of court trials, those military officers, who plotted coup against the 
government, prosecuted in an unprecedented wave of arrests. The AKP government also 




Judges and Prosecutors, the Council of Higher Education, the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs, which had been part of the Kemalist state machinery.   
The rise of Menderes, Ozal and Erbakan to power before the AKP government 
was clearly an indication of serious attempts to puncture the Kemalist hegemony but 
since the institutional and bureaucratic makeup of the existing status quo (the Kemalism) 
was too strong, they failed to attain their goals. Therefore, their attempts to reorient the 
policy goals and priorities of the policies of Kemalism did not amount to a complete shift 
or replacement of the Kemalist paradigm. However, it can be said that their trials and 
errors heralded the AKP success. With the relative power advantage vested by the single 
party rule and staunch pursuit of the EU reforms in the name of civilianization of politics 
in Turkey, it is the AKP government, which has been able to gradually eliminate the 
institutional and bureaucratic resistance of the Kemalist elite, particularly the military. 
For example, one result of the deterioration of the Turkish-Israeli relations after the 2008-
2009 Israeli-Gaza Conflict was that Turkey, under AKP government, barred Israel from 
participating in the Anatolian Eagle air force exercise in 2009 also freezing arms deals 
with Israel. In the same situation, it would be expected that the Erbakan government 
would not have had enough clout over the military, which had close relations with Israel, 
to do the same. This proves how the AKP government has been able to subdue the 
Kemalist aspect of the Turkish military. However, the data shows that political 
deterioration in relations with Israel did not reflect on trade relations between Turkey and 
Israel. 
The examination of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government showed 
that replacing the Kemalist foreign policy priorities with those of neo-Ottoman did not 




the western bloc while also increasing its relations with the West. This can be called as 
“diversification of foreign policy options”. For example, although it began formal 
membership negotiations with the EU in 2006, the next year, Turkey expressed its 
intention to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is 
considered to be an alternative to EU. 
Between 2003 and 2011, the Turkish foreign policy experienced an 
unprecedented activism. One of the most striking characteristics of the proactive Turkish 
foreign policy during this time was that it carried the neo-Ottomanist features. For 
example, as opposed to the traditional Kemalist understanding of foreign policy that 
advocates the preservation of the status quo, the neo-Ottoman ideology prompted the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Ahmet Davutoglu to engage with Cyprus and Armenia, 
which were considered taboo. Strikingly, the AKP government eliminated Rauf Denktas, 
who supported an independent Turkish republic in the north, and promoted a united 
Cyprus, which to most Kemalists and nationalist was “treachery”. Likewise, the bold step 
came when Turkey and Armenia decided to establish political communication, although 
this was to some extent dictated by the United States. 
The extent of activism in Turkish foreign policy went far beyond the traditional 
limits of Turkey and extended as far as Latin America and Africa. This manifested itself 
with the rapid proliferation of consular entities in the aforementioned continents. As 
foreign policy instrument, under the AKP government the soft power concept replaced 
the more security oriented Kemalist view, which brought pro-active and preemptive 
involvement of foreign issues. One such remarkable example was the attempt to reach a 
political resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue, pioneered by Turkey and Brazil. 




The common denominator, Islam, was the driving force in Davutoglu’s shuttle diplomacy 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The term “Mosque Diplomacy” was also 
used to define Turkey’s willingness to reach to the Muslims of the Balkans. Certainly, the 
identity based diplomacy, be it Islam or Turkishness, is a major departure from the 
Kemalist tenets of the traditional Turkish foreign policy. 
The comparison between the Ozal and Erbakan showed that while both 
policymakers pursued neo-Otomanist foreign policy, they differed in their interpretation 
of identity politics. They both recognized Islam as a common denominator but they again 
differed in how they perceive Islam. While Erbakan focused on a more third wordlist 
Islamic foreign policy, Ozal’s focus was mostly the newly independent Muslim-Turkic 
former Communist/Socialist countries in the Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. 
The AKP era foreign policy can be a combination of both Ozal and Erbakan, thus more 
encompassing and comprehensive.   
In sum, while Menderes, Ozal and Erbakan challenged the status quo in foreign 
policy, by pursuing exceptionally active policies abroad, they failed to completely 
overcome the Kemalist institutions and their bureaucracy and create a shift in the 
paradigm. The chart below compares the periods of governments that are included in this 
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Applying the Theory 
 
The policymaking process can be 
structured by a particular set of 
ideas, just as it can be structured by 
a set of institutions. The two often 
reinforce each other since the 
routines of policymaking are 
usually designed to reflect a 
particular set of ideas about what 
can and should be done in a sphere 
of policy.814      
The Kemalist elite utilized the Kemalist ideology in 
order to create a paradigm. While before the advent of 
multi-party system it was the People’s Republican Party 
(PRP) that represented the Kemalist ideology as well as 
supervised its application in the state and over masses, 
after the 1960 coup, the military became the spearhead 
of the Kemalist ideology, protecting it from the 
perceived internal and external threats. Besides the 
Military, the other Kemalist Institutions such as the 
Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors and the 
Council of Higher Educations, in cooperation with each 
other, served to uphold the Kemalist principles.   
One of the most important 
explanatory variables is the ideas 
due to the fact that policy change is 
typically highly constrained 
because the ideas that support the 
status quo remain extremely 
powerful. However, in the presence 
of paradigmatic shifts the policies 
themselves can be transformed, 
creating a new equilibrium and a 
severe break from the past.815   
Ozal and Erbakan were highly constrained to change the 
policy paradigm/staus quo (the Kemalism) because the 
reinforcing symbiotic relationship between the Kemalist 
institutions/bureaucracy and the ideology rendered it 
difficult to alter the prevalent paradigm until the 
beginning of the AKP era. 
The movement from one paradigm 
to another that characterizes third 
order change is likely to involve the 
accumulation of anomalies, 
experimentation with new forms of 
policy, and policy failures that 
precipitate a shift in the locus of 
authority over policy and initiate a 
wider contest between competing 
paradigms.816  
Due to its exclusionist nature (especially the pious 
Muslims and Kurds) the Kemalist top-down revolution 
failed to embrace a wide portion of the Turks, which led 
to the emergence and the rise of the “periphery”. This 
“anomaly” for the Kemalist paradigm culminated in the 
emergence of political movements and actors like Ozal 
and Erbakan, who experimented with new form of 
policy (neo-Ottomanism) albeit failed due to the potency 
of the existing status-quo. However, for the Kemalist 
policy realm, the growing anomaly precipitated in the 
formation of the AKP government.   
Third-order change entails 
simultaneous changes in 
instrument settings, instruments 
themselves, and the rearrangement 
of policy goals.817  
As seen in Chapter 7, the AKP took over the Kemalist 
institutions/bureaucracy one by one in order to 
implement its own agenda. At the same time the AKP’s 
manifested policy goal, neo-Ottomanism, is a through 
discrediting of the Kemalist ideology. For example, the 
neo-Ottomanism in foreign policy promotes soft-power 
as an instrument unlike Kemalism, which is security 
oriented and hard power is paramount. 
“…the actions constituting The process that culminated in the replacement of the 
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paradigm shift cannot be pinned 
down to a single moment in time 
and that should be considered as a 
phrase in a broader process of 
change.”818  
Kemalist paradigm with that of neo-Ottomanism by the 
AKP can be said to have started all the way back to 
early 1950s, by which time the Menderes Government 
began to take aim at the Kemalist ideology and 
institutions. Although, failed, this process continued in 
the decades to come. Ozal and Erbakan challenged the 
tenets of Kemalism during their tenure. 
“…an idea’s time arrives not 
simply because the idea is 
compelling on its own terms, but 
because opportune political 
circumstances favor it. At those 
moments when a political idea finds 
persuasive expression among actors 
whose institutional position gives 
them both the motive and the 
opportunity to translate it into 
policy-then, and only then, can we 
say that an idea has found a time.” 
819  
Ozal and Erbakan could not fully go against the 
Kemalist establishment because they lacked opportune 
political circumstances. The institutions of the Kemalist 
establishment were simply too powerful to overcome for 
the two. The AKP, however, was able to translate its 
ideology into policy when the right time came after the 
government was able to subdue the Turkish military and 
the other Kemalist institutions. 
“Replacing an earlier elite to 
institutionalize the new paradigm 
may occur relying on force, as in 
coup d'état or violent revolution, 
through democratic process, such 
as elections or nominations, 
societal negotiation, or 
generational cohort shift. A new 
group or coalition with a new 
paradigm or model of institutional 
arrangements appears on the scene 
and assumes a position of power, 
enabling it to bring about a 
substantial shift in the institutional 
paradigm and arrangements.820  
No sooner did the AKP acquire the required power to 
silence the Kemalist institutions and bureaucracy, the 
Kemalist upper echelon in those institutions were 
replaced by those who are pro-AKP. For example, the 
AKP was able to exert enough influence at the National 
Security Council to get pro-government officers to 
become the Chief of Staff of the Turkish armed forces. 
This replacement process occurred, as Carson suggests, 
through democratic elections that conslolidated the 
power of the AKP. 
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